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Abstract of the thesis 
The aim of my thesis is twofold. First, I focus on the controversies arising from the 
renegotiations of patienthood and citizenship entailed in what I call ‘empowerment-based 
reforms’ (EBRs). What I define as EBRs will have in fact different implications for the various 
stakeholders involved in their development and implementation. Empowered citizens within 
EBRs will have access to (and will be required to manage) an unprecedented amount of 
information regarding their health conditions. Factors such as genetic and biological makeup, 
life-style behaviours and environmental exposures will be increasingly used (by both citizens 
and professionals) to identify treatment options, to target developing diseases, and to adopt 
preventive measures for future illnesses. Among the effects that this personalising vision of 
healthcare is likely to foster, it is thus worth emphasizing how the nature and scope of 
individual responsibility for health will be affected by this paradigm shift, and how this future 
scenario can be made an ethically desirable one. In my thesis, I therefore identify the range of 
normative exercises entailed in EBRs, and I present a normative analysis of empowerment 
aiming at highlighting the distinctive ethical aspects of this approach. 
Second, the goal of my thesis is to explore how the normative theorization of 
empowerment proposed above can accommodate one of the most pressing societal 
implications of epigenomics. Namely, its burdening of individual responsibility for health. On 
the one hand, I argue that novel approaches to prevention, diagnosis and treatment brought 
about by epigenomics are a fundamental tenet of the personalization project at the basis of 
what I call EBRs. In this respect, epigenome-based healthcare is thus likely to foster 
controversies similar to other epistemic endeavours of personalized medicine (e.g. genomics, 
metabolomics, pharmacogenomics), which can be addressed from the normative premises of 
empowerment. On the other, I maintain that concerns arising from the translation of 
epigenomics into healthcare practice should be poised with its promise to make increasingly 
visible the ‘contextual nature’ of health (i.e. tracing the mechanistic interaction between 
lifestyle, living conditions and individual health). Rather than limiting societal appraisal of 
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epigenomics to the danger of burdening individual responsibility for health, I argue that 
epigenetic knowledge may become pivotal in fleshing out social and environmental influences 
inherently affecting individual health. Sufficiently valid, reliable and actionable epigenetic 
knowledge may in fact orient individual choice across the spectrum of environmental and 
lifestyle exposures determining health, thus championing epigenomics with the potential of 
serving the empowering aims fleshed out throughout this work. 
The road connecting the constitution of an empowered citizenship in healthcare, and 
the societal appraisal of epigenomics can be regarded as a two-way road. There is in fact a 
possibility that empowerment and epigenomics may respectively shape their normative and 
epistemic dimensions in the future of healthcare. It is thus towards the identification of the 
possible challenges and opportunities that this synergy may bring about that the theoretical 
attention of this work is devoted. 
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 How could anything originate out of its opposite? […] 
[I]t might be even possible that what constitute the value 
of these good and revered things is precisely that they are 
insidiously related, tied to, and involved with these 
wicked, seemingly opposite things – maybe even one with 
them in essence. Maybe! 
(F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §2) 
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Introduction 
 
Contemporary biomedicine is widely regarded as heralding a number of revolutions. The 
advancements of the life sciences disrupt the boundaries between basic biology and medicine. 
Revolutionary (bio)technologies promise the development of a unifying molecular language, 
under which investigating one’s biological make-up is increasingly indistinguishable from its 
direct application in the understanding, classification and management of many health 
conditions (Nowotny and Testa 2011). This change of perspective in medicine, I shall say, is 
the first epistemological revolution of modern biomedicine, where the understanding of the body 
and its illness get embedded in the style of thought of molecular biologists (Hacking 1992). 
From the rise of reproductive biotechnologies, to genetic testing, stem-cell therapies and the 
emergence of ICT-based tools for genome-wide analysis, the dynamic development of 
molecular discoveries opens up new perspectives over for the comprehensive management of 
health conditions. Rather than being enmeshed with the scale of tissues, organs and organ 
systems, medicine is increasingly imbued with a molecular topography of genes, alleles, 
proteins and epi-genes – to name a few – that shapes medical judgement and intervention. In 
doing so, this epistemological revolution also fuels the assemblage of novel technological 
platforms for more personalised, molecular and effective care (Garraway and Lander 2013). 
This is a second revolutionary thread in modern biomedicine, which emphasizes the 
technological drive required for the accomplishment of the epistemic aims of molecular 
medicine outlined above. From the strive to reduce sequencing costs and to optimize bio-
computational analysis of whole-genome data, to the search for cell-reprogramming 
standardization and marketability, the first two revolutions (i.e. the epistemological and the 
technological) intermingle one with another, and mutually support the achievement of their 
respective goals (Keating and Cambrosio 2003).   
By no means, however, the molecular and digital leap forward in medicine can be 
considered as a solely epistemological and technological one. Rather, molecular medical 
technologies are also technologies of life – of how we make sense of it. This ontological, third 
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revolution points to the reconfiguration of the vital process itself, which happens in the 
unravelling of the molecular knowledge and its applications. The technical and the 
epistemological reconfigure our identity as human beings, they turn what was previously 
regarded as the natural working of the genetic code – the intangible code of life – into the 
possibility of changing and improving it (Harris 2007). This new alignment of intersecting 
technologies and biological understandings goes as far as putting into the remit of human 
agency, according to some authors, the freedom to intervene on and modify its own nature 
(Habermas 2003). This means that this change of perspective in the understanding of what we 
are “by nature” triggers also a fourth strand of revolutionary thinking. Advanced technological 
biomedicine challenges the political and moral categories governing the outset of the twenty-
first century (Rose 2007). In configuring a sophisticated diagnostic and therapeutic repertoire 
of gene sequences, cell lines and big data, medicine demands a renegotiation of individual, 
community and state roles in realizing the future of individualized and personal care become 
reality. Biological notions of patienthood become pivotal in activating citizenship projects, 
whereby the demand to plunge into the molecular roots of ‘our own diseases’ becomes an 
imperative to participate to governmental regimes of medicine (Rose and Novas 2004). A new 
morality of active and informed patient citizenship emerges from the need to act responsibly 
upon the wealth of knowledge of molecular medicine, and calls for the development of 
political techniques that can empower individual agency to maximise its potential benefits. 
  In a nutshell, the multiple ways in which all of these different revolutions (i.e. 
epistemological, technological, ontological and political) intermingle constitute what has been 
called a new molecular biopolitics (Rose 2007). Or, if we wanted to be cautious about historical 
claims, these molecular revolutions most likely build upon and stem from the past 
developments of biopolitical regimes (Foucault 1973). The interrelation between these four 
“revolutions” leverages in fact past renegotiations of concepts such as medicine, biology, 
reproduction, care, risk, patient, healthy individual, citizen (and many others) to recast them 
under the mutations occurring in the age of ‘omics technologies and the personalization of 
medicine (Chadwick 2013).  
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In this thesis, I do not map the various interactions among ontological, 
epistemological, technological and political domains of contemporary biopolitics. Rather, I 
focus and isolate the challenges attached to two of the technologies underlying its innovation: 
namely, the political discourse of empowerment in contemporary healthcare policy-making, and 
the biomedical platform of epigenomics in the rise of personalised medicine. In sacrificing the 
breadth of approaching the molecular biopolitics in the entirety of its intertwined dimensions, 
I hope my analysis gains depth on the respective challenges raised by these two endeavours, 
and on the potential reinforcement we can envisage between them. 
 The reasons to focus specifically on empowerment and epigenomics are in fact 
manifold. First, the concept of empowerment plays a pivotal role in political discourses of 
healthcare reforms (Colombo et al. 2012). Empowerment strategies are widely regarded as a 
suitable framework to accomplish the goals of contemporary personalised biomedicine 
(European Science Foundation 2012). The promise of empowerment in activating the 
citizenship project of responsibility to act upon (and be liable for not doing so) the richness of 
information provided by molecular biotechnologies for health can, in other words, deliver the 
shift from consent to choice envisaged by the biopolitical regime of the twenty-first century. 
However, the language of empowerment is an extremely controversial one. Besides lacking 
definitional precision, which represents for some scholars a good reason for avoiding the use 
of this term (Salmon and Hall 2004), the discourse of empowerment fosters several ethical 
controversies that deserve careful analytical scrutiny. As shown in Part 1 of the thesis, what 
needs to be clarified is whether empowering citizens has an intrinsic value (e.g. it is the right 
thing to do for reasons of democracy, freedom and justice), an instrumental value (e.g. allows 
policy choices to be coproduced with publics in ways that authentically embody diverse health 
outcomes, values and meanings), or is animated just by economic motivations (e.g. it fosters 
social responsibilities for the management and improvement of health with consequent 
reduction of national health costs).  
Second, the discourse of epigenomics is a promising and emerging field of inquiry in 
contemporary biomedicine. Studying the epigenetic roots of health and disease is expected to 
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bring into the vision of personalised medicine the missing piece in the aetiological puzzle of 
most common diseases (Mill and Heijmans 2013). The language of epigenomics shows, 
measures, and (promises to) make(s) sense of the plastic responses of our genome to its 
environment broadly conceived (from lifestyles, to occupational exposures, pollution, parental 
care, etc.). In doing so, epigenomics shows how transient and dynamic the interplay between 
genes and experience, biology and biography is. And consequently, it evokes an imaginary of 
reversibility and responsibility to safeguard one’s epigenome. The genome becomes, through 
the rise of epigenomics, an eminently malleable developmental resource (Moss 2004), 
damaged and protected by individual agency (Meloni and Testa 2014). These visions and 
expectations fostered by epigenetic knowledge are beginning to circulate in society, though 
they have only just begun to be investigated in their implications (Landecker and Panofsky 
2013). The societal aspects of epigenomics are still a widely uncharted territory (Rothstein 
2013), and demand a thorough philosophical and sociological appraisal to which Part 2 of this 
thesis is dedicated. 
But there is more than the need of both scrutinizing the unwanted consequences of 
empowerment, and anticipating the emerging societal challenges of epigenomics, at the basis 
of the focus of this thesis. What will be (hopefully) clear at the end of this work is that the two 
trajectories of empowerment and epigenomics can mutually reinforce and forge their 
importance in the biopolitics of the twenty-first century (Rose 2007). The paradigm-shift in 
the understanding of the social and biological roots of health and disease outlined by 
epigenomics may in fact help accomplish the empowering social program I defend throughout 
this work. Different scholars have already emphasized how epigenomics intersects with 
research on and regulation of our social life (Dupras et al. 2012, Landecker and Panofsky 
2013). To this recognition, my thesis adds that valid, reliable and actionable epigenetic 
knowledge may provide comprehensive information on the limitations of one’s power to (i) 
remedy to health problems, and (ii) resist to the effects of powerful social determinants of 
health over material and societal injustices (Marmot and Wilkinson 2003, World Health 
Organization 2013). This is, in essence, the empowering step in the social trajectory of 
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epigenomics envisaged and problematized by my thesis, which constitutes also a cogent 
reason to focus on empowerment and epigenomics together. 
Building upon these premises, Part 1 of this work focuses on an ethical scrutiny of the 
discourse of empowerment in recent healthcare policy-making. Chapter 1 starts from a 
historical analysis of what I call EBRs in recent policy-making literature (see infra Chapter 1). 
Here, I note how a “new wave” of empowerment in healthcare policy and reforms has 
produced a shift in the substantive foundations of empowerment. The emancipatory discourse 
of control and liberation from social oppression traditionally associated to the concept (Freire 
1972, Tengland 2008) has recently become a discourse allegedly aimed at a renegotiation of 
power relationships in healthcare through devolutions of responsibility for health. Moving on 
from this descriptive analysis, I then argue that this paradigm-shift in the values at the basis of 
empowerment is likely to generate some ethical controversies. In particular, I discuss issues 
related to paternalism in EBRs (see infra Chapter 2), to what I call the ‘charge of healthism’ (see 
infra Chapter 3), and to the potential unwanted consequences of different evaluations of 
responsibility within this context (see infra Chapter 4). Finally, I also address the methodological 
issue of how to import the distinctive ethical aspects of empowerment emerging from my 
analysis in the construction of valid instruments for the evaluation of its effectiveness (see infra 
Chapter 5). 
Part 2 of the thesis explores instead the contribution of epigenomics to the political 
project of personalised medicine. Accordingly, I start from a review (see infra Chapter 6) of 
the impact of epigenetic science on the understanding, management and treatment of three 
common disease areas (i.e. cardiovascular diseases, neuropsychiatric disorders, and cancer). 
The flip side of the monumental shift in the understanding of the plasticity of both disease 
aetiology and health outcomes promised by epigenomics, I argue, is the creation of an 
imaginary of individual and collective responsibilities to protect one’s epigenome and 
consequently one’s health (Hedlund 2012, Chadwick and O’Connor 2013). Building upon this 
recognition, I finally problematize in Chapter 7 the emerging notion of ‘epigenetic 
responsibility’ from two main perspectives. On the one hand, I show how the normative 
	   16 
understanding of empowerment proposed in Part 1 could accommodate the burdening of 
individual responsibility for health attached to the societal impact of epigenomics (Hedlund 
2012, Chadwick and O’Connor 2013). On the other, I also turn to the potential synergies 
between my theorization of empowerment and the promises of epigenomics, which could 
indeed render the emerging style of thought of epigenomic medicine a genuine empowering 
technology.  
This thesis may, in the end, solve none of the current political and social struggles 
attached both to epigenomics and empowerment. Yet, I hope the analysis I present may clear 
up the ideas of those who are willing to delve into the liberatory potential of intersecting these 
two thought-provoking endeavours.	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Chapter 1. Empowerment-based reforms (EBRs): a “new wave” 
of empowerment thinking 
Introduction 
Contemporary healthcare-policy making in Europe1 is largely dominated by what has been 
announced as “the patient revolution” (Richards et al. 2013). An increasing emphasis is 
currently being put on the necessity to open-up the practice of medicine to patient perspective 
and involvement, both with regard to primary healthcare services (Barranco Morris and 
Morris 2008, Entwistle and Watt 2013), and the public health perspective (Cribb 2005). Within 
this broader political discourse, a central role is played by the notion of empowerment. 
Frequently, this term heralds the promise of a holistic, individualized, and participatory vision 
of medicine (Fackler and McGuire 2010) that will allegedly guide the future of medicine. 
Resorting to the empowerment strategies in the context of policy-making is regarded as an 
ethical panacea, fostering a renegotiation of power relationships within the healthcare system 
that opens up healthcare governance to the perspective of non-experts (Colombo et al. 2012). 
Throughout this work, I will label all policy documents that argue for a putative empowering 
shift in healthcare “Empowerment-based Reforms” (henceforth EBRs).  
As we will see, many examples of EBRs can be found in the European context both at 
the level of national and supra-national policy-making. Starting from this documentary 
evidence, the aim of this chapter is to scrutinize different historically situated sociotechnical 
imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim 2009, Jasanoff and Kim 2013) created by EBRs, and to identify 
the ethical tensions generated by their uncritical acceptance of empowerment as a flagship 
value for future healthcare. I take the notion of socio-technical imaginary to describe how 
different EBRs envisage a future for national and/or supra-national healthcare systems, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As shown by the discourse analysis of policy documents constituting the core aim of this chapter, what 
Richards and colleagues (2013) call “the patient revolution” mostly applies to the European context. This means 
that my scrutiny of Empowerment-based reforms is not meant to convey any claim as to the ethical 
controversies arising from similar healthcare reform strategies outside the European context. Rather, I am fully 
aware that the ethical framework developed through this thesis may not be able to capture the specificities of 
local contexts outside Europe, thus rendering it unsuitable for policy formulation at the global level (Mackintosh 
and Koivusalo 2005). 
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not only constitutes a vision of a number of achievable social benefits, but also produces a 
number of goals, meanings, norms and interpretations of the roles that actors should play for 
their attainment. As we will see in the remaining of this chapter, all EBRs imagine different 
renegotiations of power between the system and the clients2, the professional and the patient, 
and compel each of these actors to subscribe to a new meaning and value assigned to their 
contribution to the success of EBRs. 
Accordingly, the first section of this chapter will focus on the different conceptions of 
empowerment that are endorsed – and prospectively enforced – by numerous examples of 
EBRs (World Health Organization 1978, 1986, Great Britain 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005, 2008, 
2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e, European Commission 2007, 2011, 2013, European 
Science Foundation 2012). Ranging from reform proposals of national healthcare systems, to 
disease-based healthcare policies and long-term visions for the future of healthcare, all of 
EBRs share the intent of yielding new relationships between healthcare systems and citizens. 
Specifically, I highlight how empowering structures and empowered agencies EBRs envisage 
have profoundly changed in their historical development. With regard to this, I identify one 
striking difference between current uses of empowerment and its original “outbreak”. Namely 
that, in the last decade, the focus of the approach has shifted from the community-based and 
emancipatory goals of its original proponents (Freire 1972, Tengland 2008), towards an 
emphasis put on individual responsibility for health. It is this paradigm shift, I argue, that has 
recently associated the concept with a bipartisan (Perkins 1995), neo-liberal and consumerist 
view of healthcare agency (McGregor 2001, Veitch 2010).  
The second section argues instead that the tensions between the early empowerment 
discourse and its consumerist “new wave” is at the basis of the scepticism currently 
surrounding empowerment in healthcare policy-making (Covolo et al. 2012, Woodall et al. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Throughout this work, I will be using the formulas ‘healthcare client’, or ‘client’ to signify no more than the 
kind of individuals who make use of healthcare services without necessarily having been diagnosed for any 
condition. A client is to me an individual who seeks the advice of her physician, or other qualified healthcare 
professionals, without experiencing any particular symptom or distress. This is, to my view, what distinguishes a 
‘client’ from a ‘patient’. Paradigmatically, a client is an individual who undergoes genetic susceptibility testing, and 
identifies health-related risks that can be ameliorated through lifestyle. I am well aware that the term may be 
charged with a consumerist interpretation of the role of citizens in medicine (Harvey 2010). Yet, my use of the 
term does not necessarily intend to comply with this interpretation.  
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2012, Christens 2013). In addition, I also show how the distinct notions of empowerment at 
the basis of EBRs, which envisage different renegotiations of power relationships among 
healthcare actors (Veitch 2010), can generate some ethical tensions in their implementation. 
Starting from this recognition, I identify three fundamental substantive domains of 
controversy within the political project of EBRs. I show that the concept of empowerment, 
within this context, may generate ethical concerns because of its commitment to (i) a 
renegotiation of the power relationship between professionals, or more generally the 
healthcare system and the citizen patient; (ii) the achievement of individual health goals (iii) 
the allocation of responsibility for health on citizenship. Whether or not the shift to 
empowerment-centred healthcare is something ethically desirable, I conclude, will very much 
depend on our capacity to clarify the normative exercises that characterise such bundle of 
values at the basis of EBRs. The following three chapters of Part 1 of the thesis are then 
dedicated to an analysis of each of these substantive domains of EBRs. 
EBRs and the “new wave” of empowerment thinking 
Moving healthcare systems with our times, scholars and policy-makers argue, means 
recognising that some empowering steps are required when advancing a proposal for 
reforming them (Segal 1998, Veitch 2010, Colombo et al. 2012). First and foremost, devolving 
power to citizenry could produce a shift from ‘reactive’ to participatory, proactive, pre-
emptive and preventive approaches to medicine (Auffray et al. 2010, European Science 
Foundation 2012). Chronic and non-communicable diseases, this line of reasoning goes, are 
by far the biggest killers in high-income regions of the globe (World Health organization 
2010), and are vastly dependent on risk factors related to individual lifestyle and biological 
make-up. As these information become more and more integrated and clinically relevant for 
the development of individually-tailored life-long monitoring of health, emphasis must 
therefore shy away from patients (i.e. those who already display symptoms) towards empowered 
citizens taking control and action to manage their health and prevent diseases to develop over 
the life course (Barry and Edgman-Levitan 2012). Second, the empowerment of healthcare 
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clients may foster a culture of positive consumerism in medicine. Citizens may become 
empowered enough to act upon and integrate information from multiple sources (e.g. 
genomic profiling, epigenomics, proteomics, metabolomics data), so as to be able to choose 
among a range of services provided by the healthcare system (Segal 1998, European 
Commission 2013). Third, empowering citizens is bestowed with the capacity to decentralize 
authority for public decision-making on the healthcare system (Perkins 1995, Veitch 2010, 
Colombo et al. 2012), thus rendering the preferences and opinions of all actors the means of 
governing healthcare in a more transparent and accountable way. Roughly put, the 
commitment to empowerment is widely regarded as thinking ahead the roles of citizenry and 
experts for the future of medicine, as well as producing the benefit of putting individuals – 
being patients or more broadly citizens – at the heart of the healthcare system (Great Britain 
2004a).  
The recognition of empowerment as a flagship value for achieving this wide range of 
social and political objectives is not surprising. With its origins in liberatory pedagogy, social 
psychology, mental health and health promotion (Freire 1972, Rappaport 1987, Wallerstein 
and Bernstein 1988, Rodwell 1996, Laverack and Labontè 2000), the concept is traditionally 
associated to the emancipatory ability of gaining mastery over an intended state of affairs. 
Specifically, the emancipatory ability entailed in empowerment has always been associated 
with the uncontroversial goal of developing the power to control one’s life or health 
(Wallerstein 1992), while at the same time liberating the subject from exercises of power over 
herself (Wartenberg 1990, Buchanan 2000, Laverack 2005). ‘Power-over’ represented, in the 
minds of proponents of empowerment, a coercive or ideological power that keeps groups 
marginalized, whereas ‘power-to’ was instead the power to influence change with others 
(Labonte and Laverack 2008). The notion of empowerment used to be equated therefore with 
two different kinds of processes and goals (Tengland 2008). On the one hand, empowerment 
was the goal of a process of liberation conferring individuals the capacity to (power to) give 
rise to a desired outcome. On the other hand, empowerment was also the process of developing 
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the goal above by transforming social configurations, liberating individuals from influences 
over (power over) themselves through advocacy and community engagement.  
It is because of these two different dimensions of empowerment that the approach is 
often considered as an ethical panacea in health promotion, especially in the case of 
community-based and marginalised groups. Empowerment, understood as such, is widely 
regarded as a third way in public health avoiding the pitfalls of both focusing only on individual 
liberty (as freedom from interference in personal matters such as health), and state 
intervention for the benefit of both individual and community health (Taylor and Hawley 
2006, Tengland 2012). Radical educationalists in the empowerment field subvert the 
dichotomy between freedom to be left alone with regard to decisions concerning health, and 
the importance of collective action to improve people’s health conditions. Rather, they 
entertain the idea that freedom or self-determination with regard to health concerns the 
powers (in the two meanings above) that we have over ourselves, which manifest as a capacity 
to affect and transform our behaviours in the community in which we live (Tengland 2012). A 
mere focus on individual freedom does not suffice, in the minds of the proponents of 
empowerment, to produce either health benefits or to respect individual self-determination 
with regard to health matters. And the same applies to top-down intervention of the state and 
healthcare authorities that could serve only the purpose of generating power-to control one’s 
health, without challenging the structures of power-over individuals. Quite the contrary, health 
promotion is deemed achievable through intervention in the domain of communities, 
organizations and social arrangements, where a gain of power at the interpersonal level (i.e. the 
capacity to affect the social environment) may generate genuine positive health changes at the 
intrapersonal level (i.e. enhance our freedom with regard to health-related matters) (Minkler 
1999). 
This emphasis upon the social domains of freedom with regard to one’s health 
affirms, in other words, the importance of promoting individual sovereignty, while at the same 
time recognising the role of the state as a supporter or facilitator in making the individual seize 
mastery over her own health. Starting from this recognition, it is not difficult to see the 
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importance that the notion of control plays in the definition of empowerment in the academic 
literature (Rappaport 1987, Wallerstein and Bernstein 1988, Wallerstein 1992, Perkins 1995, 
Laverack 2005, Tengland 2007, 2008). On the one hand, being in a state of empowerment is 
better specified as “an ability […] that the individual develops to control her own life” 
(Tengland 2008, 82) and health. On the other, empowerment refers also to the process that is 
likely to bring about the ‘state of being in control of one’s life’, and entails a specific 
understanding of the relationship between a client and a professional. Empowerment is a 
transformation of social configurations (Freire 1972), liberating individuals from power 
structures and professional expertise. Control assumes therefore also the second meaning of 
resisting negative influence from experts/professionals in the process of achieving an 
empowerment state (Tengland 2007, 2008). 
Otherwise stated, the two aspects of the notion of empowerment as both a state and 
the process map onto two different declensions of the notion of control (i.e. control as ability, 
and control over the process that leads to the ability). This is, for instance, evident in the first 
deployment of empowerment at the level of policies in the “Declaration of Alma-Ata” (World 
Health Organization 1978). In this first example of EBR3, the concept is bestowed the 
capacity to address existing inequalities in the health status of the people (particularly between 
developed and developing countries), by representing an approach that: 
 
“requires and promotes maximum community and individual self-reliance and participation in 
the planning, organization, operation and control of primary health care, making fullest use of 
local, national and other available resources; and to this end develops through appropriate 
education the ability of communities to participate” (World Health Organization 1978, Art. 
VII-5, emphasis added). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It may look odd to the reader that I hereby call EBRs also documents such as the “Declaration of Alma-Ata” 
(World Health Organization 1978), or the “Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion” (World Health Organization 
1986). However the reason for this is that, even though both of them cannot be immediately defined as reform 
proposals, it is implicit that their nature of global strategies for healthcare is meant to identify the key health-
related goals to be attained through national policies and reforms. Though not being strictly speaking reforms, 
these documents had the potential to trigger reform processes among state members of the World Health 
Organization, and can therefore be labelled EBRs. 
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This quote suggests that empowerment approaches in healthcare policy-making ought to 
operate on a continuum from the level of the individual to the community and organizational 
levels (Laverack 2007). But most importantly it shows that the concept, in its early use within 
the policy-making literature, was framed as a resource to counter oppression and injustice 
(Tengland 2008, Woodall et al. 2012), and was meant as a broader political and social process 
by which groups and communities seize control (in the two senses above) over their health 
(Rappaport 1987, Segal 1998). Empowerment processes need, in other words, to be oriented 
both toward challenging oppressive structures as well as nurturing relationships that enable 
people to strengthen control of their own lives for the benefit of all (Restrepo 2000).   
It is important to stress here the element of social liberation characterising the 
approach at its outset. The distinctive feature of early EBRs is in fact that the notion of control 
introduced above requires also a specific view of what kind of individual health goals ought to 
be achieved through empowerment. As exemplified by the “Ottawa Charter for Health 
Promotion” (World Health Organization 1986), a major milestone in the 20th century of the 
field of public health, empowerment was originally regarded as a strategy to promote 
individual mastery and ownership of health, which is understood as a general state of 
wellbeing. Rather than being instrumental to the achievement of health goals predetermined 
by the system, empowerment is here regarded as promoting a liberation of the individual in 
healthcare, which is epitomized by the formula of setting priorities for achieving health as a 
broader physical, mental and social state (World Health Organization 1948):  
 
Health promotion is the process of enabling people to increase control over, and to improve, 
their health. To reach a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, [health 
promotion] works through concrete and effective community action in setting priorities, 
making decisions, planning strategies and implementing them to achieve better health. At the 
heart of this process is the empowerment of communities, their ownership and control of 
their own endeavours and destinies (World Health Organization 1986). 
	   28 
 
Yet, in the last decade the focus of empowerment approaches within health promotion and 
policy-making appears to have radically moved from the objective of enabling the oppressed 
to achieve their own health goals, towards an emphasis on individual choice and responsibility 
for health (Perkins 1995, Christens 2013). A new interpretation of the concept as a neo-liberal 
ideology has been inaugurated, which has made the approach much more appealing to recent 
healthcare policy-making (Colombo et al. 2012, Covolo et al. 2012). Empowerment programs 
and policies are currently very popular in political discourses, and have proliferated in the last 
few years by receiving an uncommon bipartisan support. On the one hand, conservatives view 
the approach as fostering a culture of private voluntarism in healthcare that reduces the role 
and importance of state supervision with regard to health-related decision-making. On the 
other, new labour and socio-democrat politicians see instead EBRs as renegotiating public 
support for citizens with regard to their health. Empowerment is now a buzz word for 
implementing the political objectives of (i) increased individual responsibility for health-related 
decision-making, (ii) provision of sound information, and (iii) enhanced control over the 
healthcare system. In a nutshell, this “new wave” of empowerment narrows down its goals to 
the provision of skills and opportunities, at the individual level, useful to a proactive and 
individualistic exercise of health-related decision-making, and purges the approach of any 
commitment to addressing health inequalities through community action4.  
The New Labour Interpretation of EBRs: breaking with the tradition 
The first clear-cut example of this “new wave” of EBRs is represented by the proposals for 
reforming the UK National Health Service (NHS) put forward by the New Labour 
governments (Great Britain 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005, 2008). Here, the empowerment 
approach is expected to foster an active role on the side of citizens “choosing which provider 
treats them and controlling healthcare decisions” (Great Britain 2004a, 79). Rather than being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Consistent with, although not always explicit in this view is the idea that empowerment can occur even without 
fostering any change at the community level (Laverack 2007, Wallerstein 2006), thus abandoning the general 
commitment of the approach to addressing the social context and determinants affecting people’s health 
(Marmot et al. 2010). 
	   29 
committed to the radical overtones of the original approach, here empowerment is bestowed 
the capacity to update the relationship between the state and the citizenry in line with the new 
culture of consumerist individualism characterising contemporary British public life (Thorpe 
2010): 
 
Patients’ desire for high-quality personalised care will drive the new system. Giving people 
greater personal choice will give them control over these issues, allowing patients to call the 
shots about the time and place of their care, and empowering them to personalise their care to 
ensure the quality and convenience that they want (Great Britain 2004a, 9). 
 
The shift towards empowerment in healthcare is regarded, in the case of the New Labour 
EBRs, as part of a broader intent to establish an “entrepreneurial spirit in institutions, and a 
consumerist orientation in public life” (Thorpe 2010, 403). Health politics is here an 
instantiation of a new kind of public life, which draws from the decline of conventional and 
traditional ‘nannying’ state, and the necessity to encourage civic and social initiatives. 
Accordingly, empowerment is not anymore emphasized as a transformation of oppressive 
power structures that affect health. Rather, it is instrumentally valuable for providing citizens 
with the opportunity to influence public decision-making on the healthcare system in 
partnership with healthcare authorities. Social participation strategies within this context are not, 
in other words, meant to establish a strong link with social change and therefore with bottom-
up community-based action and political processes. Quite the contrary, the New Labour 
EBRs are concerned with top-down development of health-related public policy, which aim at 
securing a range of options to individuals on which to exercise their choice in a market-like 
fashion (Veitch 2010). In the light of this recognition, it is by no means surprising that the 
emphasis of New Labour’s EBRs falls heavily on individual responsibility rather than on 
“control” (World Health Organization 1978, 1986) for maintaining a chosen level of health, 
and running public services together with healthcare authorities. Once those in power set the 
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range of options, it is up to the responsible citizens to take up the opportunity to manage her 
own health: 
 
Patients empowered in this way are more likely to take greater responsibility for their own 
health, and to dedicate their own time, effort and energy to solving their health problems. This 
partnership is especially important for those with long-term conditions and their carers. We 
must therefore continue to empower patients with greater choice, better information, and 
more control and influence (Great Britain 2008, 38). 
 
The new-labour interpretation of empowerment strategies in healthcare inaugurates therefore 
the different discernment of the substantive foundations of the approach anticipated above. 
Or, I shall say, a “new wave” of empowerment thinking in healthcare policy-making. Rather 
than aiming at emancipating the worse-off with regard to their health, i.e. giving them a 
chance to pursue their own state of complete physical, mental and social well being (World 
Health Organization 1986), empowerment requires here taking up a number of responsibilities 
on the side of citizens. First, one kind of responsibility envisaged by these reforms can be 
described as a responsibility to choose (services, treatments, practitioners’ advice) within the 
publicly funded healthcare system. Such a responsibility demands citizens to act as consumers 
(Veitch 2010, Curnutte and Testa 2012), and to select the preferred service among the ones 
provided by institutions. Second, it is worth noting how it is central to the success of this 
public health strategy not only that patients exercise choice with regard to what service they 
may require, but also that they provide feedback on the treatments received, the support of 
professionals, and the quality of their experience in the NHS. This means that, through the 
lens of New Labour EBRs, empowered patients and clients are responsible also for speaking 
up, for ensuring that their voice is heard in order for the system to function properly. Third, a 
manifest importance is also given to patients and citizens assuming a responsibility for the 
management of their health levels, this being a matter of changing their lifestyles in order to 
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adopt healthier behaviours, or making “the right choices for themselves and their families” 
(Great Britain 2008, 39; emphasis added).  
 The numerous responsibilities yielded by New Labour EBRs do not pertain, however, 
only to the three kinds of responsibilities placed upon individuals described above. It is indeed 
also important to stress how they also instate a precise role and accountability for 
professionals. Although sometimes presented in the document as a partnership between lay 
citizens and healthcare professionals (Great Britain 2008, 38) healthcare staff is expected to 
play “a stronger role for clinical leadership and management throughout the NHS” (Great 
Britain 2008, 48) within the picture of New Labour EBRs. Quality of the services, these EBRs 
argue, “is improved by empowered patients and empowered professionals” altogether (Great 
Britain 2008, 48): 
 
If clinicians are to be held to account for the quality outcomes of the care that they deliver, 
then they can reasonably expect that they will have the powers to affect those outcomes. This 
means they must be empowered to set the direction for the services they deliver, to make 
decisions on resources, and to make decisions on people (Great Britain 2008, 64; emphasis added). 
 
Changing towards an empowerment-based system requires therefore, according to New 
Labour EBRs, not only that greater freedom and responsibility is devolved to citizens. Rather, 
such a shift requires leadership (Great Britain 2008, 65) on the side of professionals to make 
individual citizens and patients meet the health-related expectations of the system of 
tomorrow. Redrawing the boundaries of medical and professional responsibility in this way 
fosters some ethical concerns, to which we will turn in the final section of this chapter. For 
the moment, it is however worth noting the contrast this understanding of empowerment 
creates with the original tone of the approach. As it appears evident from the quote above, the 
empowerment of healthcare professionals prospected by New Labour EBRs outlines a 
relationship between the roles of stakeholders in the system that does not lend itself to the 
shift in authority and legitimacy for which empowerment was traditionally evoked:  
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Health promotion is carried out by and with people, not on or to people. It improves both the ability 
of individuals to take action, and the capacity of groups, organizations or communities to 
influence the determinants of health. Improving the capacity of communities for health 
promotion requires practical education, leadership training, and access to resources. 
Empowering individuals demands more consistent, reliable access to the decision-making 
process and the skills and knowledge essential to effect change (World Health Organization 
1997; emphasis added). 
 
Differently from the revival of Freire’s theories (Freire 1972) on popular education and 
consciousness-raising epitomized by this quote from the Jakarta Declaration, New Labour 
EBRs do not support the egalitarian power linked to early uses of the concept of 
empowerment in policy-making. The idea of a social-action process that promotes 
participation and control of people (e.g. organizations, communities, marginalised groups) in 
solving health problems is instead diluted in an expert-led and informed consumption of 
healthcare services (Woodall et al. 2012). Empowerment does not imply here extending the 
degree of public involvement for the sake of putting the source of legitimacy in health-related 
decision-making onto the hands of the non-experts. Quite the contrary, the emphasis on 
leadership in New Labour EBRs supports the interpretation that no challenge to the 
distribution of power in the clinical encounter is actually demanded by these documents, thus 
rendering their use of the language of empowerment “a cloak under which powerful actors 
can obscure their continuing exercise of power” (Callaghan and Wistow 2006, 596). 
To recapitulate, there can be little doubt about the sharp contrast in which New 
Labour EBRs and traditional understandings of empowerment stand. First, New Labour 
EBRs introduce the language of responsibility in the discourse of empowerment, as opposed 
to the traditional emphasis on control (Wallerstein 1992, Tengland 2008). Most prominently, 
however, the new wave of empowerment inaugurated by New Labours operates a thorough 
reconfiguration of the values behind empowering processes (Tengland 2007, 2008). The 
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element of power-over (or lack thereof) in the approach is in fact overlooked by this 
interpretation. Empowerment is still, at least in its declared aims, letting the healthcare client, 
group or community have as much control (or responsibility) as possible over the processes 
they are involved in. Nevertheless, no implication as to the role of professionals to serve this 
goal of empowerment is drawn by New Labour EBRs. The approach does not entail a view of 
the professional-patient relationship (Tengland 2008), which is concerned with the restrictive 
effect that medical expertise may have on individual ability to control medical decision-making 
(Callaghan and Wistow 2006, Juengst et al. 2012). Or, to use the jargon of its theorists, 
empowerment does not compel here practitioners to change their paternalistic behaviours, 
and to redistribute the “unbalance of ‘power’” between them and the client (Tengland 2008, 
91). Quite the contrary, no change in the professional-patient power balance is demanded by 
New Labour EBRs, thus opening up a question as to how this interpretation can actually 
attain the empowering goals it endorses. 
Conservative EBRs for the NHS: empowering (healthy) choices  
The kind of reasoning on empowerment introduced by New Labour EBRs is even more 
forthright in the usage of the term in the conservatives’ proposals for reforming the British 
NHS (Great Britain 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e). The ambition of these documents is 
in fact much more explicit in determining the shift to empowerment in the politics of the 
NHS as a devolution of active responsibility on citizens and professionals: 
  
Our ambition is to once again make the NHS the envy of the world. Liberating the NHS - a 
blend of Conservative and Liberal Democrat ideas - sets out our plans to do this. First, 
patients will be at the heart of everything we do. So they will have more choice and control, 
helped by easy access to the information they need about the best GPs and hospitals. […] 
Second, there will be a relentless focus on clinical outcomes. Success will be measured, not 
through bureaucratic process targets, but against results that really matter to patients – such as 
improving cancer and stroke survival rates. Third, we will empower health professionals. 
Doctors and nurses must to be able to use their professional judgement about what is right for 
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patients. We will support this by giving frontline staff more control. Healthcare will be run 
from the bottom up, with ownership and decision-making in the hands of professionals and 
patients (Great Britain 2010a, 1). 
 
Through the endorsement of empowerment strategies, conservative EBRs appear to 
consolidate the devolution of governmental power into the social and the public firstly 
introduced by New Labours. Equity and Excellence (Great Britain 2010a), the strategy for the 
NHS proposed by the alliance between Tories and Liberal-Democrats, could thus be read as 
further instating the newly established tenets of empowerment that we encountered in its New 
Labour interpretation. Also here it is not difficult to see how the discourse of empowerment is 
bestowed the capacity to allocate a “shared responsibility” (Great Britain 2010a, 21) for using 
effectively healthcare services and improving citizens’ involvement in decision-making. 
Furthermore, resorting to empowerment is again presented as a political response to sweeping 
social changes towards increased individualism, and to the need of rethinking the role of 
institutions in the governance of healthcare (Thorpe 2010). The main aim of conservative 
EBRs is, in other words, to “empower local leadership and encourage wide responsibility 
across society to improve everyone’s health and wellbeing, and tackle the wider factors that 
influence it” (Great Britain 2010e, 6). In doing so, the strategy for healthcare is meant to 
“reflect the Government’s core values of freedom, fairness and responsibility” (Great Britain 
2010e, 6), which compel the healthcare institutions to “treat capable, responsible and 
informed adults as adults” (Great Britain 2010e, 28). 
It is worth noting at this stage of my analysis how the link between empowerment and 
responsibility recasts empowering processes as a transfer of health-related risk, accountability 
and liability from society to individuals, and how this contrasts sharply with the traditional 
emphasis of the approach on the political opportunities for freedom and self-determination 
with regard to health. Conservative EBRs put a strong emphasis on the idea that creating the 
right environment for people to take responsibility for their health is “the way to improve 
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health and wellbeing” (Great Britain 2010e, 23), thus producing individual benefits and 
reducing costs for healthcare for taxpayers: 
 
In future, patients and carers will have far more clout and choice in the system; and as a result, 
the NHS will become more responsive to their needs and wishes. People want choice, and 
evidence at home and abroad shows that it improves quality. We are also clear that increasing 
patient choice is not a one-way street. In return for greater choice and control, patients should 
accept responsibility for the choices they make, concordance with treatment programmes and 
the implications for their lifestyle (Great Britain 2010a, 16). 
 
Leveraging personal responsibility for achieving outcomes of care and maintaining acceptable 
health levels is – under conservative EBRs – an empowering process instrumental to health-
related behaviour change (Tengland 2012). Empowerment does not aim here at helping 
people “gain greater control over decisions and actions affecting their health” (World Health 
Organization 1997), but rather is regarded as an effective strategy for fostering a change in 
individual habits towards healthier lifestyles (e.g. exercising more, eating better, drinking less, 
quit smoking, etc.). Differently from “Whitehall diktats and nannying about the way people 
should live”, empowering citizens is in fact considered as giving the right tools to individuals 
and communities to exercise healthy choices and relieve themselves from suffering of severe 
lifestyle-driven ill health, as well as reducing costs for healthcare in the national budget. To 
this end, conservative EBRs also envisage mechanisms of “financial incentives to reward 
progress on improving health” in the general population (Great Britain 2010e, 2).  
 Besides the limitations identified by other critics as to the capacity of conservative 
EBRs to actually reduce healthcare expenditure in Britain (Asthana 2010, Walshe 2010), it is 
worth emphasizing how these documents further contribute to define new roles for patients, 
citizens and professionals engaged in an empowerment process. Apart from taking up the 
emphasis of New Labour EBRs on responsibility for both users and professionals to exercise 
greater personal choice for the functioning of the system, conservative EBRs move forward 
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the reconfiguration of the fundamental tenets of the approach operated in its “new wave”. 
They compel empowerment to the specific constitution of a normative domain of 
responsibility for the achievement of health goals that are established by top-down political 
measures. Empowerment is not here a public health strategy for increasing equitable health  
through an enabling process (Laverack 2005). It does not concern addressing the social 
determinants of health in order to create the conditions for making healthy choices easier for 
individuals, especially among marginalised groups of our societies (Koelen and Lindström 
2005). Rather, empowering citizens is, in the conservatives’ view, redistributing the onus of 
health across society, in order to ensure that people remain free from diseases, and make 
responsible decisions about their lifestyle.  
Personalised Medicine in the EU: the pinnacle of EBRs 
The most clear-cut example of a system instituted by EBRs is however the rise of 
‘Personalised Medicine’ (henceforth PM) at the level of European policy-making (European 
Science Foundation 2012, Lehrach 2012, Sahlin and Hermeren 2012, Shapiro 2012, European 
Commission 2013). Indeed, it could be even argued that the “personalization project” – 
providing the right individual with the right therapy at the right time – is nothing more than 
the pinnacle of all the initiatives that so far I have labelled EBRs. By promising to provide the 
technological and biomedical platforms (from genomics to epigenomics, proteomics and 
stem-cell therapies) to pursue the individualization of therapies and preventive measures, PM 
can move forward the shift towards empowerment-based healthcare firstly prospected by 
EBRs above (Chadwick 2013). It is however worth noting here that the discourse of 
empowerment does not make its appearance at the European level only with the advent of 
PM. Quite the contrary, the value of citizens’ empowerment is already recognised as a core 
value of healthcare governance in the EU Health Strategy "Together for Health" (European 
Commission 2007), the reference document for reform actions to be undertaken at national 
and EU levels between 2007 and 2013: 
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A core value is Citizens' Empowerment. Healthcare is becoming increasingly patient-centred 
and individualised, with the patient becoming an active subject rather than a mere object of 
healthcare. […] Community health policy must take citizens' and patients' rights as a key 
starting point. This includes participation in and influence on decision-making, as well as 
competences needed for wellbeing, including ‘health literacy’ (European Commission 2007, 4). 
 
This document points to an intensive investment on community activity and empowerment in 
healthcare systems, which should have guided the governance of the Union towards an 
increasing involvement of various actors in its making. Together for Health compels all Member 
States, for the first time in European legislation, to pursue the engagement of various 
stakeholders, like healthcare providers and patients (e.g. European Patients’ Forum and the 
European Public Health Alliance), in political decision-making on the healthcare system. As 
argued by Flear (2008), Together for Health represents therefore a turning point in the EU 
governance of healthcare, which firstly establishes the need to explore modalities of 
engagement and empowerment of “patients qua EU citizens” (Flear 2008, 872). Meaning that 
this document operates a paradigm shift in the political discourse of European citizenship 
with regard to health and healthcare. In considering the potential for political discourses of 
active involvement, Together for Health redirects in fact the European governance of health 
from the commitment to extending rights to access healthcare to all Europeans (Jenson 2007), 
towards the constitution of an EU patient citizenship5 as participation to the making of its 
healthcare polity. No doubt, the discourse of empowerment is also here regarded as the key 
strategy for reshaping the contours of agency in healthcare across the Union. This point is also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Besides the reference to Flear’s (2008) work on the different discernment of citizens’ role in the EU healthcare 
governance, the notion of ‘patient citizenship’ presented here is indebted to the analytical concept of ‘biological 
citizenship’ developed by Rose and Novas (2005), and Rose (2007). My analysis of the constitution of EU 
citizenship, as distinctively linked to the creation of new roles and responsibilities for patients, has benefited from 
Rose and Novas’ scrutiny of “citizenship projects that have linked their conceptions of citizens to beliefs about 
the biological existence of human beings” (2005: 440), and wishes to complement this view by pointing on the 
political discourses, such as empowerment, which also play a decisive role in the generative process of new 
contours of citizenship in contemporary healthcare. Besides coming to think of ourselves as citizens in terms of 
knowledge of our somatic individuality (Rose and Novas 2005), the concept of patient citizenship highlights the 
importance of the politically constructed beliefs and expectations about the empowered role assigned to patients 
and citizens in contemporary EU polity of healthcare. To the best of my knowledge, the notion of patient 
citizenship has not been used so far with the only exception of Rhodes et al. (2013) field study on individual 
perceptions of patients affected by Hepatitis C. 
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reemphasized in the current EU strategy for healthcare “Health for Growth”, which will run 
from 2014 to 2020: 
 
The position of the patient should be strengthened to achieve better and safer health 
outcomes. Patients need to be empowered to manage their health and their healthcare more 
pro-actively. The transparency of healthcare activities and systems and the availability of 
information to patients should be optimised. Healthcare practices should be informed by 
feedback from and communication with patients. Support for Member States, patient 
organisations and stakeholders is essential and should be coordinated at EU level in order to 
effectively help patients and in particular those affected by rare diseases to benefit from cross 
border healthcare (European Commission 2011, 13; emphasis added). 
 
It is against this background, I argue, that the advent of PM should be analysed. PM 
constitutes the fulfilment of a broader political endeavour characterised by an increasing 
discursive weight assigned to citizens’ engagement and participation to the governance of 
healthcare. At the basis of this political generation of European patient citizenship, we find 
the language of empowerment in its own development and reconstitution in the new wave of 
EBRs. Thanks to PM, however, EU healthcare can finally leverage also another decisive 
discursive repertoire for the accomplishment of the political project of EBRs. Namely, PM 
provides also the bio-technological means to move away from a one-size-fits-all approach in 
medicine, towards services that are tailored and responsive to the needs and characteristics of 
individual citizens. The emphasis that PM puts on profiling, prevention, early detection, and 
tailored treatments could successfully rise to the empowerment project identified above in 
EBRs, both with respect to the social and scientific challenges characterising contemporary 
healthcare (Auffray et al. 2010, Shapiro 2012). On the one hand, PM is allegedly able to grant 
healthcare an appreciation of the biological variability in disease development and treatment 
responses across the general population, which is currently made visible (Nowtony and Testa 
2011) by the life sciences. In this respect, PM is empowering because it accommodates scientific 
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advancements in the understanding of individual features of disease and illness into the 
practice of healthcare. Treatment and prevention strategies are in fact increasingly 
characterised by a “molecular gaze” (Nowotny and Testa 2011), and demand the seamless 
integration of data from all the ‘omics technologies (e.g. genomics, epigenomics, 
metabolomics, proteomics, etc.)6 for the sake of “tailoring the right therapeutic strategy for the 
right person at the right time” (European Commission 2013, 5; see also: Hood et al. 2004). As 
argued by Nowotny and Testa (2011), this defining feature of molecular life sciences opens up 
a wide range of possibilities for understanding and manipulating individual biological makeup 
and health to an unprecedented extent. On the other, PM’s focus on individual responsibility 
for health allegedly meets the social demands of (i) cost-effective models of healthcare 
provision made necessary by the huge impact of healthcare costs on national budgets (Frith 
2012), and of (ii) a more inclusive approach to patient involvement in medical decision-
making (Kuehn 2012). By advocating for the requirement, on the side of citizens, to partake to 
the healthcare process and to actively contribute to the achievement of the health outcomes 
established by its proponents, the emerging model of PM can finally produce the empowered 
patient citizens envisioned by the new wave of EBRs:  
 
Despite the assertion that medicine has always been personalised, it is clear that in many areas 
citizens have not felt that they are fully in control of the decisions made about their wellbeing. 
Personalised medicine could provide the means for citizens to exert more control over their 
health without having to rely directly on professional healthcare. […] This is a potentially 
empowering step for European citizens. The promise of empowerment, however, raises issues 
of health literacy, responsibility and access (European Science Foundation 2012, 17). 
 
Despite the caution rightly expressed here by the European Science Foundation on the 
potential unwanted consequences of empowerment, it is worth emphasizing how the 
empowered role for citizens entailed by PM has acquired a completely different meaning from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The unique contribution of emerging epigenomic medicine to this endeavour will be analysed in Part 2 of the 
thesis. See infra Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
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the one it had at its onset in the 1970s and 1980s (Tengland 2008). A new “sociotechnical 
imaginary” (Jasanoff and Kim 2009, Jasanoff and Kim 2013) of a desirable and tangible future 
of individualized, more effective and inclusive medicine is now evoked by the concept. 
Empowerment at the pinnacle of its “new wave” in healthcare policy-making means first of all 
constructing the aspirations to translate huge investments in ‘omics technologies into medical 
practice, and to leverage citizens’ contribution to the success of this paradigm-shift. This is the 
main reason why the shift towards the language of responsibility, initiated by EBRs described 
above, fits perfectly with the currency of the approach in PM. Enhancing individual 
responsibilities for their health is in fact beneficial to the empowering project of PM in three 
main respects. First, empowerment ties individuals to obligations and liability as to their use of 
the unique resources provided by ‘omics technologies (e.g. genomics, epigenomics, 
metabolomics, proteomics, etc.), and the sustainability of the whole system. In this respect, 
the empowered role assigned to citizens demands taking up responsibility to be in charge of 
health-related choices, to contribute to the fulfilment of the promise of increased potential for 
prevention of disease based upon biological make-up and monitoring of physiological status 
over the life course. Second, empowerment here means also fostering a culture of 
responsibility with regard to maintaining certain levels of health by enacting the richness of 
medical information provided by its multiple sources of biological data. Citizens who are 
willing to get the best out the endeavour of PM, might not only want to fully exercise their 
powers with regard to their health, but also to comply with tailored treatments once diseases 
have developed, or tailored prevention strategies based on their continuously updated 
biological profile. Finally, empowerment in PM means also redrawing the boundaries of 
medical and public responsibilities with regard to citizens’ health. The empowering step, 
entailed in PM, of giving citizens greater responsibility for their own health has in fact the 
correlate effect of freeing professionals or the healthcare system from a degree of 
responsibility for citizens health, thus producing a retraction of social and individual 
professional obligations to support the lay in the management of its own health. 
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This can, in essence, be one of the reasons why the language of empowerment is 
gaining increasing currency in EU policy-making, to the extent that some scholars have 
cautioned its colonization of governance discourses (Covolo et al. 2012, Colombo et al. 2012). 
PM reinforces the primacy of empowerment as a suitable strategy for making future 
healthcare move with the times of increasing individualized care. As the quote below suggests, 
the “personalization project” (Chadwick 2013) requires an empowering shift in healthcare 
services, which demands citizens to take up similar responsibilities to the ones we identified 
above for EBRs above, and provides them with the right biomedical tools to achieve this goal: 
 
If appropriate solutions can be developed in this way, it is likely that the role of the state will 
shift from taking responsibility for individual health towards empowerment of citizens and 
their communities to take responsibility for their own health. However, this will require a 
genuine devolution of power and agency to the citizen (European Science Foundation 2012, 
41) 
 
The language of empowerment has thus a strategic importance for fostering activism by 
biological citizens (Rose and Novas 2005) in the EU, so that as patient citizens they are more 
able to discern and contribute to the way in which health will be governed in the near future. 
This recognition raises, however, some questions about the extent to which the empowerment 
of citizens entailed in PM, and more generally in EBRs, could be detrimental to those lacking 
adequate skills to become responsible for their health. Wide ranges of experts and policy-
makers agree upon the benefits that PM can offer and the importance of paving the way to its 
implementation (Fackler and McGuire 2010). PM can, as the rhetoric goes, provide citizens 
with the opportunity to leave better lives and to gain a greater mastery or power over their 
health. It is however likely that this empowering process will come at some moral cost. 
Granting increased access to information and factors that determine individual health (e.g. 
genetic predispositions, epigenetic exposures, metabolomics profiling, etc.) could actually be a 
winning strategy to achieve an improvement of health within the general population, and a 
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genuine devolution of power and agency to the citizens (European Science Foundation 2012). 
Yet, sufficient attention should be paid to social factors such as race, culture, socio-economic 
context and gender having an impact on the individual capacity to gain power with regard to 
health (European Science Foundation 2012). How to ensure therefore that these critical 
aspects of empowerment are given sufficient attention? 
The need for a normative scrutiny of empowerment in EBRs 
Clearly, the analysis of the “new wave” of EBRs above confirms the widespread conviction 
that the concept of empowerment has been extremely preeminent in discourses of healthcare 
reforms and policy-making in the last decade (Veitch 2010, Colombo et al. 2012). In addition, 
it also hints at the possibility that the current suspicion surrounding the concept (Covolo et al. 
2012) may largely be due to a clash between two historically distinct empowerment discourses. 
What I showed so far supports in fact the view that the narrative of empowerment has come 
to acquire very different contours in its historical development. On the one hand, the idea 
behind the original outbreak of the concept was that individual choice could not be analysed 
as if occurring in a relational vacuum (Minkler 1999). Rather, individual behaviour and choice 
were regarded as the result of power structures embedding the individual and her capacity to 
make decisions, whose ‘control’ empowerment processes were compelled to address. On the 
other, the “new wave” of EBRs inaugurates instead a different narrative of empowerment, 
mainly defined as a shift in responsibility with regard to health and healthcare governance 
from the state (or healthcare institutions) to individual citizens. Starting from this recognition, 
it is much easier to recognise how the term empowerment has gradually attracted critical 
scrutiny as a noble, but double-edged ideal (Sandroff 2012). Devolving power into the hands 
of individual healthcare clients was deemed to be ethically sustainable in the original theoretical 
underpinnings of the approach (Feste and Anderson 1995, Wallerstein 2006), only if 
accompanied by a strong emphasis on individual action for the sake of social transformations, 
as well as on the social dimension of individual capacity for self-determination (Rappaport 
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1987, Minkler 1999): an element which is now widely overlooked by the “new wave” of 
empowerment thinking in healthcare. 
Is there a homogeneous account of empowerment? A ‘bundle view’ of the concept 
This recognition supports the conclusion that distinct substantive commitments are entailed in 
the recent “new wave” of empowerment and its original understandings. Consequently, it 
raises a question as to whether the ethical allure originally attached to the approach still 
persists in its “new wave”. According to some authors, the differences identified above within 
the empowerment discourse support the view that the concept should be best understood as a 
dynamic (moral) concept, whose different interpretations stand along a continuum (Laverack 
2005, 2007, Labonté and Laverack 2008). The new wave of empowerment and its original 
conceptualization, this line of reasoning goes, can be regarded as two instances of the same 
concept ranging from individual to social and collective action. Empowerment, under this 
account, is best conceived as a flexible and multi-purpose framework, rather than a precise 
political, social and ethical theory. Accordingly, this view regards the concept as having only a 
general normative content – i.e. promoting the positive value of power and control gains over 
health-related decision-making through capacity building processes (Laverack 2005) – which 
needs then to be tuned to the various levels and contexts of its application.  
Needless to say, the ‘continuum view’ has the merit of emphasizing how the goals of 
empowerment can potentially be maximized both through a focus on individuals and 
communities (Christens 2013). In addition, if we applied this view to the analysis of EBRs 
above, we might easily conclude that the different meanings assigned to the concept are 
actually due to the different contexts in which current proponents of PM and radical 
educationalists in the 1970s’ and 1980’s operate(d). However, a main limitation of viewing 
empowerment as a continuum lies in the possibility that fundamentally different substantive 
and normative commitments may underlie different uses of the empowerment language. 
Otherwise stated, the linear interpretation of empowerment entailed in the continuum (Labonté 
and Laverack 2008) may conceal the distinct substantive commitments at the basis of its 
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different uses, and consequently obscure potentially divergent ethical evaluation of their 
outcomes.   
For this reason, I argue that the definitional diversity of empowerment can be better 
captured through a different analogy that grasps the heterogeneous substantive and normative 
content of the concept. What I maintain is that evaluative commitments behind 
empowerment are best conceived as a bundle of different entitlements. Very much like in the 
case of other concepts (e.g. “self” in Hume 2012, or “property” in Hoppe 2009), the 
prescriptive dimensions of empowerment cannot be in fact straightforwardly identified, due to 
the variety of uses of the word. As we have seen above, the goals and the context of a given 
EBR could require different actions on the side of the agents involved, or simply be defined in 
very different ways. This means that a number of distinct entitlements may be part of the 
substantive content of a given notion of empowerment grounding an EBR. Or, if we put it in 
the words of the bundle analogy, different sticks can be designated for the sake of making up 
the bundle of values to be promoted for empowerment in a given context. If we subscribe to 
the bundle analogy, definitions of empowerment should not therefore be regarded as merely 
describing a way of informing social action under a common approach (like in the ‘continuum 
view’). Quite the contrary, the bundle analogy takes definitions as making claims on the agents 
involved, on their mutual obligations, and on the values fostering the empowerment goals of 
‘control over life and health’, or ‘responsibility for health’ (Korsgaard 1996). This means that 
analysing different bundles (i.e. concepts) of empowerment demands identifying the sticks (i.e. 
values) that constitute their substantive underpinnings. For instance, let us consider the 
following definition by Tengland (2008, p.93): 
 
We achieve empowerment […] when a person (or group) A acts towards (in relation to) 
another person (or group) B in order to support B (by creating the opportunity and 
environment, and giving ‘expertise’ support) in gaining better control over (some of) the 
determinants (those relevant for the situation or profession) of her (quality of) life through 
(necessarily) an increase in B’s knowledge (self-knowledge, consciousness raising, skills 
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development, or competence), or health (e.g., autonomy, self-confidence, selfefficacy, or self-
esteem) or freedom (positive and negative), and this acting of A towards B involves 
minimizing A’s own ‘power’ (or influence) over B with regard to goal/problem formulation, 
decision-making and acting, and B seizes (at least) some control over this situation or process 
(goal/problem formulation, decision-making and acting). 
 
This definition illuminates clearly the values behind this concept of empowerment, and 
consequently determines also the normative exercises that are compatible with it. What we owe 
to an empowered individual, in Tengland’s interpretation, is revealed in the number of 
entitlements, values and actions instrumental to the achievement of her empowerment. These 
may include providing her with genuine opportunities, or knowledge, or enhanced capacity for 
self-determination, which are compelled to produce a better mastery over determinants of 
quality of life, and consequently of health (Tengland 2008). Returning to the analogy of the 
bundle, this means that sticks in Tengland’s empowerment bundle could, for example, be the 
entitlement to be respected and supported as an autonomous person in the case of personal 
empowerment; or to have the opportunities required to exert control over the environment 
that influences one’s actions and health in the context of a community intervention. It is not 
necessary for each and every of these sticks to part of the bundle for empowerment to obtain. 
Things stand differently if we look at the bundle of values on the basis of 
empowerment in the “new wave” discussed above. By paraphrasing Tengland’s account, a 
tentative definition of the concept in EBRs and PM could in fact go as follows: 
 
We achieve empowerment when a person (or group) A acts towards (in relation to) another 
person (or group) B in order to support B (by creating the opportunity and environment, and 
giving ‘expertise’ leadership) in acquiring responsibility for her health (i.e. solving their health 
problems in concordance with treatment programmes, identifying strategies for prevention, 
treatment and management of disease), and in participating to the governance of healthcare 
(providing feedback on the quality of services received, and contributing to public decision-
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making about the system) through (necessarily) an increase in B’s access to relevant knowledge 
with regard to her health. 
 
This definition of empowerment summarizes the different approaches to the concept 
identified above within the new wave of EBRs. First, it reiterates the idea that the 
commitment to ‘control’ has currently been replaced by an emphasis upon ‘responsibility’ for 
health, which is articulated as accountability for enacting relevant knowledge to solve a given 
health problem (Great Britain 2008, 38) and to identify personalised strategies for prevention, 
treatment and management of disease (European Science Foundation 2012, European 
Commission 2013). Second, it also captures the idea that empowerment means, within this 
context, enhancing citizens’ responsibility to partake to the governance of the healthcare 
system, i.e. it demands citizens to act as consumers with regard to the services they require 
and to provide feedback on the quality of care received (Great Britain 2004a). Third, this 
definition highlights also the new role designed for professionals by the new wave of EBRs. It 
refers to the idea, encountered above (Great Britain 2008, 2010a), that the shift towards 
empowerment of citizen patients demands leadership on the side of professional to fruitfully 
guide the lay public in seizing responsibility for their behaviours. 
It will be already clear to the reader at this stage of the present analysis, how different 
are the sticks in the two empowerment-bundles hereby described, and consequently how it is 
likely that they demand a different ethical evaluation. Identifying the sticks that compose a 
particular empowerment bundle has therefore the merit of distinguishing among the 
entitlements traded off when acting on the basis of a given concept of empowerment, as well 
as illuminating the potential conflicts between resulting actions and obligations on the side of 
all the actors they involve. Each of these notions of empowerment prioritizes some individual 
health-related beings and doings, and focuses on the opportunities that are deemed relevant to 
realize those beings and doings (such as the genuine opportunities to increase health literacy, 
or the opportunity to have access to medically relevant information). And yet, trading off all 
of these values may not be an easy task. This point leads us to another possible aim of this 
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section of the thesis: clarifying what kind of ethical controversies can be generated by the 
different substantive and normative elements of empowerment in the new wave of EBRs.  
Three substantive domains of controversy in EBRs 
So far, I have been purposely using concepts such as ‘health’, ‘responsibility’, or ‘control’ 
without particular qualifiers. This finds its justification in the descriptive purposes of the 
analysis above, aiming at an extended historical exposition of how developments in the 
empowerment discourse have operated a thorough reconfiguration of the normative 
foundations of the political, social and technical imaginary to which the approach is 
connected. However, it is also worth pointing out that the conceptual disagreement regarding 
the theoretical underpinnings of empowerment is likely to generate major ethical tensions in 
the implementation of the political vision of the new wave of EBRs. Most of the critics of 
these regulatory documents agree in fact that the shift towards individualized and participatory 
medicine envisioned by these EBRs will come at some moral cost (Salmon and Hall 2004, 
Veitch 2010, Juengst et al. 2012, Sandroff 2012). For this reason, this final section of the 
present chapter formulates some potential unwanted consequences of the approach to be 
normatively addressed in the remaining of Part 1. In particular, the new wave of EBRs can be 
found liable of three main ethical concerns. 
Empowerment and the paternal i sm paradox 
Empowering citizens’ health is supposedly a useful strategy to renegotiate the relationship 
between medical experts and the public, which overcomes the so-called ‘compliance model’ of 
healthcare delivery (Swift 1984, Feste and Anderson 1995). In contrast to the latter – which 
regards the medical encounter as a process that both “persuades and prepares patients to carry 
out recommendations made by health professionals” (Feste and Anderson 1995, p.140) – the 
major emphasis of empowerment is on having the knowledge, self-awareness and skills 
(Rappaport 1987, Wallerstein and Bernstein 1988), as well as the opportunities (Tengland 
2008), necessary to exercise control over quality-of-life-related health. Because of this view, 
empowerment is widely considered to avoid the paternalistic criticisms of the compliance 
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model. Recent developments of the approach in the “new wave” of EBRs support however a 
rather different view of the relationship between professionals and patient citizens to be 
promoted by empowering processes. As showed above, the focus of some EBRs falls heavily 
on empowering leadership on the side of healthcare personnel to ensure the quality of 
outcomes of the care they deliver (Great Britain 2008, 2010a). Starting from this recognition, 
many critics of empowerment have questioned its declared anti-paternalistic virtues by 
pointing to an alleged contradiction within this discourse. Experts and policy-makers, they 
argue, do not use empowerment as an emancipatory ideology and discourse, which aims at 
changing the power structures in healthcare (Marmot et al. 2010). Rather, they employ it as 
rhetoric to conceal their continuing exertions of power-over their clients (Buchanan 2000, 
Salmon 2004, Cribb 2005, Juengst et al. 2012).  
In this respect, they conclude, empowerment is no less paternalistic than the so-called 
‘compliance model’, thus creating an ethical tension in the approach that can be characterised 
as a paradox. On the one hand, EBRs put a strong emphasis on responsibility and control as a 
renegotiation of power relationships between professionals and healthcare clients. Their 
declared intent is that of moving away from paternalistic professionalism and nannying state 
(Great Britain 2010e) towards a role of patients as equal decision-makers and experts in 
healthcare (Fox et al. 2005). On the other, the very idea of sharing the powers of doctors with 
clients is professionally centred, and demands leadership on the side of experts (Great Britain 
2008, 2010e). By doing so, EBRs may reinforce the idea that the professional – even when 
committed to client’s participation in the decision-making process – is “in the driving seat” 
(Cribb, 2005, p.45). The danger entailed in the anti-paternalistic language of EBRs is therefore 
that of masking a persistence of paternalistic values and power relations with the enfranchising 
rhetoric of patient-centeredness. How to solve this paternalism paradox in EBRs? 
Empowerment ,  responsibi l i ty  for  heal th and the charge o f  heal thism 
This second critique exposes the risk, allegedly entailed in EBRs, to produce obligations on 
the side of citizens to conform to social expectations and interests regarding their health 
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(Cribb 2005, Holland 2007, Veitch 2010). As showed above, some of these documents put in 
fact a strong emphasis on ameliorating the general health of the population through the 
empowerment of citizens’ responsibilities (Great Britain 2010a, 2010e). Diffusing 
responsibility for health within EBRs, builds therefore upon a specific consideration of the 
social good of health (Cribb 2005). Namely, EBRs conceive health as a common good whose 
pursuit requires the contribution of all members of society (Holland 2007). In doing so, they 
appear to assert not only the need for an approach to healthcare oriented by the preferences 
of the population. Rather, they instate also a different kind of responsibility, on the side of 
each of us, for supporting the system’s efficiency and sustainability, through healthy 
behaviours. One obvious problem of empowerment approaches conceived as such is that they 
attempt at pursuing two radically different aims, which can hardly be reconciled (Holland 
2007). On the one hand, EBRs aim at enhancing opportunities for self-determination of 
individual citizens with regard to health-related decision-making. They put an emphasis on 
patients and individuals assuming responsibility for selecting services, or managing their own 
conditions (Great Britain 2004a, European Science Foundation 2012). On the other, they seek 
to establish high quality levels of care for the population, and better health standards within 
the system (Great Britain 2008, 2010a, European Commission 2013).  
In this respect, EBRs could be seen as a political effort devoted to conform 
individuals to the “healthy” standards in the minds of those in power (Holland 2007, Veitch 
2010). Roughly put, according to this interpretation, their objective would be that of 
empowering individuals to freely choose healthier behaviours that are established by the 
healthcare system. This critique shows therefore that attention should be paid to the value 
assigned to health in EBRs, and calls for an understanding of health-related goods within their 
vision. If EBRs commit themselves to foster a culture of healthism (Minkler 1999, 
Greenhalgh 2004), a tension emerges between the aims of empowerment and its application 
to health. Placing a strong emphasis on the enhancement of responsibility can indeed being 
empowering for citizens, by enabling them to direct the management of their own health and 
the healthcare system. Yet, if health is presented as a standard to which all members of a 
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community are empowered to conform, the system’s rationale appears to switch from ‘citizens 
make a choice’ to ‘ensuring that specific kinds of choices are made’ (Veitch 2010). How then 
should we conceive health in EBRs, so as to avoid this potentially disquieting implication of 
their vision? 
Empowerment ,  and the pi t fa l l s  o f  shi f t ing responsibi l i ty  for  heal th 
Finally, another ethical concern may be fostered by EBRs’ emphasis on responsibility for 
health. Many of these policy documents recommend in fact citizens to be responsible for their 
health and with respect to their use of healthcare services and resources. Such shift in 
responsibility for health is presented as a core tenet of the broader empowering intent of putting 
individuals “at the heart” (Great Britain 2004a, 2004b, 2010a, 2010e) of the healthcare system, 
and raises questions about the interpretation of responsibility that are of utmost importance 
for the ethical appraisal of EBRs. Different interpretations of responsibility for health allow in 
fact invoking different ethical or critical evaluations of EBRs.  
This critical uptake of EBRs highlights the negative aspects of ‘responsibilization’ for 
health by stressing the potential unwanted consequences of assuming that people can be held 
morally responsible for their health (Minkler 1999, Wilkinson 1999, Buyx and Prainsack 2012, 
Brown 2013). From this perspective, the main problem with EBRs is not that they invoke 
responsibility for the promotion of a particular standard for health across the population (see 
above). Rather, it is the assumption that agents are sufficiently free so as to be in charge of their health-
related choices. An uncritical attribution of responsibility for health that does not take into 
account this issue, critics argue, simply ignores the psychological mechanisms underlying the 
social distribution of health, and may introduce or accentuate health inequalities in the general 
population. Extensive evidence (Marmot and Wilkinson 2005, World Health Organization 
2013) has been in fact produced regarding the gradient between health and socio-economic 
status. Roughly put, this evidence shows that the lower the socio-economic status of an 
individual is, the higher the likelihood that she will experience poorer health outcomes. This is 
mainly due to differences in power, skills and resources within a given population, and implies 
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that shifting responsibility from the system onto the hands of patients could disempower rather 
than empower certain groups of our society. Although it appears to fall within one’s powers to 
refrain from risky behaviours, or – as I argued – to pursue one’s own standard of health, it is 
also important to keep in mind that unhealthy behaviours are less about personal control than 
EBRs assume. How to make sure that EBRs do not unfairly inflate citizens’ responsibility for 
their health? 
 
Part 1 of the thesis is dedicated to addressing these three categories of issues. The general 
argument that I will propose is that empowerment, as it is presented in EBRs, can be 
considered a defensible and feasible feature of future healthcare systems only if its 
understanding is capable of addressing and resolving the aforementioned ethical concerns. 
Otherwise stated, I maintain that tackling the ethical issues potentially arising from EBRs must 
be an explicit objective for advocates of empowerment – along with the development of 
strategies for its achievement and implementation – if the approach has to be considered not 
only for its “ideological soundness” (Tones and Green 2004, p.39), but also for its ethical 
sustainability. In doing so, Part 1 engages in a normative analysis of the foundations of 
empowerment, highlighting the substantive elements and values that should be at the basis of 
this approach.  
Conclusions 
The analysis presented in this chapter shows that the “new wave” of empowerment thinking 
in healthcare policy-making operates a thorough reconfiguration of the substantive and 
normative tenets originally attached to the concept. To this purpose, I presented a historical 
reconstruction of the different policy documents that, whilst revisiting the primary raison d’être 
of empowerment approaches to the governance of healthcare, appear to edify anew the 
substantive and normative foundations of the approach. In light of what I showed above, the 
new wave of EBRs is not to be merely understood as reiterating the benefits of 
disempowering healthcare institutions and professionals for the empowerment of citizens and 
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patients. Rather, the new wave of EBRs should best be regarded as creating a new 
sociotechnical imaginary (Jasanoff 2009, Jasanoff and Kim 2013) about the political modalities 
of organizing healthcare and redistributing the onus of health and healthcare polity across 
society. Among the effects that this vision of healthcare is likely to foster, I argued, it is worth 
emphasizing how latest EBRs reconfigure the manner in which patient citizens should come to 
think of managing their health and illness in the terms of a proactive exercise of responsibility. 
Furthermore, this chapter highlighted also how some disquieting implications are 
potentially yielded by the political endeavour of the new wave of EBRs, thus supporting the 
need of a normative appraisal of empowerment within this context. The main question that 
emerges from the present analysis is thus whether the empowerment approach has currently 
lost all of “its power” (Woodall et al. 2012), and still remains an ethically “sound and popular 
discourse” in healthcare policy-making (Veitch 2010, 314). Under the aegis of the new 
interpretation of empowerment presented above, igniting citizens’ power-to control their own 
health (often framed in terms of responsibility rather than control) assumes, as we have seen, 
very different moral contours from the ones it had in the original formulation of the approach 
(Salmon and Hall 2004, Veitch 2010, Colombo et al. 2012). How to ensure therefore that this 
future scenario is an ethically desirable one?  
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Chapter 2. Empowerment, compliance and the paternalism 
paradox  
Introduction 
As we have seen in Chapter 1, critics argue that the anti-paternalistic rhetoric of control and 
choice at the basis of empowerment in political discourse on healthcare reforms actually 
conceals a continuing exercise of power over healthcare clients that can be qualified as an 
instance of paternalism. To this view, one of the main outcomes of EBRs is that professionals 
can continue to exert power-over their clients (like they did under the so-called ‘compliance 
model’), whilst at the same time using the emancipatory ideology and discourse of 
empowerment (Buchanan 2000, Salmon 2004, Juengst et al. 2012).  
I call this tension, in the debate on empowerment, the ‘paternalism paradox’. In order 
to address the critique entailed by the paradox, this chapter explores the relationship between 
paternalism and the empowerment approach. In particular, I single out what kinds 
paternalistic acts (if any) can be part of empowerment, and discuss the normative issues 
concerning their legitimacy. Accordingly, the chapter proceeds as follows: 1) I provide a 
working definition of paternalism for the purpose of identifying the paternalistic features of 
both the compliance model and the empowerment approach; 2) I take a hard look at the 
compliance model of healthcare delivery and I provide an answer to the question ‘what is 
paternalistic in the compliance model?’; 3) I explore the reasons behind what I call the 
‘paternalism paradox’ by assessing how (some accounts of) empowerment fall under the 
proposed working definition of paternalism; 4) siding with the critique entailed by the 
‘paradox’ I then provide a normative analysis of the paternalistic features identifiable in (some 
accounts of) empowerment, and investigate whether they mimic the difficulties attributed to 
the compliance model; 5) I scrutinize whether paternalistic features are necessarily 
encompassed by different accounts of empowerment.  
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What I will conclude is that, all things considered, the ‘paternalism paradox’ applies 
only to some understandings of empowerment. Yet, the ‘paradox’ raises a relevant question 
regarding the substantive underpinnings of empowerment. It shows us that, in some of its 
declensions, empowerment fails to fully live up to the promise of being a tout court anti-
paternalistic strategy for health promotion. In order to tackle this difficulty, I then present an 
understanding of empowerment that is free from paternalistic features, and hence capable to 
account for the promise of the anti-paternalistic revolution ascribed to EBRs. 
A working definition of paternalism 
In order to fulfil the aims of this paper, I need to identify a definition of ‘paternalism’ that can 
function as a benchmark for the identification of the paternalistic features in the compliance 
model and the empowerment approach. For this reason, this section explores some adequacy 
criteria (Gerring 2001, Tengland 2008) for the identification of a definition of paternalism 
both generally plausible and useful to the present analysis.  
A first reasonable criterion to start from, in choosing a definition, is the so-called 
language criterion. Such criterion points to the advantages of developing formulations of a 
concept grasping its meaning and use in common language. In the case of paternalism, this 
means that the definition provided should capture shared uses of what counts as a 
paternalistic act. By incorporating social and psychological practices of a certain (i.e. the 
English-speaking) language community into the definition of a word, the language criterion has 
the advantage of minimizing conceptual confusion7. However, the language criterion needs to 
be tempered in the light of what shall be called the descriptiveness criterion.  
The word ‘paternalism’ has in fact come to convey strong negative connotations in 
both ordinary and academic language. The value assigned to individual autonomy supports the 
widespread intuition that paternalistic behaviours, though not problematic in the exercise of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I am well aware that capturing the distinctive use of the term ‘paternalism’ in everyday language would demand 
a sociological appraisal of the gendered implications that the term has (Christensen and Hewitt-Taylor 2006). 
This represents an alternative line of reasoning for dismissing the legitimacy of paternalistic attitudes in the 
doctor-patient relationship, which I do not explore further in the thesis. However, my attempt to take up 
Kultgen’s (1995) parental analogy in defining the term intends to make the reasons for defining paternalism 
oblivious as to their problematic gender biases. I only stick to the term ‘paternalism’ for the sake of consistency 
with the rich philosophical literature to which this analysis is meant to contribute.  
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parental authority and oversight, are morally suspicious when directed to competent adults. 
What seems to foster such recognition is the idea that adults are, in general, competent 
enough to make autonomous decisions and thus should not be equated to children (Sjöstrand 
et al. 2013). Yet, that does not mean that the concept should be best defined in evaluative 
terms. Defining paternalism in non-evaluative terms allows better distinguishing between acts 
of justified and unjustified paternalism, both when dealing with children or adults. The 
reasons for approving or condemning a certain act of paternalism are in fact independent 
from the ones that define the act paternalistic. For the purpose of this chapter, I will therefore 
make use of a descriptive definition of paternalism, which will be in turn used to normatively 
evaluate the legitimacy of a paternalistic act. Such descriptive definition of paternalism should 
help discuss and better determine its potential normative issues. The particular ethical analysis 
of paternalism presented here is not in fact intended to exclude different normative views 
about whether a certain paternalistic act is justifiable (or not).  
Thirdly, the definition should preferably be formulated as a conceptual theory grasping 
the common characteristics of a class of entities deserving of being called with the same name. 
In other words, a useful definition should clearly provide the conditions that make a certain 
act paternalistic. The search for a conceptual theory of paternalism calls however for an 
additional – fourth – criterion to be employed in choosing its definition. As argued by 
Tengland (2008), it may be worth emphasize the uniqueness of the concept of ‘paternalism’ in 
relation to other germane concepts, such as simple beneficence or gift giving. Finally, we have 
the analytic utility criterion requiring us to elaborate a definition that can be beneficial to a 
particular analytic (or theoretical) context. This means, in the case of the present discussion of 
paternalism, that the definition employed should eventually facilitate the normative analysis of 
the compliance model and the empowerment approach.  
Striking the balance between all of these criteria is no easy task. Some of them may 
conflict with one another – e.g. evaluative uses in ordinary language of the word paternalism 
make these definitions incompatible with the descriptiveness criterion. Some others may instead 
need to be tempered in order to be compatible with other criteria – e.g. uses in ordinary 
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language of the word paternalism lack the level of abstraction required by the theory criterion. 
Thus, what I will attempt here is finding a compromise between all the criteria suggested, 
which will result in a working definition of paternalism. Such definition will be then useful to a 
critical scrutiny of the compliance model and empowerment.  
Let us consider first the following definition famously proposed by Dworkin (1972). 
According to the author, paternalism is: “the interference with another’s liberty of action 
justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or 
values of the person being coerced” (Dworkin 1972, p.65). This definition sets two 
fundamental criteria for an action to be considered paternalistic: a) the element of benevolence: 
the act should be taken for the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the 
paternalised; b) the violation of liberty: it has to actually interfere with the liberty of action of 
the paternalised. Otherwise stated, a key aspect of Dworkin’s definition is that actions are 
paternalistic, only if (i) they are successful in being liberty-limiting and (ii) are expected to yield 
a benefit (in terms of welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values) for the recipient. 
This account of paternalism has been thoroughly revised across the years (Dworkin 1995, 
2010). Currently8, Dworkin’s definition of paternalism extends the above-mentioned condition 
b) to all the “usurpations of decision-making” (Dworkin 1995, p.220), thus holding that 
interferences with liberty and/or autonomy (together with the element of benevolence) are 
required for an action to qualify as paternalistic. According to this latter definition, paternalism 
obtains when people are prevented – for beneficent reasons – from doing something they 
have decided, or by “interfering with the way in which they arrive at their decisions” (Dworkin 
1995, p.220).  
Dworkin’s account of paternalism appears to fare quite well with respect to the 
adequacy criteria set above. First, it provides us with a clear understanding of which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The latest development in Dworkin’s scholarship on the concept of paternalism can be found in Dworkin 2013. 
Rather than proposing his own theorization of the concept, here the author discusses the long-standing 
controversy as to how paternalism should best be defined. I do not discuss this piece of Dworkin’s work in this 
chapter, due to the relatively little contribution it may bring to its purposes. However, my analysis of paternalism 
is thoroughly indebted to the recognition of the author that, although conceptual analysis of paternalism is 
mostly devoted to the resolution of substantive conflicts, definitions are not, strictly speaking, required for 
normative arguments (Dworkin 2013, 33). As it may be clear to the reader, I take up this suggestion by adopting 
a descriptiveness criterion in my analysis of paternalism.  
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conditions should be met in order for an action to be paternalistic (theory criterion). 
Paternalistic actions are qualified as interferences with individual decision-making, motivated 
by an expected improvement of individual welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values. 
Second, it refrains from specifying whether paternalism is an inherently good/bad practice, 
thus relegating arguments for its condemnation (or justification) to a different and 
independent layer of analysis (descriptiveness criterion). Third, the concept of paternalism thus 
understood is distinct from other practices motivated by beneficent motives. Coercive and 
manipulative practices, for the sake of the recipient’s benefit, are the unique class of actions 
that satisfy the criteria set by the definition. Finally, this definition appears to be analytically 
useful to the purpose of its potential ethical justification. It clearly identifies the moral loci (i.e. 
the element of benevolence, as well as the interference with the recipient’s liberty and/or 
autonomy) of concern for its normative analysis.  
Nevertheless, it is worth noting how Dworkin’s definition is not free from defects. As 
argued by Kultgen (1995), philosophical understandings of paternalism are defective because 
they are narrower than its popular uses. According to Kultgen, philosophers fail to capture 
what is meant by paternalism in ordinary language (language criterion), and especially within the 
practice of healthcare (Buchanan 1978, p.371). Under this interpretation, a key aspect for the 
definition of paternalism lies in the parental analogy defining the term in its common use. 
Taking up such analogy points to the similitudes between paternalistic relationships and parents 
caring for a child (Kultgen 1995, p.47). Rather than emphasizing the mere interference with 
the liberty/autonomy of an agent, the parental analogy suggests that a relevant component of 
what makes an act paternalistic is the attitude that an agent (e.g. the state) might take towards 
another agent (e.g. citizens). There is no need for paternalistic actions to interfere with the 
autonomy, or liberty of the recipient. The paternalised (e.g. a child) “may have no capacity for 
decision-making for the paternalist to usurp” (Clarke 2002, p.87). It is rather the attitude of 
the paternalist – recapitulating those of caring parents – what defines paternalism, together 
with the commitment to the good of the paternalised. 
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What seems problematic in light of this consideration is the second condition 
identified by Dworkin’s definitions. Claiming that paternalism occurs only when actions are 
effective in limiting liberty and/or autonomy, and for the recipient’s good, does not account 
for the idea – dictated by the language criterion – that attitudes are what qualify paternalistic 
behaviours of parents in ordinary language. Taking up the parental analogy, therefore, exposes 
actions as paternalistic not only if an actual interference with individual decision-making 
occurs together with the promotion of the recipient’s good. Rather, paternalism should 
describe, under this interpretation, an influence over the paternalised, which is not exhausted 
by interferences with decision-making. A form of control and authority exercised par excellence 
on children, for the sake of promoting the recipient’s good “regardless of [her] short-term 
pleasures, desires, and wishes” (Kultgen 1995, p.50).  
In light of this consideration, what I need is therefore a revised definition that tempers 
Dworkin’s second condition with the idea that not all paternalistic actions must limit decision-
making, for the sake of bringing about the good of the recipient. In particular, this condition 
defining paternalism should take into account the intuition that what makes an act 
paternalistic depends from the attitude deployed in promoting the good of the recipient. To 
better elucidate this point let us consider the following case from Hershey (1985): 
 
Suppose, for example, that the aunt of a young student wants to help her niece by transferring 
a certain amount of money to her account on a regular basis. She does so because she is aware 
that her niece has serious troubles with numbers leading her to write wrong checks. This 
happens to such a degree that the young student’s resources are never sufficient to provide her 
adequate means of support. Furthermore, the father of the student (the aunt’s brother) is 
outraged when he finds out that his daughter is draining some of the resources he provides 
her with. For this reason, he would harshly castigate his daughter. The aunt, who works in a 
bank, knows about these conflicts between her niece and her brother, and therefore she would 
give her niece this money even if she did not desire it. The fact that she has access to the bank 
account of the niece allows her to deposit this money in a way that neither her brother nor her 
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niece would ever find out about it. Her main concern is that of avoiding contrasts between the 
two, and making sure that her niece has all that she needs to complete her studies.  
 
The aunt in Hershey’s (1985) example does not appear to interfere with her niece’s liberty of 
action. It could be rather argued that, by providing her with the material means she needs to 
complete her studies, the aunt is actually enhancing the liberty (i.e. freedom of opportunity) of 
her niece (Sen 1985). Neither does she appear to violate the autonomy of the niece, if we 
conceive autonomy as the reflective endorsement of one’s values, desires and commitments 
(Frankfurt 1971). The niece had no stance (she does not know) about the aunt making an 
extra deposit in her account, thus the aunt did not interfere with the wishes, desires, choices, 
or actions of the niece. Nevertheless, Hershey contends that there are good reasons to 
conclude that the aunt in the example is acting paternalistically towards her niece. What is it 
that makes her act paternalistic?  
According to Hershey (1985), the element prompting the recognition of the aunt’s 
behaviour as paternalistic lies in the fact that the money transfer is performed regardless of her 
niece’s consent or dissent. Otherwise stated, the aunt intends to benefit her niece and in doing 
so she considers her potential preferences (which could be manifested through consent or 
dissent) as “irrelevant or motivationally impotent” (Hershey 1985, p.178). Should the niece 
consent or dissent to the money transfer does not make a difference to the aunt. This is not 
meant to exclude that paternalistic actions may involve violations of liberty and/or autonomy. 
The attitude of the aunt may (or may not) violate the niece’s autonomy and/or liberty. If the 
niece had a stance against the money transfer, the aunt’s behaviour would in fact qualify as a 
violation of the niece autonomy. However, for the recognition of the act as paternalistic this is 
not what matters, according to the view I am endorsing here (Hershey 1985).  
To sum up, the attitude of discounting the (unknown) preferences, wishes, choices, or 
actions of her niece is what makes her act paternalistic according to Hershey (1985). Following 
this suggestion, I maintain that the lack of consideration for the recipient’s consent or dissent 
can be regarded as a better second condition for identifying a paternalistic action. In 
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particular, this new condition seems to account for the intuition described above (complying 
with the language criterion) that paternalistic conduct does not necessarily entail explicitly 
interfering with the liberty and/or autonomy of the subject. It is rather a form of control and 
authority exerted on the recipient of the act.  
Let us then consider a definition of paternalism taking on board all of the above 
considerations: an action is paternalistic if and only if it is (i) intended to promote the good of 
the recipient in terms of individual welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values, and (ii) 
the consent or dissent of the recipient is not a relevant consideration for the initiator of the act. 
This definition adopts the first condition of Dworkin’s account of paternalism and preserves 
some of its strengths. Similarly to his account it satisfies: (1) the theory criterion (it clearly states 
the common characteristics of the class of acts deserving of being called ‘paternalism’);  (2) the 
descriptiveness criterion (the normative evaluation of the practice is not entailed in the 
definition); (3) the uniqueness criterion (beneficent actions discounting the consent or dissent of 
the recipient are the unique class of actions that follow under the definition); (4) the analytic 
utility criterion (it brings into focus the potential loci of ethical concern useful to its normative 
analysis – e.g. on which grounds can the paternalist beneficent motives justified to discount 
the consent or dissent of the recipient?). Furthermore, it also fares better with regard to the 
language criterion, by taking on board Hershey’s suggestion that the consent or dissent of the 
recipient might be regarded as a relevant constituent of what makes an act paternalistic. Such 
condition captures the idea, present in the common use of the term, that paternalism entails 
an attitude towards exercising control and authority analogous to the behaviour of a father 
towards his children.  
Differently from past influential analyses of this concept (e.g. Dworkin 1972, 1995, 
2010), the definition I presented here does not confine paternalism to the sole performance of 
liberty and/or autonomy limiting acts, but rather to the invocation of specific reasons and 
motives (epitomized by the relevance assigned to attitudes) for certain actions (Grill 2007). 
Namely, paternalism comprises those actions moved by beneficent motives that entail the attitude 
of considering the consent or dissent of the recipient motivationally unimportant. In doing so, 
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the account proposed here does not aim at providing a necessarily original account of 
paternalism, but only at taking into account the attempts at opening up philosophical 
understandings of paternalism to the range of shared and lay intuitions about what makes an 
act paternalistic. 
What is paternalistic in the compliance model? 
Given the identification of a definition of paternalism both plausible and suitable to the 
purposes of this chapter, I now move to investigate whether and why the compliance model 
falls under such a definition. The aim of this section is thus to test whether it is possible to 
identify paternalistic features in the compliance model, and to analyse whether this recognition 
could be a source of legitimate ethical concern.  
As noted by Kyngäs and colleagues (2000), the concept of ‘compliance’ refers to the 
extent to which a patient’s decision coincides with medical or health advice. This means that, 
with regard to its general definition, the concept does not explicitly encompass any 
commitment to paternalistic intervention. Yet, the notion of compliance is widely regarded as 
an ideology that emphasizes the professional power of healthcare providers (Anderson and 
Funnell 2005). Advocates of empowerment have always questioned the compliance model of 
healthcare delivery for its narrow focus on treatment adherence and health outcomes 
(Raymond 1984, Feste and Anderson 1995). This commitment to clinical endpoints, they 
argue, is likely to result in an attempt to persuade patients to accept predetermined healthcare 
goals, thus reducing their autonomy and freedom of choice. Other critics (Cribb and Entwistle 
2011, Sandman and Munthe 2010) have instead investigated the ethical implications of such 
focus, concluding that this model is paternalistic. However, little explanation is provided as to 
which paternalistic features they identify in the compliance model. On what basis then is the 
compliance model presented as an instance of paternalism? 
At this stage of my analysis, it is worth emphasizing how such recognition depends 
very much on the definition of paternalism we employ. The analysis of paternalism above 
shows us that controversies surrounding its philosophical understandings (Dworkin 2013) 
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should make us cautious in concluding that the compliance model is a paradigmatic example of 
paternalistic care (Feste and Anderson 1995, p.140). I will not delve into the reasons behind 
different accounts of paternalism that would not recognise professional behaviour to be 
paternalistic if it aims at using expertise power to persuade patients into a clinical outcome9. 
What I will probe, instead, is whether the definition of paternalism I proposed allows us to 
recognise some paternalistic feature(s) in the compliance model. Let us consider the following 
situation:  
  
Jenny is a 38 y/o woman who has just married the person she believes is the love of her life. 
After a gynaecological check-up she is unfortunately diagnosed with cervical cancer. Her 
doctor, Yuri, decides to perform on her a lymphadenectomy. In addition to this, he suggests 
also adjuvant chemo-radiation, an additional therapy usually given after surgery in cases where 
there exists a statistical risk of relapse due to occult disease. Jenny has promptly consented to 
the lymphadenectomy, and now faces the choice of whether to accept the after-surgery 
treatment. If she accepts the procedure she will likely lose her fertility. Without undergoing 
chemo-radiation, instead, she still has the possibility of giving birth to a child through 
gestational surrogacy (i.e. having a child genetically related to her parents and not to the 
surrogate mother). Jenny knows the reality of her condition, but she strongly believes that 
having a child biologically kin to her and her newlywed is what best conforms to her values 
and desires. The doctor understands that Jenny has some difficulties in coping with the 
decision at stake. For this reason (and for the sake of her own good), he repeatedly uses his 
authority to persuade the patient to change her mind, by prospecting her that (i) adjuvant 
chemo-radiation could decrease the risk of relapse by 40-50%, and (ii) the chances of 
obtaining a successful pregnancy are less than 10%. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Dworkin’s first definition (1972) is a good example of the difficulties, for the critics of the compliance model, 
arising from a narrow view of paternalism. While the first condition in Dworkin’s definition (i.e. the commitment 
to the good of the paternalised) does not create much of a problem to the critics of the compliance model, 
difficulties arise when we claim actions to be paternalistic only if they succeed in being for the recipient’s good. 
Though being committed to the therapeutic goals of care, the compliance model does not entail necessarily 
ignoring or infringing patient’s liberty. Rather, patient’s perspective is simply taken as not being on a par with the 
one of the professional. It may therefore well be that the professional in the compliance model does not succeed 
to coax the patient into her expectation. Was this the case, the exercise of persuasion entailed by the compliance 
model would not be deemed paternalistic in Dworkin’s terms. 
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The fictional case of Jenny presents us with a situation exemplifying the compliance model. A 
patient is confronted by a professional for the purpose of making her comply with what is 
medically good for her. In particular, Jenny’s case portraits a contrast between what the 
patient perceives as her own good, and what the doctor thinks instead could best benefit the 
patient. Jenny is competent enough to be considered capable of autonomous and rational 
decision-making. Her decision to refuse adjuvant chemo-radiation resorts to her deepest 
values and desires. Nevertheless, Yuri believes that the motives at the basis of her decision are 
fundamentally questionable. From his perspective, her conception of the good is simply 
inadequate because it would be different if she appraised the harms arising from her potential 
refusal of additional treatment. The upshot of this situation is that Yuri repeatedly attempts to 
persuade Jenny into making a therapeutic decision that would best conform with her medical 
interest. In doing this, he does not consider relevant whether she would reach her decision in 
full autonomy, or not. 
Is this example of the compliance approach to medical decision-making an instance of 
paternalism? Recall the two conditions above: (i) the act has to be intended to promote the 
good of the recipient in terms of individual welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or 
values; (ii) the consent or dissent of the recipient is not a relevant consideration for the 
initiator of the act. Both of these conditions obtain in the fictional case of Yuri and Jenny. 
First, Yuri takes action (i.e. an exercise of authoritative persuasion) in order to benefit Jenny. 
As a professional, he is committed to the principle of beneficence and tries to convince her to 
follow the best treatment plan available for her condition. He genuinely intends to promote 
the good of his patient, thus satisfying the first condition set for an act to be paternalistic. 
Second, Yuri performs his act of benevolence independently from Jenny’s wishes, choices, or 
actions. He exerts his professional authority in order to convince Jenny about what biomedical 
research statistically suggests being in her interest. He does so in a way that Jenny’s 
perspective does not make a difference in his decision to act. Although Yuri does not coerce 
Jenny in any way, he discounts her point of view. Differently from the doctor’s perspective, 
her reasons are simply not considered in the decision-making process to which both partake. 
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This independence in Yuri’s decision to act (i.e. exert authoritative persuasion) characterizes 
Jenny’s perspective as motivationally impotent. Otherwise stated, Jenny’s potential dissent to 
receive the adjuvant treatment, as well as to be persuaded onto complying with professional 
advice, are not a relevant consideration for Yuri’s exercise of professional authority. This 
means that also the second condition for paternalism obtains in this situation. If we combine 
the two considerations above, it is thus possible to conclude that the case of Jenny and Yuri – 
capturing the characteristics of decision-making within the compliance model – is an act of 
paternalism.  
To sum up, the fictional example of Jenny and Yuri allows a better qualification of the 
recognition that the so-called compliance model of healthcare delivery is indeed paternalistic. 
Roughly put, the compliance model can be deemed paternalistic because it systematically 
discounts the perspective of the patient for the sake of her own medical good. Furthermore, if 
my analysis of a working definition of paternalism holds, it is also safe to conclude that such 
recognition is concordant with a reasonably plausible understanding of paternalism. Detecting 
the paternalistic features of the compliance model, however, tells nothing about its ethical 
evaluation. The next step for the present analysis is, therefore, to understand whether the 
compliance model is a worrisome form of paternalism.  
The answer to this question lies in a number of possible ethical considerations. First, 
the compliance model appears to endorse a narrow view of what medical beneficence entails. 
What is good for the patient is provided a meaning specific to medicine, which is identified by 
a professional on scientific grounds (Sandman et al. 2012). Although it is obvious that doctors 
are in general more knowledgeable as to the best medical option available to their patients, 
such conception of beneficence runs the risk of disregarding the short and long-term goals of 
the patient. By contrast, it could be argued that the example above shows no major violation 
of autonomy. It is in fact generally held, in medical ethics, that overriding patient perspective 
for the sake of improving decision-making competence is in the end beneficent to the patient 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2001). Yuri’s actions aim at providing Jenny with more detailed 
information about the potential consequences of her choice, thus preserving and improving 
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her long-term autonomy. According to this perspective, Yuri’s action would not be ethically 
problematic because the positive value of making his patient’s decisions more informed 
outweighs the negative value of imposing information onto Jenny. 
However, a different evaluation of Yuri’s behaviour can be also grounded on 
considerations of autonomy. This second line of reasoning would deem problematic, in Yuri’s 
paternalistic behaviour, the fact that he considers legitimate to authoritatively (attempt to) 
coalesce Jenny into what is good for her from the medical point of view. This concern about 
the compliance model is, in other words, that it disfavours a full recognition of patient’s 
perspective as the ultimate guidance for clinical decision-making (Cribb and Entwistle 2011). 
Jenny is not consulted as an equal participant to the medical decision-making process. Rather, 
her preferences are simply considered not authentic enough (because they are not scientifically 
informed) to be on a par with those of Yuri (Sjöstrand et al. 2013). To this view, it is the 
imbalance of power between the non-expert patient and the physician functioning as a 
“purveyor of expertise” (Tauber 2005, p.62), what makes ethically problematic the compliance 
model. It could be in fact argued that the notion of authentic autonomous agency encountered 
in the case of Jenny and Yuri is philosophically naïve. A substantive disagreement exists in fact 
in the philosophical literature about what counts as an authentic autonomous decision, and 
especially as to the role that cognitive, affective, valuational, and dispositional states play in the 
constitution of an authentic expression of the will (Oshana 2007). Regardless of this 
complexity, the compliance model conflates authenticity of patient’s decisions with the 
capacity to govern one’s own health accordingly to scientifically informed beliefs. By doing so, 
the compliance model conveys therefore the message that healthcare professionals know 
better than patients what is best for them because of their scientific expertise, thus legitimising 
potential exercises of arbitrary power in the doctor-patient relationship (Holm 1993, Sandman 
et al. 2012).  
In conclusion, the example of Yuri and Jenny describes a situation where the clinical 
interest of a patient is presented independently from what the patient might perceive as her 
best interest in the light of her values and beliefs. The professional is (i) considered to know 
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best what is good for the patient, and (ii) expected to authoritatively persuade the patient into 
what is good for her (from the professional point of view). Through the lens of the 
‘compliance model’, we can conclude, collaboration between the doctor and the patient is thus 
understood in terms of an obligation (Evans 2007) to follow medical advice, grounded on 
considerations of beneficence. Such strong focus on health outcomes, however, can lead to 
neglect other important entitlements ascribable to patients in contemporary healthcare. The 
commitment to the respect of patient autonomy can hardly be reconciled with the idea that a 
poorly (or not) compliant patient ought to be regarded as unable to grasp what is good for 
her, and/or lacking the ability to authentically choose in their own best interest. 
Empowerment and the ‘paternalism paradox’ 
Evaluating the paternalistic features of the compliance model is pivotal to the forthcoming 
analysis of what I shall call the ‘paternalism paradox’. In order for the paradox to hold water, 
it is necessary to single out whether some accounts of empowerment can give rise to actions 
comprised by the definition of paternalism defended above. As we will see in the remaining of 
this section, proponents of the ‘paradox’ are concerned with the potential drawbacks of 
empowerment in the context of contemporary personalised medicine. In a nutshell, they argue 
that it is possible to identify paradoxical paternalistic outcomes to specific accounts of the non-
paternalistic discourse of empowerment.  
This critique takes off from the widespread appeal to personalized genomic medicine, 
which has gained enormous popularity in the last decade (Juengst et al. 201210). In particular, 
the authors take a hard look at the rising vision of medicine equating empowerment with (i) 
enhanced participation to decision-making processes, and (ii) higher availability of health-
related information (e.g. genomic information). The intent of their analysis is to highlight how 
the appeal to empowerment is not as uncontroversial as it might appear under the aegis of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 As referenced accordingly by Juengst et al. (2012), the argument against paternalistic outcomes of personalised 
genomic medicine builds upon a paper by Prainsack and colleagues (2008). I use the work of Juengst et al. (2012) 
for the purpose of my analysis because the original paper revolves around the potential unwanted consequences 
of pushing individual responsibility for health in direct-to-consumer genetic testing, rather than on the analysis of 
its paternalistic features. 
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personalized medicine. Building upon the market rhetoric surrounding empowerment within 
genomics, they show that this approach has a fundamental “vice” (Juengst et al. 2012, p.36). 
Namely, it relocates responsibility for health from traditional healthcare structures onto the 
hands of patients. The language of empowerment is often associated with rhetoric of 
liberation from the oppression of paternalistic expertise. However, the enthusiasm 
surrounding such a paradigm-shift runs the risk of obscuring its potentially paternalistic 
drawbacks.  
In order to better illustrate this point, let us consider a different version of the thought 
experiment we analysed in the case of the compliance model: 
 
Jenny is a 38 y/o woman who has just married the person she believes is the love of her life. 
After a gynaecological check-up she is unfortunately diagnosed with cervical cancer. Her 
doctor, Yuri, decides to perform on her a lymphadenectomy. In addition to this, he suggests 
also adjuvant chemo-radiation, an additional therapy usually given after surgery in cases where 
there exists a statistical risk of relapse due to occult disease. Jenny has promptly consented to 
the lymphadenectomy, and now faces the choice of whether to accept the after-surgery 
treatment. If she accepts the procedure she will likely lose her fertility. Without undergoing 
chemo-radiation, instead, she still has the possibility of giving birth to a child through 
gestational surrogacy (i.e. having a child genetically related to her parents and not to the 
surrogate mother). Jenny knows the reality of her condition. She has been empowered with all 
the relevant information on her health status, and asked to decide about the after-surgery 
treatment. However, she is uncertain about whether having a child biologically kin to her and 
her newlywed should prevail over the possibility of reducing the risk of relapse. The doctor 
understands that Jenny has some difficulties in coping with the decision at stake. Among the 
possible ways to react to this situation (and for the sake of her own good), he decides to 
repeatedly use his authority to persuade the patient to accept his advice, by prospecting her 
that (i) adjuvant chemo-radiation could decrease the risk of relapse by 40-50%, and (ii) the 
chances of obtaining a successful pregnancy are less than 10%. 
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This alternative version of Jenny’s fictional case shows us that we should not assume that 
empowerment always “yields positive outcomes” (Juengst et al. 2012, p.36). In this situation, 
Yuri behaves in conformity to the account of empowerment presented by Juengst and 
colleagues (2012). He provides the patient with all the information available, and lets her the 
possibility to decide what is best for her. This is indeed what the notion of empowerment at 
stake here prescribes him to do. However, this shift in responsibility appears to be 
counterproductive for the patient. Jenny has some difficulties in taking up the responsibility of 
choosing between having a child with her newlywed, and consenting to the adjuvant therapy. 
By “styling participation as an expansion of patient control” (Juengst et al. 2012, p.38), such 
notion of empowerment burdens the patient with an obligation to exercise control over the 
healthcare process. This state of affairs puts some pressure on Jenny, which weakens her 
capacity to resist to Yuri’s same paternalistic interference we encountered in the case of the 
compliance model. In other words, Juengst and colleagues (2012) point to the risk of patient 
empowerment collapsing into the ambiguous benefit of having more information at patient’s 
disposal (e.g. genomic susceptibilities in their analysis), without the capacity of understanding, 
managing, and directing it in an autonomously chosen course of action.  
This revised version of Yuri and Jenny’s case highlights therefore the shortcomings of 
the view of empowerment, which is a major concern for the proponents of the ‘paradox’. 
First, by reducing patient control to enhanced and informed participation, empowerment 
(understood as such) creates a “whole range of complementary obligations on the patient’s 
part” (Juengst et al. 2012, p.38) that might run up against its own objectives. Jenny is given the 
burden of making an important decision regarding her life, without any consideration of the 
difficulties originating from her empowered role. An undesirable consequence of (this account 
of) empowerment might be, therefore, the creation of an undue pressure on the side of 
patients originating from their lack of capacity to direct genetic information in an 
autonomously chosen course of action. Second, the case of Jenny and Yuri shows that, “when 
falling into medicine’s traditional domains of authority” (Juengst et al. 2012, p.39), the 
emphasis on empowerment potentially results in an increase of patient compliance with medical 
	   77 
recommendation. Jenny lacks the ability to cope with the decision to accept or refuse adjuvant 
chemo-radiation. This state of affairs puts her in a weak position, which opens up the 
possibility of making her more exposed and vulnerable to Yuri’s paternalistic interferences. 
Juengst and colleagues (2012) point, in other words, to a legitimate concern regarding 
the theoretical underpinnings of a specific conception of empowerment. They subject to 
critical scrutiny the unintended consequences of the personalized medicine discourse. In brief, 
the paternalism paradox points to the fact that, regardless of the anti-paternalistic allure often 
ascribed to empowerment, some uses of the concept have actually the potential unwanted 
consequence of opening up possibilities for paternalistic interferences to be furthered in the 
doctor-patient relationship. In doing so, the critique of Juengst and colleagues (2012) hints at 
the possibility that paternalistic outcomes of empowerment may depend on how the concept 
is conceived, understood and implemented in practice. 
Empowerment is no l ess  paternalistic than the compliance model 
In the previous section, I showed how the empowerment approach could result in the same 
paternalistic behaviours ascribable to the so-called compliance model. This means that critics 
are right in pointing out that empowerment, in some of its understandings, is no less 
paternalistic than the compliance model (Buchanan 2000, Holland 2007, Juengst et al. 2012). 
Differently from the compliance model, however, the empowerment approach analysed above 
entails paternalistic behaviours on the side of professionals only as a possibility (among others) 
resulting from the kind of relationship it instates. Due to the difficulties, on the side of Jenny, 
to cope with the devolution of responsibility for health entailed in this account of 
empowerment, Yuri can exercise on her the same kind of paternalistic interference he is 
compelled to in the previous scenario from the compliance model. This means that a 
fundamental difference exists between the compliance model and the empowerment 
approach, as it has been analysed so far. In the former, paternalistic behaviours of healthcare 
professionals are ingrained in the understanding of agency and obligations of a doctor towards 
a patient. The patient’s view is deemed not to stand equal foot against the one of the doctor, 
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who is consequently required (for the patient’s own good) to authoritatively persuade the 
patient into medical advice regardless of her potential consent/dissent. Things stand 
differently however, if we take into account the fictional scenario epitomizing the 
empowerment approach in personalised genomic medicine. Here, the professional is required 
to step in the direction of a devolution of his power to the patient, by providing her with all 
the relevant information on her health status, and by asking her to take up the responsibility to 
decide about the after-surgery treatment. However, the difficulties encountered by the patient 
in coping with this burdensome task leave open the possibility for the doctor to exercise the 
very same kind of paternalistic interference he was compelled to by the compliance model.  
In other words, the paternalism paradox stems here from a limitation of this account 
of empowerment, which is unable to keep up with its own anti-paternalistic promise. The 
accounts of empowerment liable to the paternalism paradox hint at the potential benefits 
arising from having at one’s disposal more information and participating in decisions about 
health. However, what these understandings of empowerment fail to account for is that the 
success of this strategy is linked to individuals grasping the information and choosing to act 
upon it. This means that critics of empowerment are right in pointing out that medical 
information may be difficult for patients to manage and that, consequently, empowerment is 
likely to open up a space for authoritative persuasion in the process of delivering medical 
information to healthcare clients. 
Similarly to the case of the compliance model, some ethical concerns can thus be 
recognised in the account of empowerment liable of the paternalism paradox. First, one could 
map this account onto the narrow view of medical beneficence ascribable to the compliance 
model. The understanding of empowerment at the basis of the paradox allows in fact for the 
imposition on patients of the same narrow focus on health outcomes, which has proved 
problematic for the compliance model. The space left for authoritative persuasion in 
empowerment could be subverted as a “device for increasing patient compliance with medical 
recommendation” (Juengst et al. 2012, p.39), in the light of the achievement of a clinical good. 
Second, a legitimate concern about (this account of) empowerment is that it fails to keep up 
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with its commitment to the promotion of patient autonomy. Very much like in the case of the 
compliance model, empowerment appears to disfavour a full recognition of patient’s 
perspective as the ultimate guidance for clinical decision-making. However, it does so in a 
different way from the compliance model. This account of empowerment makes appeal to the 
alleged importance of enhancing patient autonomy, but fails to keep up to its own promise.  
In light of this recognition, I can now conclude that empowerment, through the prism 
of the paradox, appears to be a mixture of paternalism and authority that puts the individual in 
a weak position. The critique entailed in the ‘paradox’ reveals that some legitimate concerns 
exist as to whether processes of empowerment have the potential to yield their declared goals 
(Tengland 2007). In particular, it points to the necessity of improving our understanding of 
empowerment in a way that is compatible with the aims of the approach. Not only 
empowerment should aim at devolving decisional power to the patient, but also it should 
ensure that this process does not leave open a space for paternalistic interferences. Of course, 
this recognition holds only insofar as we want to fulfil the promise of empowerment to have a 
special “moral stand against medical paternalism” (Juengst et al. 2012, p.39). In the remaining 
of this chapter, I will present an understanding of empowerment, which avoids these 
unwanted outcomes. By doing so, my aim is to counter the objection entailed in the 
paternalism paradox, and clarify how processes of empowerment could consistently achieve 
empowering goals without being paternalistic. 
How to prevent paternalistic outcomes of empowerment? 
The recognition that paternalistic outcomes may be attributed to a given notion of 
empowerment questions the alleged ethical advantages of this approach vis à vis those of the 
compliance model (Swift 1984, Feste and Anderson 1995). In order to understand whether 
alternative accounts of empowerment can handle the problems arising from the paternalism 
paradox, it is necessary to delve into the diverse normative foundations at the basis of the 
concept. Defining the normative underpinnings of empowerment approaches is, however, no 
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easy task because of the substantial philosophical disagreement on how to best describe the 
concept (Tengland 2007).  
As we have seen in Chapter 1, the concept of empowerment was elaborated in 
disciplines such as liberatory pedagogy, social psychology, mental health and health promotion 
(Rappaport 1987, Wallerstein 1992, Rodwell 1996, Laverack and Labontè 2000). Within these 
contexts, empowerment has been associated with both of the distinct notions of power 
(Wartenberg 1990) highlighted above; that is, “power-to” and “power-over” (see infra Chapter 
1). These two notions of power were originally meant to go hand in hand within the 
empowerment approach. A mere focus on individual enablement did not suffice, for its 
inventors, to produce the benefits ascribed to the approach. Quite the contrary, such outcome 
was deemed to be achievable only through intervention in the two domains of power. 
Roughly put, a gain of power at the intrapersonal level ought to necessarily be accompanied by 
changes at the interpersonal level, in order for empowerment to obtain (Minkler 1999). 
Things stand differently, however, if we analyse latest developments in the 
empowerment literature, and what I called EBRs. In the last two decades, the focus of this 
approach has narrowed down to a specific interpretation of the idea of power-to, i.e. towards 
an emphasis on individual responsibility for health-related decision-making. As shown in 
Chapter 1, this is especially frequent in the policy-making literature, which has recently 
associated the concept with a neo-liberal and consumerist view of health-related agency 
(McGregor 2001, Veitch 2010).  
If we scrutinize closely the notion of empowerment at the basis of the paternalism 
paradox (Buchanan 2000, Salmon 2004, Juengst et al. 2012) it is not difficult to recognize its 
resemblance with the latter family of empowerment approaches described here. Two 
assumptions appear in fact to underlie empowerment as questioned by its critics and the 
paternalism paradox: first, that providing individuals with relevant information and 
opportunities to exercise choice can be automatically considered an empowering step; second, 
that the achievement of empowering goals does not need to involve any influence over the 
“environmental and socio-organizational circumstances” (Owens and Cribb 2013, p.263) that 
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affect clinical decision-making (e.g. the use of authoritative persuasion on the side of 
healthcare professionals). One question that could be asked at this point of our analysis is 
therefore whether accounts of empowerment of the first kind are actually able to prevent the 
paternalistic outcomes at the basis of the paradox. To this issue I now turn for the remaining 
of this section.  
As showed above, traditional understandings of empowerment have to do not only 
with the goal of increasing ability and opportunities to exercise choice in medical decision-
making, but also with the means that can be used within empowering processes to actually 
obtain them (Tengland 2007, 2008). From this perspective, empowerment is understood as 
letting the healthcare “client, group or community have as much control as possible over the 
change processes they are involved in” (Tengland 2012, p.143). However, what is also 
important – for this view – are the means that professionals are allowed to use for the 
achievement of the goals of empowerment (Tengland 2007). Some of them are considered to 
be compatible with its goals, some others are instead deemed to be in open contrast with 
them. Otherwise stated, traditional understandings of empowerment are based on a view of 
the professional-patient relationship, which is different from the one of its more recent 
versions (Juengst et al. 2012). Traditionally, empowerment theorists are concerned with the 
restrictive effect that medical expertise may have on individual ability to control medical 
decision-making. Many professional relations are considered, under this interpretation, as 
heralding “paternalistic outcomes”, due to the “unbalance of ‘power’ (or influence)” between 
the professional and the client (Tengland 2008, p.91). The professional is often in the position 
of (i) structuring and guiding the clinical encounter with patients (Tengland 2008) due to her 
medical expertise, and consequently (ii) of exercising an influence over the patient that can be 
qualified – as we have seen above – as paternalistic. Yet, such kind of patient-professional 
interactions can hardly be reconciled with the goals of empowerment. Changing the power 
balance by limiting professional control is therefore, according to traditional accounts of 
empowerment, of pivotal importance to attain its goals. Empowerment as a process is in fact 
about letting the client actively participate in the decision-making process. This means that the 
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professional should be primarily understood as an enabler or facilitator, who refrains from 
exercising a dominant role over the patient and supports the individual (or group) in 
addressing a problem through the use of empathic listening, non-judgemental attitudes, and 
genuine participation (Tengland 2012). No “persuading, rewarding, punishing, coercing or 
manipulating” (Tengland 2012, p.143) can be considered valuable means for the 
empowerment process. 
 Starting from this premise I can now attempt a final evaluation of our thought 
experiment involving Jenny and Yuri. What I will deploy in this version is the above-sketched 
understanding of empowerment as both a process and a goal, in order to test whether the 
requirement of a reduced professional control over the process is able to prevent its 
paternalistic outcomes: 
 
Jenny is a 38 y/o woman who has just married the person she believes is the love of her life. 
After a gynaecological check-up she is unfortunately diagnosed with cervical cancer. Her 
doctor, Yuri, decides to perform on her a lymphadenectomy. In addition to this, he suggests 
also adjuvant chemo-radiation, an additional therapy usually given after surgery in cases where 
there exists a statistical risk of relapse due to occult disease. Jenny has promptly consented to 
the lymphadenectomy, and now faces the choice of whether to accept the after-surgery 
treatment. If she accepts the procedure she will likely lose her fertility. Without undergoing 
chemo-radiation, instead, she still has the possibility of giving birth to a child through 
gestational surrogacy (i.e. having a child genetically related to her parents and not to the 
surrogate mother). Jenny knows the reality of her condition. She has been empowered with all 
the relevant information on her health status, and asked to decide about the after-surgery 
treatment. However, she is uncertain about whether having a child biologically kin to her and 
her newlywed should prevail over the possibility of reducing the risk of relapse. The doctor 
understands that Jenny has some difficulties in coping with the decision at stake. For this 
reason (and for the sake of her own good), he engages in a mutual exchange of views with 
Jenny as to the various options at her disposal. He provides her with his knowledge of the 
relevant facts about her condition: namely, that (i) adjuvant chemo-radiation could decrease 
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the risk of relapse by 40-50%, and (ii) the chances of obtaining a successful pregnancy are less 
than 10%. Furthermore, he collaborates with the patient to facilitate her understanding of the 
problem and helps her identify a solution that best suits her desires and values, whatever it 
might be. 
 
This different version of Jenny and Yuri’s case displays the characteristics of empowerment 
we identified in its traditional understandings. This account shares in fact the goals of 
empowerment that we encountered in the analysis of the paternalism paradox (Juengst et al. 
2012). Also in this case, Jenny is provided with all the information available regarding her 
condition, and is given a greater space for deciding about what is the best clinical option to her. 
However, differently from the previously examined version of empowerment, in this situation 
Yuri is bound also to the procedural requirement of reduced professional control over the 
empowerment intervention.  
This obligation on the side of Yuri has an effect over his interaction with Jenny, which 
should now be examined as to its potential paternalistic features. Yuri’s reaction to Jenny’s 
difficulties of making the decision regarding adjuvant chemo-radiation is still animated by 
beneficent motives. He is committed, as a professional, to the principle of beneficence 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2001) and seeks an interaction with Jenny that genuinely intends to 
promote the good of his patient. In this respect, his action appears to satisfy the first condition 
I set for an act to be paternalistic. Yuri’s motives are indeed aimed at improving his patient’s 
welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values. Yet, his attitude towards Jenny appears to 
be rather different from the one encountered in the two previous versions of this case. The 
crucial difference here lies in the fact that Yuri supports Jenny in deciding what is best for her, 
rather than attempting to persuade her into the best medical option available. He does so 
because the procedural requirement of minimizing the use of his authority prescribes him to 
resort to specific means for the empowerment of his patient, which do no admit the use of 
authoritative persuasion (Tengland 2008, 2012). The notion of empowerment at the basis of 
this clinical encounter puts an obligation on the side of the doctor to fully respect and 
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acknowledge the perspective of the patient. Such emphasis on respecting and furthering 
patient control is in sharp contrast with the attitude of considering motivationally impotent 
the consent or dissent of the recipient. Yuri cannot disregard the wishes, desires, choices, or 
actions of Jenny, if he has to act according to the remit of empowerment. This means that his 
action does not satisfy the second condition for paternalism identified above, and hence 
cannot be qualified as paternalistic interference.  
What is worth emphasizing as to traditional accounts of empowerment is, in other 
words, that there exist means of promoting goals of empowerment that do not necessarily 
involve paternalism. By doing so, these means are also more congruent with the declared aims 
of the approach. Seeking an increase of patient ability in “the problem formulation, the 
decision process, and the actions undertaken” (Tengland 2012, p.146) may be implemented in 
practice through different degrees of influence over the patient. Some of these influences may 
be characterised as paternalistic, as shown in the previous sections of this work. It is important 
to note however that influences stand along a continuum, where at one end of the spectrum 
are coercion and deliberate uses of force, and at the other is letting the patient do what she 
prefers. In between we have influences like manipulation, persuasion, recommendation, 
encouragement, and provision of information (Tengland 2008) that leave the patient different 
degrees of control over the situation. If control over the healthcare process is to be considered 
a fundamental tenet of empowerment, what I can conclude from this analysis is therefore that 
the more the professional limits her paternalistic influence over the process, the more 
appropriate are the means deployed for achieving the goals of empowerment. 
Conclusions 
My main concern throughout this chapter has been to critically scrutinize what I characterized 
as the ‘paternalism paradox’ in the empowerment literature. According to this critique, there 
exists a sharp contrast between the declared anti-paternalistic aims of empowerment and its 
actual impact on healthcare relationships (Buchanan 2000, Salmon 2004, Juengst et al. 2012). 
Such paternalistic outcomes question the ethical advantages of the empowerment approach as 
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opposed to the so-called compliance model – i.e. an approach to the healthcare relationships 
that emphasizes persuasion and compliance with medical recommendation (Swift 1984, Feste 
and Anderson 1995). In order to address this issue, I have first identified a definition of 
paternalism, which is not merely stipulative, but aims also at comprising some of the 
characteristics of this concept in the philosophical literature (Hershey 1985, Dworkin 1972, 
1995, 2010). Such a definition enabled me to compare the characteristics of the compliance 
model and the empowerment approach through three different versions of a thought 
experiment involving a doctor (Yuri) and a patient (Jenny), exemplifying the moral reasoning 
behind the compliance model and two versions of the empowerment approach. In the analysis 
of this fictional cases I found that different approaches to the doctor-patient relationship may 
result in paternalistic interferences on the side of the professional, and that some forms of 
empowerment can arguably bring about paternalistic outcomes. 
In order to mark the difference between the empowerment approach and the 
compliance model as to their potential paternalistic outcomes, one requirement emerged from 
my analysis. Namely, that the empowering means of the professionals should be made 
congruent with the empowerment goals – i.e. increased control for the client over the 
healthcare process (Tengland 2008). This means that my work acknowledges that there is 
something paradoxical (or at least problematic) about accounts of empowerment where the 
professionals are left in the position of exerting paternalistic influences over the client. 
However, this does not appear to be sufficient ground to question the merits of all versions of 
empowerment (Salmon 2004). With regard to this, I argued that paternalistic outcomes of 
empowerment could be possibly prevented by those accounts that consider professional 
reduction of power, control and influence over decision-making as one of their fundamental 
tenets. 
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Chapter 3. Empowerment, responsibility and the charge of 
heal th i sm  
Introduction 
This chapter addresses a second criticism of EBRs, which I call ‘the charge of healthism’. 
Namely, their potential to produce obligations on the side of citizens to conform to social 
expectations and interests regarding their health (Cribb 2005, Holland 2007, Veitch 2010). As 
showed above (see infra Chapter 1), some of these policy documents put a strong emphasis on 
ameliorating the general health of the population through the declared intent of empowering 
citizens’ responsibilities (Great Britain 2010a, 2010e). Such a diffusion of responsibility for 
health within EBRs builds upon a specific consideration of the social good of health (Cribb 
2005). EBRs conceive health as a common good whose pursuit requires the contribution of all 
members of society (Holland 2007). In doing so, they appear to assert not only the need for 
an approach to healthcare oriented by the preferences of the population. Rather, they instate 
also a different kind of responsibility, on the side of each of us, for supporting the system’s 
efficiency and sustainability through healthy behaviours. One obvious problem of 
empowerment approaches conceived as such is that they attempt at pursuing two radically 
different aims, which can hardly be reconciled (Holland 2007). On the one hand, EBRs 
supposedly aim at enhancing opportunities for self-determination of individual citizens with 
regard to health-related decision-making. They put an emphasis on patients and individuals 
assuming responsibility for selecting services, participating to public decision-making on the 
governance of the system, or managing their own conditions (Great Britain 2004a, European 
Science Foundation 2012). On the other hand, they also seek to establish high quality levels of 
care for the population, and better health standards within the system (Great Britain 2008, 
2010a, European Commission 2013).  
This two-sided commitment to responsibility within EBRs could be seen as an effort 
devoted to conform individuals to the “healthy” standards in the minds of those in power 
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(Holland 2007, Veitch 2010). According to this interpretation, EBRs represent the political 
enforcement of an obligation to comply with ‘standards of health’, or – to put it differently – 
to foster a culture of healthism (Minkler 1999). If this recognition holds, the objective of EBRs 
becomes the oxymoronic empowerment of individuals to freely choose healthier behaviours 
that are established by the healthcare system: a goal that raises a conflict between the 
supposed emancipatory aims of empowerment and its application to health. This charge of 
healthism shows, in other words, that attention should be paid to the value assigned to health 
in EBRs, and calls for an understanding of health-related goods within their political vision. If 
EBRs commit themselves to foster “healthist” expectations across society (Minkler 1999, 
Greenhalgh 2004), a tension emerges between other values at the basis of their political 
project. Placing a strong emphasis on the enhancement of responsibility is an empowering 
move for EBRs, because they explicitly resort – at least prima facie – to the value of providing 
citizens with the opportunity to direct the management of their own health and the healthcare 
system. Yet, if health is presented as a standard to which all members of a community are 
empowered to conform, the system’s rationale appears to switch from ‘citizens make a choice’ to 
‘ensuring that specific kinds of choices are made’ (Veitch 2010). The only choice that EBRs 
open up, if this healthist interpretation prevails, is whether or not to meet the expectations 
that the system places upon citizens’ shoulders with regard to their health. Briefly put, their 
objective turns into the problematic goal of empowering individuals to “freely” choose 
healthier behaviours that are established by the healthcare system. 
Recognising the charge of healthism calls for problematizing some of the substantive 
commitments entailed in EBRs. In particular, this critique demands tipping the balance 
between the value of efficiency-considerations for the system (Great Britain 2004, 2010a, 
2010e), and the importance of the element of self-determination at the basis of responsibility 
claims on which EBRs put a strong emphasis (European Commission 2007). As we will see in 
the next chapter (see infra Chapter 4), many commentators have rightly displayed strong 
scepticism towards the moral legitimacy of holding citizens responsible not only the for taking 
up control over their health, but also for contributing to the sustainability of the healthcare 
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system (Minkler 1999, Wilkinson 1999, Buyx and Prainsack 2012, Brown 2013). Yet, very little 
has been written on the importance of an evaluative appraisal of the concept of health for the 
legitimacy of the normative claims of responsibility for health (Cribb, 2005, Holland 2007). 
With regard to this, the present chapter shows that the concept of health is not morally 
neutral. Rather, the value we assign to health contributes to the desirability of the empowered 
role of healthcare clients envisaged by EBRs. If EBRs require placing an objectivist account of 
health (i.e. a standard of health determined a priori by means of biological and medical 
knowledge) at the centre of their new morality, and elevating it to the level of its primary 
value, their political discourse may actually restrain – rather than enhance – citizens’ 
responsibilities for their health.  
Understood as such, the charge of healthism calls for an understanding of how health-
related goods ought to be conceived so as to avoid such an undesirable consequence. Prima 
facie this critique depends in fact upon the way we conceptualize the value of health. If EBRs 
commit themselves to a deterministic understanding of health, a tension emerges between the 
aims of empowerment and its application to EBRs. A healthcare system framed around such a 
conception of health entails the danger of allowing too little space for medicine to be sensitive 
or – as envisaged by EBRs – tailored to “individual and culturally specific constructs of health” 
(Cribb 2005, 24). By requiring citizens to conform to health-related expectations, EBRs would 
create a demand, rather than an opportunity to seize responsibility with regard to one’s health. 
This means that a conception of health that is consonant with the aims of empowerment 
should be found, in EBRs, and that this theory should not conflict with the elements of self-
determination and control that are distinctive of this approach. But, does such a conception of 
health exist? 
In order to answer this question, this chapter will firstly turn to the analysis of a 
number of theories of health that currently dominate the philosophical debate. Different 
authors have in fact attempted at providing a “sufficiently circumscribed conception of 
health” (Cribb 2005, 22), but a controversy exists as to how health should be best 
conceptualized. Building upon the classification of theories of health proposed by Nordenfelt 
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(2012), I will discuss two types of theories of health (World Health Organization 1948, Boorse 
1975, 1997). These theories are the objectivist ‘biostatistical theory of health’ (BTH) and the 
relativistic ‘holistic theory of health’ (HTH)11. Both accounts, I will argue, present limitations 
as to their conceptualization of health and health-related phenomena for their application to 
the context of EBRs. In particular, I will show that besides the motives at the basis of the 
charge of healthism in EBRs, we have compelling philosophical reasons to reject the BTH as a 
generally suitable theory of health. Moving on from this analysis, I will turn to the family of 
HTsH, where I will show how the WHO’s theory of health (World Health Organization 
1948), though resonating with the aims of empowerment in EBRs, lacks also sufficient 
precision to be a viable conceptualization of health. For this reason, I will finally turn to a 
revised version of the HTH (Nordenfelt 1993, 1995, 2001, 2012, forthcoming). What I will point 
out is that this theory can be regarded as a compelling account of health that avoids both the 
difficulties identified in the BTH and the other version of the HTH, while at the same being 
compatible with the aims of EBRs. By taking up a fundamental element of self-determination 
with regard to one’s own standard of health, Nordenfelt’s (1993, 1995, 2001, 2012, forthcoming) 
holistic theory may constitute the best way to consistently trade-off the value of health with 
other substantive commitments in the empowerment bundle of EBRs. 
The Biostatistical Theory of Health (BTH) 
The BTH is widely considered the dominant biomedical conception of health (Nordenfelt 
1993, Cribb 2005, Tengland 2007, Nordenfelt 2012), and is the most clear-cut example of 
theories of health to which the ‘charge of healthism’ outlined above is addressed. The BTH is 
in fact largely considered an objective, deterministic and value-neutral theory of health (Cribb 
2005). In discussing this theory, I will show that we have reasons, independently from its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Other scholars would no doubt cluster these theories in a different way. For instance, Tengland (2007) argues 
for the existence of four types of theories of health. Namely, he divides theories into four different monistic 
kinds: (1) health as functional normality (Boorse 1975, Wakefield 1992), (2) health as balance (Pörn 1984), (3) 
health as ability (Nordenfelt 1995), (4) health as well-being (1948). In addition, he maintains that also pluralistic 
theories of health exist, combining two or more features of the monistic ones (Brülde and Tengland 2007). I will 
make use of the classification proposed by Nordenfelt (2012) for the reason that such broader clustering of 
theories of health does not leave out any of the theories comprised by the more fine-grained taxonomy of 
Tengland (2007). As we will see in the analysis of the two types of theories introduced by Nordenfelt (2012), 
health as balance, ability and well-being can be considered instances of the holistic kind of theories. 
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compatibility with the empowerment discourse within EBRs, to be cautious before giving this 
conception of health free reign. In particular, I will argue that strong limitations can be 
identified in both of the criteria employed by this theory to determine the state of individual 
or population health. 
The most influential example of BTH is the one defended by the American 
philosopher Christopher Boorse (1975, 1997). The basic idea behind his work is that an 
organism is healthy, i.e. free from disease12, insofar as its functioning makes a contribution to 
its survival and reproduction that is minimally normal in statistical terms. According to the 
author, evolution has brought about some changes in organisms, but it has also produced “a 
fixation and conservation” (Nordenflet 1993, 87) of species-typical characteristics. Such 
attributes of organisms are (i) typical because they are, in statistical terms, the more frequent 
functions we can observe in a given organism; (ii) species-related insofar as they compose the 
structure and function of organisms, and serve the goal of survival and reproduction for both 
individuals and the whole species. The crucial element for this theory is, in other words, 
determining what natural (i.e. favourable to survival and reproduction) and normal (i.e. 
statistically more frequent) functions are, so as to discriminate between healthy and unhealthy 
states in an organism: a problem that, to this view, can be easily solved empirically by turning 
to contemporary biology and medicine. In the BTH the health of an organism consists 
therefore of a function of internal processes in the body and their relationship with survival 
and reproduction. Furthermore, health is a concept “descriptively definable within medical 
theory” in biological and statistical terms, “as intelligence is in psychological theory or validity 
in logical theory” (Boorse 1975, 553).  
 It should be noted that this theory has the merit of capturing some basic intuitions 
about what constitutes health and its reduction. Pathological conditions (e.g. cancer) can in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In presenting his theory, Boorse (1975) claims that ‘health is the absence of disease’. For this reason, he sets 
about a conceptualization of health by introducing the concept of disease first. For the sake of simplicity, I 
discuss here his theory in terms of ‘health’ rather than starting from ‘disease’. It is however not difficult to 
understand, starting from the formulation of health I present here, what his background definition of disease is. 
According to Boorse (1975, 1997) a disease is the subnormal functioning (i.e. not making its statistically normal 
contribution to the survival and reproduction of the individual and the species) of an organ, or part of an 
organism. 
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fact be easily recognised as the clear-cut example of processes that reduce our health (i) by 
impairing the functioning of parts of our body, and (ii) by threatening the survival of the 
individual. This theory is thus particularly good at capturing those aspects of health that are 
related to physiological dysfunctions of the body. However, what we should ask ourselves is 
whether all of that matters with regard to health can be comprised by such a focus. With 
regard to this point, a number of difficulties have been identified in Boorse’s work that have 
led other scholars to conclude that his theory should be thoroughly refuted as a compelling 
account of health (Tengland 2007). First, one problem is whether health really requires 
determining the range of normal functioning of an organism. Especially after the 
establishment of Personalized Medicine (European Science Foundation 2012), it sounds 
increasingly odd to hold that for every function or organ of the body there is one normal 
range that is typical for an organism. Quite the contrary, contemporary biomedicine shows us 
that normal ranges of species functioning do not exist (if not in the form of abstract 
generalizations), and that such model of medicine should rather be abandoned in favour of a 
full uptake of individual unique characteristics determining health. Currently normal 
functioning of a given individual depends rather on the combination (see infra Chapter 6) of 
genetic makeup, age, gender, sex, environment, and lifestyles that draws very little insight from 
analysing what is typical (i.e. statistically more frequent) for the species. In this respect, 
Nordenfelt (2012) provides us with a counterexample showing the limitations of this bit of 
Boorse’s (1975, 1997) theory:  
 
The pulse of an athlete, for instance, can be abnormally low, say thirty-five beats per minute. 
His or her pulse is then well below the normal frequency scope, which lies between sixty and 
eighty beats a minute. However, we would clearly say that the function of the athlete’s heart is 
perfect. The function is indeed supernormal in that, as we believe, it makes more than a 
contribution to the survival of its bearer (Nordenfelt 2012, 26). 
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This counterexample provided by Nordenfelt shows us that it is not as straightforward as the 
author claims that normal species functionings are a descriptive and objective attribute of 
organisms that can be easily established in biological and medical terms. The heart function of 
the athlete falls outside the scope of statistical normality for a human body, and yet it does not 
cast any doubt on his/her health status. The establishment of normal and healthy ranges of 
functioning tells us nothing about health, for the notion of normal ranges makes sense insofar 
as we relativize it to the circumstances under scrutiny. A criterion for investigating the health 
of an individual that is much different from Boorse’s emphasis on establishing normal 
functioning of a species.  
Yet, the criticism discussed so far is not decisive in rejecting Boorse’s theory (1975, 
1997). His criterion of normal species functioning is nothing but one of the conditions for 
assessing health. What he could argue in response to the case of the athlete is in fact that the 
dysfunction he/she bears (i.e. his/her deranging from statistical normality) is still no health 
problem because it does not lower in any way the probability of survival. However, also this 
second bit of Boorse’s theory proves defective when put to test. Although lots of diseases 
have the potential of bringing about complications that threaten the survival of the individual 
affected, it is unclear whether the criterion of reduced survival is able to cover all kinds of 
diseases “that are conventionally accepted as such” (Nordenflet 2012, 27). Cancer, 
cardiovascular diseases, are all easy examples to be handled by Boorse’s theory. The fact that a 
tumour or a stroke may lead to death proves, to make an example, that the intuition at the 
basis of Boorse’s second condition is a plausible one. Yet, not all the conditions that we 
consider diseases are necessarily linked to a reduction of the probabilities of the bearer’s 
survival. Let us consider diseases such as headache, eczema, or injuries like a bruised leg 
(Nordenfelt 2012). All of these conditions appear to fall under the category of dysfunctions 
(they derange from statistical normality of human beings), but at the same time they have no 
known fatal complication that lowers the possibility of survival. This difficulty of Boorse’s 
theory is even more evident if we take into account cases of mental illness such as mild 
depression. Unless such a depression entails also suicidal tendencies, a person affected by this 
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condition has no possibility of survival that is significantly lower than statistically normal 
people. This second critique points, in other words, to the limitations – in terms of 
generalizability – of the second criterion selected by Boorse (1975, 1997) for establishing what 
disease and health are. Roughly put, the element of survival does not account for all the 
conditions that we may label as diseases, or health-limiting. 
If we combine the latter objection with the one presented above, we can conclude that 
there are good reasons for scepticism that can be addressed both at the idea of normal species 
functioning and the idea of survival as viable criteria for health. Furthermore, this recognition 
points to the need of abandoning conceptualizations of health like the BTH for the 
foundations of empowerment within EBRs. Leaving aside the charge of healthism, my 
analysis of the BTH shows that we have compelling philosophical reasons to dismiss the value 
of the most influential objectivist account of health (Boorse 1975, 1997) in the morality of 
EBRs. The critical issues identified in Boorse’s theory suggest therefore that it may be worth 
finding a different conception of health, which is able to handle its limitations, to be traded-
off with the elements of self-determination and control at the basis of EBRs. In particular, the 
limitations of the BTH show that, when using the concept of health, our intuitions exceed the 
mere assessment of functions of the body and its probability of survival. Statistical normality 
of functions and probability of survival are neither necessary, nor sufficient criteria for 
assessing health, as the examples of the athlete and the mildly depressed individual show us. 
But what is it then that makes a person (un)healthy aside from functions and survival? This 
question is exactly the starting point for theories of health that fall under the category of 
HTH.  
The Holistic Theory of Health (HTH) 
Prevalent versions of the HTH build upon the recognition that health cannot be determined 
from a consideration of functions of parts of an individual. Quite the contrary, health and 
disease should be understood as phenomena that influence the wellbeing or the ability of people 
as a whole in their social context. These theories are thus holistic in two main respects 
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(Tengland 2007). First, they are holistic because they focus on the whole person either by 
looking at her wellbeing, or to her abilities. Second, they are also holistic in the sense that they 
take the environment into account as a relevant factor for health. Both of these elements are, 
as showed above, far beyond the scope of the BTH. Starting from these premises, it may be 
already clear to the reader that holistic conceptions of health can be subdivided into two main 
categories. On the one hand, some versions of the HTH have focused on the element of 
wellbeing (World Health Organization 1948). On the other, different interpretations of the 
HTH claim that health is the ability to reach certain goals in a given environment (Nordenfelt 
1993, 2012).  
The HTH based on wellbeing 
The WHO’s definition of health can be said to be the most paradigmatic example of a theory 
that puts wellbeing at its core. Its definition goes as follows: health is a “state of complete 
physical, social and mental well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” 
(World Health Organization 1948, 1). This version of the HTH has admittedly some 
strengths. It captures some connotations of health in ordinary discourses, and in particular it 
has the merit of emphasizing how “there are ideals of health and not merely degrees of 
freedom from disease” (Cribb 2005, 26). Otherwise stated, it opens up the understanding of 
the concept of health to the possibility that there exist subjective dimensions of health and 
that health is also good insofar as it enables individuals to “live their own lives and participate 
in society” (Cribb 2005, 24). Regardless of the degree of functioning of the body, an individual 
can in fact be healthy – according to this version of the HTH – if she positively values her 
quality of life, her fundamental interests are met, and she benefits from fruitful relationships 
(i.e. her wellbeing is acceptable). Health, under this version of the HTH, is an ideal status that 
the individual may be able to achieve regardless of her conformity to alleged species-typical 
standards of functionings.  
 This is an important consideration in light of the present discussion of the charge of 
healthism within EBRs. The WHO’s (1948) HTH may in fact represent a suitable theory to 
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reconcile the conflict between the values of self-determination and health at the basis of the 
devolution of responsibility EBRs entail (Allen 2011). By pointing to the importance of 
individual choices with regard to the ideal levels of health to be pursued throughout life, this 
version of the HTH may guarantee a hierarchy of values between health and responsibility at 
the basis of EBRs, which does not pay lip service to the empowering aims of these 
endeavours. If desirable levels of health across society become a matter of individually chosen 
levels of wellbeing, the charge of healthism is likely to drop because the empowerment step 
purported by these documents assumes the connotations of an enhancement of individual 
responsibility to behave accordingly to self-chosen life plans with regard to their health13.  
However, the WHO’s theory of health has also been the subject of harsh criticisms 
since its appearance. As argued by Nordenfelt (forthcoming), one set of critiques addressed to 
this theory has to do with the word ‘complete’ in its formulation. If we set the threshold to the 
point that “physical, social and mental well-being” ought to be “complete” (World Health 
Organization 1948, 1) to count as health, it is likely that most people will fall short of this 
threshold. The counter-intuitive conclusion to which this theory leads is, in other words, that 
all people who do not value their life as a complete success would fall under the category of 
unhealthy people. Most of us are not fully satisfied with their physical, social, and mental 
wellbeing, and yet we would not be keen to conclude that – merely because of that – we all 
have reduced health. Hence, although it seems reasonable that wellbeing is indeed a relevant 
component of health, it is at the same time odd to stretch this intuition to the point that the 
absence of complete wellbeing is a state of ill-health.  
Furthermore, another limitation of this theory lies in the “difficult task to characterize 
the well-being purporting to constitute health” (Nordenfelt forthcoming, 13). Even if we granted 
this version of the HTH that the criterion of wellbeing allows for degrees of health, this 
theory would still result ambiguous as to its specific emphasis on the subjective experience of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 I am fully aware that this conceptual move is not free from defects, as I will argue in conclusion to this chapter. 
Although giving free reign to individually self-chosen life plans with regard to health has a prima facie allure in the 
context of EBRs, this conceptual move calls for better specifying the criteria under which it is morally legitimate 
to hold choices regarding the preferred levels of wellbeing “responsible”. This problem will be the subject of 
Chapter 4. 
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health. Stressing the importance of wellbeing as the sole constituent of the HTH entails in fact 
the risk of equating health with a set of feelings, such as happiness, thus leading this theory to 
problematic counter-intuitive conclusions. In order to better illustrate this point, let us 
consider the case of a woman who unfortunately develops breast cancer. At the early stage of 
its occurrence, such a disease is most likely not to affect the wellbeing of the woman in any 
respect. If she did not undergo regular mammography screenings, she would be – for a while 
– completely in the dark with respect to her disease. Her wellbeing is left untouched, at least in 
the asymptomatic stage of disease development, by the tumour that is growing inside of her. 
Is it reasonable to claim that the health of this woman is good insofar as she has good feelings 
with regard to her life? The answer to this rhetorical question is, intuitively, “no” and calls for 
a rebuttal of the equation between health and wellbeing as the solely relevant dimension of a 
HTH.  
Interestingly enough, the case of the woman in the early stage of breast cancer would 
not be a problem for the BTH discussed above (Boorse 1975, 1997). Cancer is not part of the 
normal functioning of humans and threatens the survival of the individual (though 
prospectively at its early stage), thus allowing us to conclude that this woman suffers from ill-
health. This means that there is something valuable, when discussing health, in the focus on 
the physiological functioning of the body. Yet, we have also seen that this theory has some 
difficulties in handling conditions that either are not health-diminishing but derange from 
statistical normality (e.g. the atypical heartbeat of the athelete), or negatively affect health (in 
the common use of the word) but are not life-threatening (e.g. mild depression). For this 
reason, I turned to the HTH, and analysed one of its most influent versions (World Health 
Organization 1948). The merit of this theory is showing how, beside the functioning status of 
the body, an important aspect of health lies in its subjective dimension. Whether I am in a 
state of wellbeing or suffering, as to the individual and social goals I wish to accomplish in life, 
is certainly a relevant consideration for health-related judgements, which is not comprised by 
the BTH. In addition, we have seen also how this is an important advantage of this theory in 
the context of EBRs. The WHO’s HTH (1948) allows an appreciation of the importance of 
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opening up seizures of responsibility (i.e. opportunities for self-determination) with regard to 
one’s health within the political narrative of EBRs. However, there is an ambiguity in this 
theory between stressing the importance of wellbeing as a component of health, and concluding 
that wellbeing is health. What we need is, in other words, a modified version of the HTH, 
which is able to capture both the subjective and relativistic aspects of health emphasized by 
the focus on wellbeing (i.e. the element allowing this theory to avoid the charge of healthism), 
and the physiological aspects of health at the basis of the BTH that may complement the 
emphasis on wellbeing.  
A revised version of the HTH 
A theory that responds to these criteria is the one presented by Nordenfelt in its extensive 
work on the concept of health (1993, 1995, 2001, 2012, forthcoming). His version of the HTH 
can be formalized as follows: “A is completely healthy if, and only if, A is in a bodily and 
mental state such that A has the ability, given standard or otherwise reasonable circumstances, to 
realize all his or her vital goals” (Nordenfelt 2012, 24, emphasis added). Three main 
components of health14 are emphasized by this theory. First, a pivotal role is played by the 
concept of ability. As we have seen above, different conceptualizations of health have focused 
on two kinds of phenomena. On the one hand, within the BTH, health has been connected to 
the functioning of the body (Boorse 1975, 1997); on the other, within one version of the 
HTH, health has been associated with feelings of well-being (World Health Organization 
1948). However, the reason why these two criteria cannot account for a viable conception of 
health is that they leave out, according to Nordenfelt (2012), what they have in common: 
namely, the fact that both have consequences on individual agency. The distinguishing feature 
of health-related conditions, such as suffering or being injured, is in fact that they determine 
what individuals can or cannot do. Health, in other words, does not depend upon neither 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Despite his thorough criticism of the BTH (Boorse 1975, 1997), Nordenfelt’s project (1993, 1995) builds upon 
a very similar argumentative strategy. He starts from an analysis of health-related concepts such as ‘disability’ and 
‘pain’. The reason for this is that, for the author, we often engage in discussions of health due its absence or lack. 
As in the case of my presentation of Boorse’s theory (1975, 1997) and for the same need of simplicity, I will here 
discuss his theory directly in terms of health, rather than starting from negative health states such as disability and 
pain.  
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abnormalities in the body, nor feelings of well-being. Rather, health is a state of the individual 
that lies in his/her ability to achieve some goals.  
One question that may be asked at this point of the analysis is whether all kinds of 
abilities are constituents of health (Tengland 2007). For instance, let us consider my ability to 
reach the goal of writing a thesis. Is this ability telling something about my health? Even 
though it is certainly true that achieving this aim is sustained by the ability to move my fingers 
on the laptop’s keyboard, we would not go as far as to conclude that I am healthy only if I am 
able to write my thesis. And conversely, if I were unable to accomplish such an important goal 
of my life, we would not reckon my lack of ability to write this thesis as a reduction of health. 
This means that Nordenfelt’s (1995, 2001) theory has to be refined so as to distinguish 
between health-related and non health-related abilities. The author himself (Nordenfelt 1995) 
recognizes this problem by differentiating between first and second-order abilities. Abilities, 
his reasoning goes, “occur in layers, where one layer presupposes the other, but not the other 
way round” (Nordenfelt 2001, 88). First-order abilities are the upper level of abilities that we 
can acquire. Driving the car, reading, writing the thesis are all abilities of this kind. Such 
abilities, that we may call competences (Tengland 2007), are not health-related, and presuppose 
second-order abilities for their acquisition. Namely, “the basic physical and mental resources” 
(Nordenfelt 2001, 89) that I need to gain a first-order ability. This second level is, according to 
Nordenfelt (2001), where health lies. This means that I may be unable to write my thesis for 
two main reasons, and that only one has to do with my health. First I may not be competent 
enough (i.e. lack the necessary first-order ability) to accomplish the main goal of my PhD 
studies. This could be due to some limitation in my education, or supervision that would 
prevent me from writing my thesis. The other one, instead, is that I may lack the second-order 
abilities (i.e. the health-related abilities) required to do so: I may have a disabled sight, or be too 
frightened and depressed to be able to write my thesis. Only the latter scenario is, according to 
Nordenfelt (2001), relevant as to considerations regarding my health. Thus, it is better to say 
that to be healthy is, according to Nordenfelt (2001), to have the second-order ability to reach 
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vital goals. Whether we have the first-order abilities to reach such goals is, in other words, not 
necessarily a matter of health. 
But, what should a healthy person be able to do? This question leads us to the 
discussion of the second main component of Nordenfelt’s theory (1993): the idea of vital goals. 
This expression, coined by the author himself, refers to the state of affairs consciously set by a 
person, which is a “component of or otherwise necessary condition for the person’s living a 
minimally decent life” (Nordenfelt 2001, 68). Vital goals are, in other words, values, 
preferences and beliefs that have high priority in our lives. Whether we are able to achieve 
them (or not) is an important component of our well-being, happiness and satisfaction with 
regard to our life. Observe here that Nordenfelt is not claiming that health is tantamount to 
the achievement of vital goals. Quite the contrary, health lies just in the second-order abilities 
that are required to realize such goals. Or, in the author’s own words, vital goals “are 
constitutive for the healthy person’s ability” (Nordenfelt, forthcoming, 17). They dictate the set 
of health-related abilities required for their achievement. Such a relationship between abilities 
and vital goals allows Nordenfelt to avoid the difficulties we observed in the case of the BTH 
and the other version of the HTH. First, health-related abilities do not entail any notion of 
normality (Boorse 1975, 1997), thus avoiding one of the major pitfalls of the BTH (i.e. the idea 
of normal species functioning). It is in fact possible, within this theory, that two individuals 
who have different second-order abilities are both deemed to be completely healthy. This is 
due to the fact that these two persons may have different priorities in their respective lives (i.e. 
different vital goals), and hence need different second-order abilities for their achievement. 
Their degree of health is relative to the congruence between their abilities and goals, and not 
by a defined standard of functioning. Second, having positive feelings as to the degree of 
realization of vital goals does not necessarily entail being healthy, thus avoiding the main 
limitation of the WHO’s version (1948) of the HTH (i.e. the equation between health and 
well-being). A person who lacks the abilities required for her vital goals could be compensated 
for his/her disability so that she manages to reach them. Something that is very common 
among the ordinary activities of healthcare provision. Let us, for instance, think about hearing, 
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visual or walking aids. All of these devices serve the purpose of improving the wellbeing of 
people who suffer from some disability, by allowing them to accomplish their vital goals 
regardless of their reduced abilities to do so. Nevertheless, according to Nordenfelt’s theory, 
their lack of second-order abilities required to fulfil such vital goals (e.g. hearing, seeing, 
walking) would anyway qualify their condition as unhealthy. Differently from theories based 
on wellbeing (World Health Organization 1948), the individual degree of happiness or 
satisfaction does not account for all that matters with regard to health.  
One final remark needs also to be devoted to the discussion of the third element of 
Nordenfelt’s theory (1993, 2001): the idea of standard circumstances. It is evident, according to 
the author, that health cannot be the ability to reach vital goals under all circumstances. If this 
was the case, we would be forced to conclude that no individual is ever really healthy. Let us 
consider my (second-order) ability to run. By saying that I am healthy enough to run, we mean 
first of all that I am in a bodily and mental state such as that I am able to run. Yet, what we 
also consider as self-evident in this claim, the author argues, is that some standard 
circumstances obtain in order for this ability to be exercised. And the reason for this is the 
following. There are a number of conceivable circumstances that could impair my (second-
order) ability to run. There could be an environmental factor that prevents me from exercising 
this ability (e.g. an unexpected snow storm), or I could be physically or legally prevented from 
moving my body (e.g. being kidnapped, or under arrest). If all circumstances – including these 
exceptional ones – counted in the evaluation of my (second-order) ability to run, and hence of 
my health, we would be forced to subscribe to the counterintuitive (Nordenfelt forthcoming) 
claim that I am not healthy enough to be able to realize my vital goals. This means that the 
abilities that constitute health must be related to a certain class of circumstances, and that, 
claiming that I am able to run, presupposes the existence of what Nordenfelt (1993) calls 
ordinary or standard circumstances. The author purportedly defines vaguely these external 
conditions for health. Standard circumstances are of “a personal, cultural and natural kind” 
(Nordenfelt 1993), and can be considered relative to a cultural situation or context. In the 
author’s own words, the “standard circumstances are not the same for those who live in 
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Communist China, capitalist Western societies, tropical Congo or Greenland” (Nordenfelt 
1993). What a person needs to be able to do in order to pursue her vital goals varies a lot in 
these very different environments, and so does the resulting conception of what is healthy and 
what is unhealthy. 
It will now be clearer what health is, according to Nordenfelt (1993). It refers to the 
balance that exists between a person’s abilities and the goals of her agency. Full health obtains, 
from this perspective, when a person is able (i.e. has the second-order abilities) to realise all of 
her vital goals. Conversely, if this situation is not realized the person maybe considered 
unhealthy, at least to a certain extent, provided that this judgement relates to standard cultural 
and environmental circumstances for the individual. This means that health is regarded, within 
this holistic theory, as an ideal state. Complete health entails, according to Nordenfelt (1993) 
that the individual can realise all of her vital goals. Starting from this ideal, different levels of 
health are allowed. Whether or not we find ourselves in a state of acceptable or complete health 
“is a matter of decision” (Nordenfelt 1993, 96) that depends upon the fulfilment of 
fundamental requirements established by the individual herself.  
Conclusions: Empowerment and the HTH 
So far, we have seen how we often oscillate between two different perspectives when 
discussing health. On the one hand, we think of it as the structure and functioning of separate 
parts of an organism and, by the same token, we ask ourselves whether everything is normal 
with organs or body functions when making health-related judgements. Such a perspective, 
which is usually grounded on “biological, chemical and statistical concepts” (Nordenfelt 1993, 
86) and is at the basis of what he calls BTH, is however limited – as shown above – in many 
respects. On the other hand, we also think of health as something that goes beyond – but 
comprises – the focus on functioning. Health is something broader, according to this view, 
and resides in a state, or ability of human beings as a whole to pursue their vital goals. By 
taking up this intuition, we focus on the complete individual and we are interested in 
understanding whether a person can perform all of those activities that make him/her feeling 
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well with regard to her life. Typically, understanding whether one is healthy under this 
interpretation requires an investigation of the social and cultural circumstances in which the 
person establishes her vital goals, and entails an evaluation based on concepts such as “ability, 
disability, handicap, coping, wellbeing, pain and anguish” (Nordenfelt 1993, 86).  
 But how does this conception fare with respect to the charge of healthism addressed 
to EBRs? Is this theory of health compatible with the elements of self-determination and 
control at the basis of the empowered responsibility prospected by these documents? In order 
to answer this question, it is worth noting that Nordenfelt’s (1993, 1995, 2001, 2012, 
forthcoming) theory of health is widely regarded as advocating for “social and ethical relativism” 
(Venkatapuram 2012). This means that, very much like in the case of the first version of the 
HTH analysed above, Nordenfelt’s view has the merit of avoiding the charge of healthism 
because it guarantees a full appreciation of individual sovereignty with regard to what counts 
as healthy, or unhealthy. What counts as relevant health (i.e. health-related abilities), if we use 
Nordenfelt’s holistic theory in EBRs, is the result of the responsible choice of a set of vital 
goals by the empowered citizenship these policies prospect.  This recognition, as it stands, 
solves the charge of healthism. Health is not an objectivist set of functionings to which the 
individual is expected to conform. However, Nordenfelt’s theory may raise another issue in 
the ethical appreciation of EBRs. 
Although most of his critics (Tengland 2007, Venkatapuram 2012) agree that this 
reasoning represents a coherent understanding of the concept of health, the fact that his 
theory envisages health as an ideal that the individual establishes for his/her standard 
environment represents in fact a conclusive reason for scepticism. Simply put, critics argue 
that assessing whether a person is healthy or not cannot be just a matter of subjective 
judgement, and that, in doing so, Nordenfelt’s account runs the risk of forgetting that social 
arrangements can be sometimes detrimental to the individual establishment of vital goals and 
the abilities constituting health (to use his own language). Otherwise stated, though avoiding 
the charge of healthism, Nordenfelt’s subjectivism and relativism as to what constitutes health 
entails another danger. Namely, the risk that individual conceptions of health may be 
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determined by local conditions and practices that would obscure what we may consider as ill 
health resulting from social injustice. An outcome of this theory may be the undesirable 
consequences of considering all choices with regard to the chosen levels of health to 
accomplish in one’s life as equally responsible, thus ignoring the effects of social arrangements 
on those who are powerless, or suffer from endemic disadvantage in our societies 
(Venkatapuram 2012). 
With regard to this potential unwanted consequence of using Nordenfelt’s relativism 
in the context of EBRs, I maintain that it represents no sufficient ground to disqualify his 
theory. Pointing to the risk that people may adapt to unfavorable circumstances – and that by 
doing so their self-evaluation of health will necessarily be distorted (Elster 1982) – represents 
only a good reason to look at how individuals choose their vital goals and health, and not to 
dismiss a subjective understanding of what counts as relevant health. Otherwise stated, the 
fact that the conditions under which these choices take place may not satisfy substantive 
criteria of responsible agency (Minkler 1999, Wilkinson 1999, Buyx and Prainsack 2012, 
Brown 2013), tells nothing about whether health should still reside in a subjective judgement. 
Rather, it calls for establishing what are the relevant criteria under which responsible choices 
with regard to one’s vital goals – and consequently as to the health-related abilities required 
for their achievement – ought to take place.  
The analysis of the substantive criteria for such allegations of responsibility, useful to 
the context of EBRs, will be the subject of the next chapter of this thesis. As to the present 
analysis of health, it is instead important to stress how, differently from the BTH (Boorse 
1975, 1997), both versions of HTH (WHO 1948, Nordenfelt 1993, 1995, 2001, 2012, 
forthcoming) are able to circumvent ‘the charge of healthism’ addressed to EBRs (Minkler 1999, 
Greenhalgh 2004, Veitch 2010). Holistic accounts of health privilege the subjective 
dimensions of health, and point to the necessity of framing its value as relative to the 
individual perspective, values, and life goals. For this reason, it is possible to conclude that 
both of these theories constitute prima facie suitable accounts of health for the purpose of 
establishing the substantive foundations of empowerment in EBRs. Yet, the difficulties 
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identified above in the WHO’s version of the HTH point to the need of abandoning this 
theory due to its limitations in capturing some of the relevant dimensions of health (i.e. the 
necessity to distinguish health from broader wellbeing). Starting from this recognition, I then 
proposed the Nordenfeltian account as a revised version of the HTH that both manages to 
avoid the charge of healthism, and the philosophical objections that apply to its WHO’s 
interpretation. Just as Nordenfelt’s HTH (2012) has come to regard health as one of the 
means of achieving the vital goals that make life socially and culturally productive, 
empowerment within EBRs should act “instrumentally to facilitate ‘healthy’ decision-making” 
(Tones 1998, 71) in the sense of fostering responsible decision-making with regard to one’s 
vital goals and their pursuit. By resorting to a conception of health like Nordenfelt’s HTH 
(2012), EBRs could commit to the values of self-determination and control allegedly at the 
basis of their diffusion of responsibility for health, while at the same time evading the 
adoption of an inadequate understanding of health. By linking Nordenfelt’s theory of health 
(1993, 1995, 2001, 2012, forthcoming) to the broader aims of EBRs, the establishment of vital 
goals depends upon the empowered and responsible choice of individuals and so does, by the 
same token, the set of abilities constituting health required for their achievement.  
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Chapter 4. Responsibility for health beyond cho i c e : an 
empowerment approach 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I have discussed how different conceptions of health can have a 
bearing upon the ethical evaluation of EBRs. What I showed is that the elements of self-
determination and control at the basis of empowerment support the view that EBRs should 
be grounded on an understanding of health that is relative to “patient’s (or group’s) interests, 
benefits, or quality of life” (Cribb 2005, 27). To this end, I argued in favour of Nordenefelt’s 
‘holistic theory of health’ (Nordenfelt 1993, 1995, 2001, 2012, forthcoming) as a suitable theory 
of health for empowerment within EBRs. Such a view, I showed, has the advantage of 
avoiding a charge of healthism addressed to EBRs.  
Yet, this conclusion led me to a second aspect of appeals to responsibility for health 
within EBRs that has indeed already fostered many criticisms. Many of these policy 
documents recommend in fact citizens to be responsible for their health and with respect to 
their use of healthcare resources. Such shift in responsibility for health is presented as a core 
tenet of the broader empowering intent of putting individuals “at the heart” (Great Britain 
2004a, 2004b) of the healthcare system, and raises questions about the interpretation of 
responsibility that are of utmost importance for the ethical appraisal of EBRs. As we will see 
in the present analysis, different interpretations of responsibility for health allow invoking 
different ethical or critical evaluations of EBRs. It is thus crucial to address such confusion so 
as to anticipate the concerns fostered by EBRs and their emphasis on responsibility for health.  
This critical appraisal of EBRs grounded on the negative aspects of ‘responsibilization’ 
for health stresses the difficulties of assuming that people can be rightly held responsible for 
their health (Minkler 1999, Wilkinson 1999, Buyx and Prainsack 2012, Brown 2013). From 
this perspective, the main problem with EBRs is not that they invoke responsibility for the 
promotion of a particular standard for health across the population (see infra Chapter 3). 
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Rather, it is the assumption that agents are sufficiently free so as to be in charge of their health-related 
choices. An uncritical attribution of responsibility for health that does not take into account this 
issue, critics argue, simply ignores the variety of social constraints having an impact upon 
individual capacity for health-related decision-making, and hence may constitute illegitimate 
ethical ground for allegations of responsibility with regard to one’s health. Extensive evidence 
(Marmot and Wilkinson 2005) has been in fact produced regarding the socio-economic 
gradient of health. Roughly put, this evidence shows that the lower the socio-economic status 
of an individual is, the higher the likelihood that she will experience poorer health outcomes. 
This is mainly due to differences in power, skills and resources within a given population, and 
implies that shifting responsibility from the system onto the hands of patients could 
disempower rather than empower certain groups of our society. Since unhealthy behaviours 
are less about personal control than EBRs assume, a devolution of responsibility for health 
failing to recognise that it does not fall within everyone’s powers to refrain from risky 
behaviours, may accentuate or introduce health inequalities in the general population. 
This is the main reason why the ‘responsibilization critique’ calls for a critical scrutiny 
of normative approaches to responsibility for health within the context of EBRs. In order to 
address this issue, this chapter of the thesis will proceed as follows. First, I will review the 
main arguments in favour of holding individuals responsible for their health. As to this matter, 
I will distinguish between appeals to responsibility for health grounded on its ‘backward-
looking’ and ‘forward looking’ interpretations, and show how different normative perspectives 
– ranging from luck egalitarianism to consequentialism – may uphold a number of conditions 
for normative claims of responsibility for health within EBRs (Morreim 1995, Cappelen and 
Norheim 2005, Feiring 2008, Segall 2009, Voigt 2013). Second, I will present three main 
objections against such appeals to responsibility for health. I will discuss (i) a general argument 
against the normative relevance of the dichotomy between ‘backward-looking’ and ‘forward 
looking’ understandings of responsibility for health (Albertsen 2013), (ii) a solidarity-based 
rebuttal of individual responsibility for health (Buyx and Prainsack 2012), and (iii) an argument 
questioning the notion of ‘freedom of choice’ at the basis of attributions of responsibility for 
	   115 
unhealthy behaviours (Brown 2013). In light of these objections, I will conclude that we have 
convincing reasons to question the moral assumptions on which appeals to responsibility in 
healthcare are grounded (i.e. the idea that we can deem individuals to freely choose health-related 
behaviours and lifestyles) and, consequently, to prefer EBRs not to be grounded on any of 
such normative stances. 
Starting from this recognition, I will then move to a possible foundation of appeals to 
responsibility for health within EBRs. I will show that empowerment theorists approach 
matters of responsibility for health-related behaviours (Koelen and Lindström 2005), from the 
assumption of a distinct view of human agency in healthcare. Consequently, the 
empowerment perspective on responsibility for health can primarily be regarded as 
questioning the notion of freedom and responsibility (Brown 2013) at the basis of most of the 
approaches currently dominating the debate. The case for attributions of responsibility for 
health starting from the premises of empowerment is rather concerned with a different view 
of what it means to be responsible in the first place. Some interpretations of empowerment 
underscore in fact what can be called an ecological model of responsibility for health. This 
model points to the necessary “balance between individual self-efficacy and broader political 
[…] action for social change” (Minkler 1999, 132) for legitimate attributions of responsibility 
for health. In other words, the empowerment perspective on responsibility for health does not 
necessarily entail abandoning the endeavour of devolving responsibilities for health to citizens. 
Quite the contrary, appeals to responsibility for health can be grounded on the substantive 
views of empowerment approaches to health promotion. However, such views demand a 
framing of individual responsibility within the context of social responsibility for health, thus 
pointing to a set of social conditions to be met in order for ascriptions of responsibility to be 
lawful.  Without attending to the broader inter-personal level of determinants of health (e.g. 
political opportunities for organizational change and community development), no emphasis 
on intra-personal change can have ethical ground from the perspective I will defend 
throughout this chapter.  
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It is against this background, I will conclude, that appeals to responsibility for health 
within EBRs could avoid the ‘responsibilization critique’ outlined above. This framing of 
responsibility for health has in fact the merit of shifting the focus of its assessment towards 
the issue of whether individual capacity, together with its broader social environment, are such 
that they empower the individual to be substantively responsible for her own health. Rather 
than being a matter of individual liability for choice, responsibility for health – through the lens 
of the ecological model – calls for the more fine-grained analysis of the contribution of 
socioeconomic structures on freedom and responsibility for health demanded by critics of 
EBRs.  
Different kinds of appeals to responsibility for health 
In recent years, the notion of individual responsibility for health has received a great deal of 
attention in philosophical debates (Minkler 1999, Wilkinson 1999, Feiring 2008, Buyx and 
Prainsack 2012, Albertsen 2013, Brown 2013, Voigt 2013). As mentioned above, many 
scholars agree upon the difficulties of holding individuals responsible for their health. Yet, the 
reasons behind this conclusion are a vexed matter and depend upon how we interpret appeals 
to responsibility as to health-related matters (Wikler 1987). Powerful normative arguments can 
in fact be found in the literature to stress the importance of individual responsibility in 
healthcare. In particular, these appeals to responsibility for health are grounded on two15 
distinct notions of responsibility (van de Poel 2011). The first one is a ‘backward-looking’ 
notion responsibility, i.e. the idea that holding a person responsible means that such person is 
properly accountable (subject to praise or blame) for having acted in a certain way. The 
second is instead the ‘forward-looking’ notion of responsibility, pointing to the idea of 
responsibility as substantive claims about whether people’s actions can be regarded as 
depending on and reflecting their choices.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Voigt (2013) identifies a third kind of appeals to responsibility for health. Namely, those connecting such 
appeals to wider considerations of efficiency for the system (Great Britain 2004, 2010a, 2010b). From this 
perspective, the responsible citizen is not only the one who takes up control over his/her health, but also the one 
that contributes to the sustainability of the healthcare system with his “healthy behaviours”. For a discussion of 
this kind of appeals to health, see: infra, chapter 3. 
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 In the remaining of this section, I will briefly outline different arguments that, building 
upon the two notions of responsibility outlined above, have provided reasons in favour of 
allocating responsibility for health at the individual level. As we will see, both arguments based 
on backward-looking responsibility (the luck-egalitarian and the liberal egalitarian), and 
arguments grounded on forward-looking responsibility (liberal-contractualist and 
consequentialist) come in two main versions. 
Backward-looking responsibility 
The first account of backward-looking responsibility is concerned with finding a criterion for 
rationing the allocation of healthcare resources (Segall 2009). Such a view, which has been 
widely ascribed to luck egalitarians (Segall 2009, Voigt 2013), stipulates health inequalities to 
be “fair if and only if they are the result of choices for which agents can be held responsible” 
(Voigt 2013, 147). This means that, conversely, only those inequalities arising from brute luck 
(i.e. from circumstances that are beyond individual control) should be considered as 
problematic. Starting from these premises, luck egalitarians support claims of responsibility 
for health by arguing that patients should be held liable for their additional demand of 
healthcare resources when such costs are the result of their own choices. In particular, those 
who suggest that responsibility should serve as criterion for denying a treatment, or according 
lower priority, or requiring a higher contribution to patients and clients, often take as an 
example lifestyle-related illnesses. Since most of these diseases are the result of individual 
choice and behaviour, this line of reasoning goes, we do not have reasons of justice to include 
their treatment and management in the provision of publicly funded healthcare services. The 
additional burden on those who are suffering from a disease that is caused by their own 
choices (e.g. smokers) is not in fact problematic from the point of view of justice, because it is 
the result of choices for which individual agency can be held responsible. 
 A second and distinct kind of appeals to responsibility, based on its backward-looking 
understanding, comes instead from the normative perspective of liberal egalitarians (Cappelen 
and Norheim 2005). Liberal egalitarian theories of distributive justice maintain that public 
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policies should aim at securing equal opportunities for all individuals, which in turn require the 
elimination of all sources of inequalities that “arise from factors outside the agent’s control 
[…], such as a person’s natural and genetic abilities” (Cappelen and Norheim 2005, 478). 
Similarly to luck egalitarians, therefore, liberal egalitarians deem inequalities or costs that are 
the result of individual choice as acceptable, and conclude that people should be held 
responsible for their health-related choices. Yet, a main difference exists between luck and 
liberal egalitarians. While luck egalitarians go as far as considering the choices of individuals 
sufficient ground to ascribe them the burden of their consequences, liberal egalitarians draw a 
distinction between choices and consequences that has strong normative relevance. To hold 
people responsible for the actual consequences of their choices would in fact be too much for 
the liberal egalitarian because the outcomes of individual choices depend also on other factors. 
Some people, they argue, are lucky when they entertain risky behaviours, while some others 
are not. This means that the difference between, say, a lucky smoker and an unlucky one (i.e. 
the one who develops cancer, and the one who does not) is not dictated only by their own 
respective choices – which is indeed the same (i.e. engaging in the risky habit of smoking) – 
but rather from factors that are beyond their control and that can be regarded as luck. For this 
reason, liberal egalitarians reject the view supported by luck egalitarians that health costs 
resulting from individual choices (e.g. unhealthy lifestyle, or risky habits) should fall on the 
individual. The correct place to introduce responsibility, they argue, “is not at the sick bed” of 
the individual (Cappelen and Norheim 2005, 479). Rather, responsibility should be allocated 
on choices, through mechanisms that reward healthy behaviours (e.g. tax deduction for sport 
activities), or disincentives that render less appealing the unhealthy ones (e.g. taxation of 
goods such as cigarettes or alcohol).  
Forward-looking responsibility 
Claims of responsibility for health based on its ‘forward-looking’ interpretation have to do 
instead with the emphasis put on strategies to encourage individuals to take up responsibility 
for their health (Feiring 2008). Rather than looking at whether individuals can be held 
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substantively responsible for their previous choices, attributions of responsibility should 
concern the willingness of individuals to change their future behaviour. In its liberal-
contractualist interpretation, arguments from ‘forward-looking’ responsibility drift the 
attention away from the question of determining whether the individual is responsible for the 
bad consequences (in terms of health) of her actions. What matters as to responsibility 
attributions is whether the individual is ready to “sign a contract declaring a commitment to 
undertake medical follow-ups and other activities aimed at changing the lifestyle in question” 
(Albertsen 2013, 2). It is only after the individual is given the opportunity for such a 
commitment that healthcare resources should be allocated on the basis of responsibility. The 
reasons for giving up on claims of substantive responsibility for previous choices are 
manifold, according to the proponents of this view. First, it is always difficult to determine 
whether something has happened because of deliberate choice or because of the 
circumstances. Keeping the two distinguished requires in fact an explanation of “what is to 
count as a choice and what is count as circumstance that must be acceptable to all” (Feiring 
2008, 35): a conceptual endeavour that seems problematic “in ideal theory” (Feiring 2008, 35) 
as well as in practice. Second, establishing whether some health disadvantage can be attributed 
to choice or circumstances may be intrusive for the privacy of the concerned individual, or 
even further ignite a culture of “moralised judgements in order to classify persons according 
to the degree of irresponsibility of their choices” (Feiring 2008, 35). Thus, it is better 
abandoning the focus on responsibility as past choices, and rather to reframe the discourse as 
an opportunity for a “fresh start” (Vansteenkiste et al. 2014) with regard to unhealthy lifestyles 
and future health improvements.  
A second kind of arguments from ‘forward-looking’ responsibility is grounded instead 
on consequentialist normative theories, like utilitarianism (Morreim 1995). Very much like the 
liberal-contractualists, utilitarians are not interested in liability for past choices. Rather, their 
attention to responsibility aims at maximising choices with the best consequences for the 
highest number of people. This means that solving normative matters of responsibility is not 
an end in itself for the consequentialist. Rather, the promotion of responsibility is just 
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regarded as a means to the end of encouraging behaviours that maximise health and wellbeing 
in the population. Starting from these premises, the consequentialist is mostly concerned with 
the reason why individuals engage in risky behaviours. According to this view, the problem 
with the healthcare system is that it favours the same kind of behaviours it wishes to limit. 
Citizens are inclined to undertake hazardous lifestyles because they do not personally face the 
consequences of the additional burden that their unhealthy behaviours put on society (in 
terms of costs). Contemporary healthcare is, in other words, a regime of moral hazard in need 
of practical strategies that, by changing individual behaviour, can produce the best 
consequences for the collectivity. Preeminent among such strategies, scholars argue, is the role 
that economic incentives could play to compel individuals to caring about, and thus 
ameliorating their health. Both negative and positive incentives have in fact the merit of 
linking distribution of costs or treatment to behaviours, by making hazardous lifestyles less 
appealing for citizens, and at the same time maximising instances of appropriate and healthy 
choices.  
A critical appraisal of appeals to responsibility for health 
Determining whether EBRs are grounded on any of the appeals to responsibility for health 
described above is no easy task. In most of the cases, these documents display a vague and 
underdetermined endorsement of substantive claims of responsibility in healthcare. And 
probably, I shall add, it is precisely such lack of clarity that has been often regarded as a source 
of ethical, social and political concern by their analysts (Veitch 2010, Colombo et al. 2012). 
Yet, in this section I wish to make the following point as to the normative perspectives that, 
within EBRs, could justify holding individuals responsible for their health. Regardless of 
which of the four accounts outlined above EBRs endorse, the moral reasons against 
upholding each of them are sound, and call for a different understanding of responsibility as a 
normative basis for the implementation of this new healthcare model.  
In order to ground this claim, I shall distinguish among three different objections to 
appeals to responsibility for health. First, an argument against them has to do with the moral 
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relevance of the distinction between past and future choices (Albertsen 2013). Second, 
another kind of criticism of appeals to individual responsibility comes from solidarity-based 
approaches to healthcare policymaking (Prainsack and Buyx 2011, Dawson and Verweij 2012, 
Buyx and Prainsack 2012). Third, appeals to responsibility for health can be dismissed by 
questioning the idea that individuals act freely in determining their own lifestyle, and thus can 
be deemed responsible for engaging in unhealthy behaviours (Brown 2013). 
On the moral significance of the distinction between ‘forward-’ and ‘backward-looking 
responsibility 
The implications of distinguishing ‘forward-looking’ and ‘backward-looking’ arguments in 
favour of responsibility, have led some scholars to conclude that the two perspectives often 
coincide and that the distinction between past and future choices offers less normative ground 
than its proponents think (Albertsen 2013, 2). In particular, this critique claims that the 
‘forward-looking’ vs. ‘backward-looking’ dichotomy leads to counterintuitive and inconsistent 
conclusions that fundamentally undermine its moral importance for normative matters of 
responsibility for health. In order to better illustrate this point, Albertsen (2013) builds upon 
an example borrowed from the seminal work on responsibility by American philosopher 
Thomas Scanlon (1998, 256-258): 
 
The local town council is tasked with the removal of hazardous waste. The health risks of 
leaving it would be huge, but removing it involves a much smaller although significant health 
risk (i.e. chemicals evaporating into the air during transport). The town council does as much 
as could be expected of them in notifying citizens prior to the event, and in shielding the 
relevant digging sites. Person C receives the information and chooses to travel to the site, 
climbs the fence and gets sick as a result. (Albersten 2013, 2) 
 
The issue raised by this example is obviously whether C should be regarded as responsible for 
the health consequences of her hazardous behaviour. A positive answer to this question is a 
cakewalk from the perspective of a backward-looking account of responsibility. Regardless of 
	   122 
whether we endorse its luck egalitarian or liberal egalitarian interpretation it is indeed quite 
straightforward that C should be held responsible either for the sickness, or for the choice of 
exposing herself to the risk of getting sick. C has in fact voluntarily crossed the fence, and the 
outcome is the by-product of circumstances on which C had control. Things stand differently, 
however, if we look at this case from the perspective of forward-looking interpretations of 
responsibility. On a liberal-contractualist account C would not be deemed responsible for the 
consequences of such a hazardous behaviour. Since she had not taken any previous 
commitment to refrain from this risky exposure, she could not be deemed responsible for the 
health-related consequences of her choice. The same kind of conclusion can be as well drawn 
from a consequentialist point of view. Since no incentive that could encourage C to avoid 
crossing the fence was in place, the responsibility for the consequences of her hazardous 
behaviour cannot fall, neither retrospectively nor prospectively, on her.  
This situation exposes some of the counterintuitive consequences of holding the 
‘forward-looking’ vs, ‘backward-looking’ dichotomy as a relevant criterion for normative issues 
of responsibility for health (Albertsen 2013). In particular, it could be argued, it displays the 
weaknesses of its ‘forward-looking’ interpretations, and questions the difference of such 
accounts with those grounded on ‘backward-looking’ responsibility. The reason for 
concluding this lies, as we have seen above, in the fact that the moral foundations of 
responsibility on all of these accounts have to do with the question of whether the individual 
can be held responsible for her own choices. Though starting from different premises, the 
main condition that for all of them “must be in place before a person can be said to be 
responsible for a state of affairs” (Albertsen 2013, 3), is whether the individual has the 
capacity to be considered the author of her own choices (Scanlon 1998). In the case of C we 
have very strong reasons to think that she acts voluntarily and responsibly when exposing 
herself to the hazardous waste. She explicitly chooses to travel to the site, cross the fence, and 
maximise her risk to get sick as a result of an exposure to hazardous substances. And yet, the 
sole fact that no previous commitment or incentive was in place, in order to make her avoid 
such exposure, obliges us to conclude that she is not responsible for her risky behaviour. 
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Whether or not she acts in full autonomy and freedom, or whether she can be reasonably held 
responsible for her actions has no moral import over judgements of liability and accountability 
from the perspective of ‘forward-looking’ accounts. Her action is valued differently depending 
on matters of time and economic incentive, which add very little to the moral legitimacy of 
judgements of responsibility.  
For this reason, I side with Albertsen (2013) in concluding that it seems 
counterintuitive to restrict ascriptions of responsibility on the basis of the time at which 
individual choices occur. And I add that the same applies to the existence of economic 
incentives for healthy behaviours. Distinguishing between actions that are morally relevant in 
terms of responsibility means looking at the conditions in which individual choice took place 
or will take place, investigating whether it is ethically legitimate to hold the individual 
accountable for a certain act. This points to the importance of assessing whether the 
individual has the capacity to be deemed responsible for her actions, whether the individual 
acts freely in determining a certain state of affairs. Normative matters of responsibility for health 
are, in other words, neutral on the subjects of time and economic incentives, thus granting us 
reasons to give up on the moral value of the ‘forward-looking’ vs, ‘backward-looking’ 
distinction. Quite the contrary, both of these kinds of appeals to responsibility for health 
should be evaluated – as I will do in the next sections of this chapter – by scrutinizing the 
moral reasons that make us consider agents substantively responsible for their choices.  
A solidarity-based rebuttal of appeals to responsibility in healthcare 
A second kind of criticism to appeals to individual responsibility for health builds upon the 
recent attention that bioethical debates have devoted to the value of solidarity in healthcare 
policymaking (Prainsack and Buyx 2011, Dawson and Verweij 2012, Buyx and Prainsack 
2012). In the understanding of its proponents (Prainsack and Buyx 2011), solidarity can be 
defined as the “shared practices reflecting a collective commitment to carry ‘costs’ (financial, 
social, emotional or otherwise) to assist others” (Prainsack and Buyx 2011, 46). Solidaristic 
acts and practices are, in other words, not only individual expressions of sympathy towards 
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others’ vulnerability in which we recognize our own. Quite the contrary, solidarity often 
manifests itself in the form of solidified social norms and structures (e.g. welfare systems and 
social welfare arrangements) that represent an explicit societal commitment to assist others at 
a nominal cost for each member of a society. For this reason, the solidarity-based rebuttal of 
individual responsibility for health is mainly addressed at arguments of retributive and 
distributive justice as to resource allocations. In particular, the main types of argument that 
this view addresses are the ones claiming that, since people can be held accountable for the 
health risks produced by lifestyles, they should withstand the additional health costs of their 
behaviour either by limiting their access to health care services, or by modifying their 
insurance coverage, or by applying fines to the hazardous behaviour at stake.  
 With regard to this matter, the line of argument of solidarity scholars starts from a 
critique of the notion of ‘risk’ at the basis of appeals to responsibility for health (Buyx and 
Prainsack 2012). One of the premises of such arguments, they argue, is that increased health 
risks are determined by individual behaviour. Yet, such a view is deemed simplistic and 
“misconceived” (Buyx and Prainsack 2012, 82) for one main reason. Namely, it is far more 
challenging than it is assumed by its proponents that a causal link exists between unhealthy 
lifestyles and increased risk to develop a certain disease. Judgements of causality are indeed, 
according to the authors, subject to conditions of uncertainty that undermine their moral 
import on claims of responsibility for health. Although the available evidences from 
epidemiology and public health show us that behaviours are an influential risk factor in the 
general population, when it comes to determining the causes of a given condition it is often 
extremely difficult – if not impossible – to ascertain how individual choices produce disease-
specific patterns of risk. The understanding of health risks as the result of individual lifestyles 
overlooks therefore, according to this view, the importance of other factors contributing to 
disease development. Decades of research in genetics and genomics have shown in fact that 
most health conditions are the result of the interplay of heritable and non-heritable factors. In 
particular, recent developments in epigenetics support the view that disease aetiology (with the 
notable exception of genetic disorders such as cystic fibrosis, or Huntington’s disease) is in 
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large part multifactorial (Petronis 2010, Meloni and Testa 2014), and involves environmental 
influences, individual biological make-up and lifestyles alike. Behaviours are, in other words, 
only partly the causal factor of the vast majority of diseases. Hence, since we are not in the 
epistemic condition of pinpointing the precise causal relation between lifestyles and health 
risks, we should reject individual responsibility as a criterion for the allocation of resources in 
healthcare. 
Building upon this analysis of risk stratification, the proposal of solidarity scholars is 
to recast normative matters of responsibility for health in a different language from that of 
risks. In particular, they argue, the alternative of a solidarity-based approach would prescribe 
access to healthcare services to be granted on the basis of individual needs rather than desert, 
or stratification of risks related to lifestyle. ‘Need’ is in fact, according to their view, a category 
that well represents the ‘sameness with others’ at the basis of their understanding of solidarity, 
and that “can empirically be determined far more easily” (Buyx and Prainsack 2012, 83) than 
lifestyle-related patterns of risk. The normative exercises that fall within the scope of solidarity 
are, in other words, diametrically in conflict with those of the appeals to responsibility for 
health abovementioned. First, the difficulties they identify in this line of argumentation lie in 
the assumption that it is possible to delineate the causal link existing between individual 
lifestyle and health risks. Rather, what solidarity scholars show us is that systems for the 
stratification of risks are often limited in their scientific foundations. By doing so, they 
question the main tenet of the accounts of responsibility for health enumerated above. 
Regardless of whether individuals can be considered to act freely in choosing their lifestyles, 
solidarity scholars rightly point out that behaviours are only one among the factors that 
concur to the development of diseases, and that, for this reason, we should downplay the 
moral importance of responsibility for health in regulating the distribution of healthcare 
resources. In addition, their contribution has also the merit of pointing to an important – yet 
overlooked – source of normativity for ethical matters of responsibility for health. Namely, 
the repertoire of practical, interpersonal and legal manifestations of our reciprocal 
commitment to support and help our fellow citizens that goes by the name of solidarity. 
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A freedom-based rebuttal of appeals to responsibility in healthcare 
Finally, a third kind of objection to appeals to responsibility for health has to do with the key 
assumption of these arguments we identified above: namely, the idea that individuals act freely 
in determining their own lifestyle, and thus can be deemed responsible for engaging in 
unhealthy behaviours (Brown 2013). This criticism, which I shall call ‘the argument from (lack 
of) freedom’ claims that choosing between candidates for the allocation of healthcare 
resources cannot be justified on moral grounds of freedom and responsibility for lifestyle 
choices. In particular, Brown’s proposal (2013) is to evaluate the legitimacy of claims of desert 
and blameworthiness as to health-related behaviours on the basis of Pettit’s account of 
freedom as ‘fitness to be held responsible’ (Pettit 2001). If, starting from this account, 
individual can be said to lack freedom when making lifestyle decisions, this implies 
straightaway that we should not consider them responsible for what they do. For this reason, 
Brown introduces some of the requirements that Pettit identifies for ascriptions of freedom to 
agents. According to the author (Pettit 2001), there exist three main domains in which 
freedom of agency is at stake. First, predicating freedom of an agent is to recognize the agent’s 
responsibility for a given action. This means that we hold an individual free insofar as we can 
safely assume that she authored a given act on a given occasion, i.e. her actions are indeed the 
result of her will. Second, freedom pertains to actions in which we can recognize the agent’s 
ownership. Namely, an individual acts freely to the extent that she reflectively endorses the 
action under scrutiny, i.e. she thinks: “this bears my signature, this is me” (Pettit 2001, 6). 
Third, freedom comprises the recognition that no influence from the environment can be 
regarded as determining choices of agents. In this respect, free agency is qualified by the lack of 
external influences undermining the possibility to choose among significantly numerous and 
distinct options available (Pettit 2001, 66).  
 Pettit’s account has the explicit goal of providing a unified picture of ‘freedom’ that 
takes into account its dimensions of responsibility, ownership, and determination by external 
influences (Pettit 2001). In particular, his aim is to show how these three distinct domains are 
intertwined and concur to determine whether we can consider an agent to be free, or fully fit 
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to be held responsible. A failure in any of these three domains of freedom can be in fact 
regarded, according to Pettit, as sufficient ground to dismiss (or at least relieve) individuals 
from claims of responsibility: 
 
When will freedom in this sense fail? Intuitively, you will not be fully free in respect of a 
choice between A and B, if you are not aware of the availability of […] options in your 
environment of choice, do not have the conceptual resources to evaluate them, or are not 
functioning in a way that would allow that evaluation to affect what you do. You will not be 
free if, as a self, you are subject to problems that make it impossible for you – or just 
particularly difficult for you – to claim A or B as something you did. And you will not be fully 
free if, as a person, you are the victim of an unwelcome form of pressure or duress or 
coercion that makes it more difficult to do one or other [thing] (Pettit 2001, 13-14). 
 
Starting from these premises, Brown’s (2013) objective is to show how these failures of 
freedom obtain when dealing with claims of responsibility for (un)healthy behaviours. To this 
aim, she then introduces extensive evidence on the so-called ‘social determinants of health’ 
and the psychology of health behaviours. Such knowledge, pointing to the sensitivity of 
population health levels to social environment and arrangements (Marmot and Wilkinson 
2003, World Health Organization 2013), undermines in fact ascriptions of free agency in each 
of the connotations identified by Pettit. First, literature on the social gradient of health shows 
us that individuals may not satisfy the criterion of responsibility identified by Pettit (2001). In 
particular, bits of evidence in health psychology – suggesting that individuals from 
disadvantaged backgrounds are more susceptible to the detrimental environmental influences 
yielding compulsive and addictive behaviours – appear to undermine the claim that unhealthy 
behaviours are the result of free will. Quite the contrary, the higher likelihood of people with 
low socioeconomic status to entertain addictive or compulsive behaviours points to the role of 
external influences in precluding – at least to a certain extent – the capacity to act in healthier 
ways. The plethora of influences and environmental cues that characterize the most deprived 
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settings in our society deflates, in other words, claims of causal responsibility for unhealthy 
behaviours. Contrary to what is upheld by responsibility-sensitive approaches to resource 
allocations in healthcare, most of these actions are most likely not an expression of free will.  
Second, another way in which broader environmental considerations affect our 
ascriptions of freedom and responsibility has to do with matters of identification and ownership 
of unhealthy behaviours. As shown above, one of the fundamental requirements for freedom 
of action on Pettit’s account lies in what he calls the discursive control over the action. To be 
free in performing a certain action, I must identify such act as “distinctively and intimately 
mine” (Pettit 2001, 7). This means that actions such as responses, choices, behaviours are free 
insofar as they conform to long-term desires and goals of an agent. This kind of requirement 
for free agency, Brown argues (2013), is far from being satisfied when we take into 
consideration the psychological mechanisms at the basis of unhealthy behaviours. Most of the 
time, these acts are of habitual nature, meaning that they are often performed without the 
control of conscious reasoning, and would require a great effort on the side of the individual 
to be changed. Typically, this makes lifestyle behaviours permeable to influence from the 
social context (e.g. advertising, others engaging in unhealthy behaviours) that hinders the 
capacity of agents to exercise a rational control on them. Even though individuals may have a 
strong desire to refrain from unhealthy lifestyles (e.g. the reluctant smoker), it is likely that 
their reiteration does not pertain psychological mechanisms of control and ownership, thus 
failing to satisfy the second condition for free agency established by Pettit (2001).  
Finally, the third requirement for free action on Pettit’s account (2001) pertains to the 
lack of significant external influences and pressure for a given behaviour. Recall that, in his 
view, ascriptions of freedom are legitimate when actions are under-determined by the myriad of 
“coercive and quasi-coercive ways” in which social arrangements may “intrude upon a 
person” (Pettit 2001, 66). With regard to this point, it could be useful to refer to the extensive 
evidence on the causal pathway that links social deprivation and exclusion (e.g. poverty, 
unemployment, disadvantaged upbringing) with poor levels of health and reduced life 
expectancy (Marmot and Wilkinson 2003). In particular, the robust two-way pathway 
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identifiable between addiction to alcohol or tobacco and social deprivation can better illustrate 
here the point raised by Brown (2013). People are in fact more likely to turn to alcohol and 
tobacco if they come from a poor background, and alcohol and tobacco dependence are likely 
to lead individuals to downward social mobility (Marmot and Wilkinson 2003, 24). This means 
that socioeconomic status and background can be consistently shown to yield deleterious 
effects on the third dimension of freedom in Pettit (2001). Roughly put, the social gradient of 
health jeopardizes the social component of freedom by highlighting how individual 
behaviours are subject to determination from external influences and pressures.  
The application of Pettit’s theory of freedom (2001) allows Brown (2013) to operate 
an assessment of responsibility for health, which is radically different from the arguments 
analysed in the previous section. Her account problematizes the fundamental premise on 
which most of appeals to responsibility for health are grounded: namely, the idea that claims 
of responsibility for (un)healthy lifestyles can be defended on moral grounds of freedom in 
performing those actions. Building upon Pettit’s inquiry (2001) on the substantive foundations 
of freedom and evidences of the social determinants of health, she questions these accounts at 
the very basis by dismissing the moral legitimacy of appeals to responsibility for health. 
Knowledge of the social patterning of health suggests in fact a rather different view. In the 
words of epidemiologist Leonard Syme, this knowledge points to the fact that “as individuals 
we are ultimately responsible for our own health. But it is naïve to think that we are free agents 
in this. All of us are influenced by forces in the community that shape our choices and 
preferences” (Syme 1994, 82). 
Interim conclusions 
In this section we have encountered different reasons for holding problematic responsibility-
sensitive theories for the allocation of healthcare resources, which could potentially drive the 
implementation of EBRs. First, we have seen how the distinction between ‘forward-looking’ 
vs. ‘backward-looking’ accounts is wanting closer philosophical scrutiny as to its relevance for 
the normative appraisal of responsibility claims. Building upon Albertsen’s analysis of the 
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liberal-contractualist perspective, I showed that the existence of economic incentives, as well 
as the time at which an action takes place, provides no moral ground for appeals to 
responsibility for health, and that therefore the ‘forward-looking’ vs. ‘backward-looking’ 
dichotomy should be rejected. By showing this, I concluded that the legitimacy of 
responsibility claims depends upon the substantive criteria for holding individuals accountable 
for their behaviours. From the perspectives discussed above, a person is held responsible, 
once we recognise that the forward- backward-looking distinction does not hold water, 
because she is deemed to have voluntarily chosen to expose herself to a given health risk, and 
not because of the time or the incentives that contribute to the action performed. 
With regard to such substantive criteria of responsibility, I then discussed two possible 
strategies for their rebuttal. On the one hand, I showed how solidarity scholars (Buyx and 
Prainsack 2012) question the idea that people entertaining unhealthy behaviours determine their 
increased likelihood of higher healthcare needs. Even though agents can be regarded as 
subjecting themselves to additional health risks, lifestyle-related diseases aetiology can hardly 
be explained as just a matter of individual behaviour. Many factors concur in fact to the onset 
of patterns of risk (e.g. individual predispositions, environmental exposures, etc.), thus 
deflating the role of individual contribution to – and thus responsibility for – loss of health. 
Lifestyles are, in other words, only one of the causes contributing to health; hence, we should 
reject individual responsibility for unhealthy behaviours as a criterion for the allocation of 
resources in healthcare16. On the other hand, I also resorted to a different source of reasons 
for rejecting substantive claims of responsibility for health. According to this view (Brown 
2013), appeals to responsibility for health are morally problematic because they conflate causal 
responsibility for disease aetiology with moral claims of responsible agency for unhealthy 
behaviours. Although it is impossible to deny that as individuals we have a fundamental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 To reinforce this claim, solidarity scholars (Buyx and Prainsack 2012) also rightly point out that distributive 
matters in healthcare cannot be resolved by looking only at one source of normativity, i.e. the value of individual 
responsibilities for lifestyle-related diseases. Establishing an entitlement to the use of healthcare resources 
depends also on other founding values of our society at large, such as the commitment to help others epitomized 
by solidarity-based practices and institutions. It will be useful to bear this point in mind when reading the analysis 
of the following section of this chapter. 
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bearing upon our health, it is far from clear – as shown by the author – whether we are free in 
doing so, and consequently whether we should be held responsible for our actions. Brown’s 
account (2013) questions the fundamental criterion on which responsibility-sensitive accounts 
of justice in healthcare are grounded. Namely, that lifestyle and health-related choices are a 
matter of personal control and free agency. By juxtaposing Pettit’s theory of freedom (2001) 
to knowledge of the social determinants of health (Marmot and Wilkinson 2003, World 
Health Organization 2013), she dismisses the claim that individuals ought be considered free 
in making – and thus responsible for – health-related behaviours. 
The upshot of this section is therefore that matters of responsibility for health demand 
to be addressed by taking into account a different and broader set of considerations in order 
to be granted legitimacy. By showing us how lifestyle-related illnesses are less a matter of 
personal control than we might assume, the three critiques I presented in this section recast 
agent’s behaviour in terms of psychosocial factors, environmental cues and influences that 
undermine the importance of individual contribution as a normative anchor point for 
healthcare resources allocation. The evidence that antecedent social and environmental 
influences determine behaviour stands in direct contradiction with the presumption that 
people have the ability to make free choices with regard to lifestyles. And, consequently, it 
undercuts the moral legitimacy of claims of responsibility and accountability for unhealthy 
behaviours. As a result of the present analysis, the ethical legitimacy of normative claims of 
individual responsibility, liability and freedom for health depends from the scrutiny of the 
complex tapestry of social factors having a bearing upon individual agency.  
In addition, what I showed so far opens up an important ethical matter to be 
addressed by proponents of EBRs. If, on the one hand, appeals to responsibility for health 
within these documents are comparable to the kinds of normative exercises entailed in the 
perspectives introduced above, it is doubtful that the new kinds of agencies and relationships 
envisaged by these documents are something desirable from an ethical point of view. If, on 
the other, supporters of EBRs are instead willing to side with critics of appeals to 
responsibility in healthcare, and to uphold claims of responsibility for health that are not 
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subject to the criticisms outlined above, the key question they are confronted with becomes 
the following: in what respects an empowerment approach to responsibility for health can 
avoid the unwanted consequences that the accounts examined here are likely to bring about? 
To the provision of an answer to this question, I will now turn for the rest of this chapter. 
The conditions of responsibility for health under the empowerment approach 
The importance of attending to the broader social and environmental determinants of health 
is well captured in some of the empowerment approaches to health promotion that I have 
introduced in Chapter 1. To recap, while analysing these understandings of the concept I 
resorted to a distinction between two meanings of the term empowerment; one referring to 
the state of an individual within a certain community or social setting (i.e. the goal of 
empowerment), and the other pointing to the process (i.e. the practical strategies or means) that 
is likely to bring about an empowerment state (Tengland 2008). The key attribute of these 
approaches, I argued, is that the dimensions of ‘empowerment as a state’ and ‘empowerment 
as a process’ are intertwined, and constitute an understanding of human agency that revolves 
around two aspects of the notion of control over determinants of health-related quality of life. 
We seize control over our health, i.e. we reach a state of empowerment, only if we also 
exercise control over the social process that produces empowerment. This means that, on the 
one hand, abilities such as self-determination and control (sometimes referred to as power-to) 
with regard to health-related agency play here a pivotal role. Being in a state of empowerment 
means, generally speaking, being able to make relevant decisions with regard to health, as well 
as to have the opportunities to act upon them. Yet, on the other hand, this emphasis on 
capacity and opportunities has to be complemented with the idea that control pertains also to 
the generative process (e.g. political action for change, community-based advocacy for health, 
etc.) that enables individuals (e.g. clients, groups, or communities) to achieve an empowered 
state (sometimes referred to as lack of power-over)17.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In Chapter 2 I have further specified this view by showing how attending to these procedural requirements of 
this notion of control constitutes the non-paternalistic element of empowerment. 
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Otherwise stated, these understandings of empowerment put a strong emphasis on a 
notion of agency in healthcare that is quite different from the one we encountered in the 
appeals to responsibility for health analysed above. Individual behaviour is framed, from these 
perspectives, as inextricably related to transformations at the interpersonal, community and 
institutional levels 18  (World Health Organization 1986, Wallerstein and Bernstein 1988, 
Laverack 2005, Tengland 2008, 2012). Freedom and responsibility for health cannot be thus 
conceived, starting from these approaches, as separated – and perhaps only affected – by the 
social context. Quite the contrary, the state of being empowered (i.e. being in control of 
health-related quality of life) stands in a relation of mutual dependence with the mastery of the 
politically and socially contextual process that is expected to produce the empowering outcome. 
From such perspectives, we are empowered insofar as we are in control (at least to a certain 
extent) of the broader social system of which we are part, and consequently of the social 
factors that affect our health.  
Although underspecified in its substantive terms, this fundamental tenet of 
empowerment points to a distinct kind of normative appraisal of matters of responsibility for 
health. Rather than being concerned with the ways in which individual responsibility is affected 
or undermined by the social environment and the determinants of health, some empowerment 
scholars focus on what can be called an ecological model of responsibility for health (Minkler 
1999). They rule out the distinction between an individual domain of responsibility (as the locus 
of ethical scrutiny for judgements of praise, blame, and accountability), and the social forces 
that may get in its way. Quite the contrary, ascribing substantive responsibility for health to 
citizens entails, from these perspectives, attending to the value of having actions depend on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 On the broader scale of EBRs, the only example of such a view is represented by the WHO’s conceptual 
framework proposed in the “Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion” (World Health Organization 1986). With its 
emphasis on the “usefulness and the challenges of an approach that truly balances concerns with individual and 
broader social responsibility for health” (Minkler 1999, 133), such document epitomizes a vision of health 
promotion as “a process of enabling people to increase control over, and to improve their health” (World Health 
Organization 1986). By doing so, the Ottawa Charter can be safely assumed to be a unique example of policy 
document attending to the empowering goals of synthesizing personal choice and social responsibility in health. 
Among the principles that can be said to underlie this vision of health promotion it is in fact possible to 
enumerate: acting on the determinants or causes of health, eliciting high-level public participation, and using a 
variety of approaches that go well beyond lifestyle education and include legislation, organizational change, and 
community development. 
	   134 
and reflect agency as embedded within a given social environment and background. This means 
that, from such empowerment approaches, only if some social conditions are met we are 
entitled to devolve responsibility for health-related behaviours to individuals.  
The moral difference between the notions of responsibility analysed in the previous 
section and the ecological model just introduced, can be captured by a distinction between a 
‘choice view’ of responsibility and its ‘holistic’ counterpart (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007). 
Although diverging in their normative stance on matters of responsibility for health, all of the 
approaches to social policy we encountered so far share in fact the view that one bears 
responsibility for an act insofar as this is the result of one’s choices. Some of them provide a 
positive answer to the question “are lifestyles and behaviours the result of individual choice?”, 
thus providing normative justification to claims of responsibility. The standard example of this 
view, provided by the luck egalitarian perspective (Segall 2009, Voigt 2013), claims for 
example that a person is substantively responsible for the health-related consequences of her 
behaviour because she chose, voluntarily, to bring them about. Some others provide instead a 
negative answer to the same question. They maintain, for instance, that claims of responsibility 
are not legitimate because social factors and determinants undermine the possibility that 
lifestyles are actually the result of choices (Brown 2013). These two views support, as we have 
seen, distinct normative stances on responsibility for health, and yet both share the 
assumption that individual choice is the fundamental criterion for allocating responsibility for 
health. On the former, responsibility is equated with attributability of choices, i.e. the 
recognition that individuals do determine their lifestyles, their increased risk to develop a 
disease, and consequently are responsible for its potential outcome. On the latter, instead, 
responsibility is substantively understood so as that, in order to legitimise normative claims of 
responsibility, lifestyle-related behaviours must be shown to be the result of an exercise of 
freedom on the side of the agent (Scanlon 1998). The fact that individuals choose to entertain 
risky behaviours does not suffice to ground ascriptions of responsibility.  
The holistic notion of responsibility at the basis of the ecological model in 
empowerment has instead different moral roots. What matters for this approach is the context 
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in which choices are taken rather than just their freedom and authenticity (in the sense of the 
‘choice view’). The normative exercise required by ecological responsibility is thus concerned 
with a different version of the question we encountered in the case of the ‘choice view’. Here, 
what we should ask ourselves is whether “it is reasonable to expect someone to act one way 
rather than another?” (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007, 80). Meaning that substantive judgements of 
responsibility for health, under the aegis of empowerment, pertain not only to individual 
freedom of choice, but also to broader social and political opportunities (Wolff and de-Shalit 
2007) to control one’s health: 
 
In judging whether someone should be held responsible for the consequences of their actions 
we should take all the impacts – costs and benefits – of potential action and non-action into 
account. On the view developed here, someone has a genuine opportunity to do x only if 
doing x is reasonable for them, in the sense that the costs of doing so are reasonable for them 
to bear. The relevant costs are the impacts on other functionings, and what is reasonable 
depends on the context (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007, 80). 
 
This holistic or ecological view of responsibility is evident, for instance, in some 
empowerment approaches to mental health (Chamberlin 2013), to chronic disease care (Feste 
and Anderson 1995), and health promotion (Segal 1998, Tengland 2007, Laverack 2005). 
Empowering patients is in fact recognised across these different contexts as having a number 
of qualities, which may help us better qualify what kind of opportunities are relevant for such 
notion of responsibility. The emphasis these scholars put on individual freedom – as the 
condition for responsibility – is epitomized by the use of formulas such as “having decision-
making power” (Chamberlin 2013), or control over one’s “desires and actions” (Tengland 
2007), and largely depends on individual abilities to change things in their environment. This 
means that ‘opportunities’ are regarded within this literature as possibilities to make changes in 
one’s social context that both affect – and complement – health-related ability and wellbeing 
(Tengland 2007). In particular, such a reading of opportunities (as contributing also to relevant 
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health-related abilities) for gaining control over health includes (i) having access to relevant 
information and knowledge (Chamberlin 2013), (ii) having the competence required to act on 
such information (Segal 1998), (iii) having a range of options from which to make choices 
(Chamberlin 2013), (iv) feeling confident of being able to make a difference (Koelen and 
Lindström 2005), (v) encouraging group and community action through the identification of 
common values, needs and goals (Feste and Anderson 1995, Laverack 2005), (vi) having the 
adequate material and economic resources to make a change in one’s own life with regard to 
health (Chamberlin 2013). 
It will be now clearer to the reader how this understanding of freedom as a basis of 
responsibility within empowerment resonates with some developments and amendments to 
the so-called capability approach (Sen 1999, Nussbaum 2000, Wolff and de-Shalit 2007). The 
terms “freedom” and “control” at the basis of these two frameworks are in fact conceptually 
related. In so far as we understand freedom as opportunity, rather than merely ‘choice’, any 
positive change in freedom is also an increase in empowerment, since these opportunities 
often consist of increasing individual control over their lives and health (Tengland 2008). This 
means that both on the empowerment and the capability approach whether it is reasonable to 
hold someone responsible for her health will, in turn, depend on an analysis of many aspects 
of a person’s life, including her socio-economic status as well as her general freedom to 
exercise control over their health. And yet, a major difference exists between these two 
approaches. As we have seen in the case of my analysis of paternalism (see infra Chapter 2), 
the moral reasoning underlying empowering strategies in health promotion is grounded also 
on a distinct and normatively binding view of the role of practitioners and healthcare policy-
makers, which pertains to the limitation of authoritative interferences entailed in their daily 
practice. Underpinning the empowerment approach is in fact the belief that patient or client’s 
decision-making power can be enhanced only through a process of constructive and 
collaborative cooperation, participation and respect (Laverack 2005, Tengland 2008), which 
should not be vested by expert authority.  
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This emphasis upon the limitation of professional power affirms therefore a view of 
freedom as opportunity – in the terms of empowerment – which goes beyond the one of 
capability thinking. Besides recognising the importance of individual and community 
development (the genuine political opportunities that capability scholars have in mind), the 
sovereignty of an empowered agent appears to be also a relational concept, meaning that it 
involves necessarily an active role of facilitation and support on the side of professionals and 
policy-makers. The opportunities for freedom (and consequently responsibility) are not 
exhausted, under the empowerment approach, by improving general levels of health, minimal 
functionings, and security of the community (Robeyns 2011). Rather, the constituency of such 
opportunities entails an obligation on the side of the healthcare system (broadly conceived) to 
support and assist the individuals to change on their own and to become more independent in 
pursuing their health plans (see infra Chapter 3). Only if this kind of freedom (Taylor and 
Hawley 2006) is achieved we obtain the conditions for responsibility under the ecological model 
of empowerment. 
Conclusions: an empowerment-based approach to responsibility for health 
Instead of seeing responsibility as liability for one’s behaviours, the view I present here 
maintains that ascriptions of responsibility are conditional to a state of freedom (or power) 
over ourselves, which consists of the opportunities (i) to transform our behaviour (with the 
support of professionals), and (ii) to affirm our presence and influence in the social life to 
which we belong. By doing so, the present analysis is meant to show how questions of 
responsibility for health within EBRs can be resolved by drawing on a source of normativity, 
which is fundamentally different from the one largely dominating the debate in healthcare 
ethics. When making substantive judgements such as “A is responsible for the health-related 
consequence X” – from the empowerment perspective defended here – we do not ask 
ourselves if A’s choices are free (Segall 2009, Voigt 2013) or not (Brown 2013) in producing the 
consequence X. Rather, we are bound to plunge into the social and political conditions and 
opportunities in which such choices are made, as well as on the social and political influences 
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that shape individual lifestyle and behaviours. What is argued here is, in other words, that a 
number of complementary responsibilities exist also on the side of the healthcare system for 
individuals to be able to legitimately assume responsibility for their health. The empowerment 
way casts in fact professionals and healthcare policy-makers in the role of facilitator and 
demands a number of support mechanisms that may provide the opportunities to enhance 
citizens’ freedom and, in the long run, their ability to acquire responsibility for their own 
health. 
Furthermore, this empowerment-based notion of responsibility for health can provide 
an alternative to the view at the basis of the responsibilization critique, pointing to the 
difficulties of solving these matters by trading off individual merit and possible sanctions for 
health-related behaviours. In countering the trend towards the individualisation of social 
policy in healthcare (Shapiro 2012), the perspective hereby proposed requires approaching 
normative matters of liability and accountability in healthcare by pointing to the inherently 
collective nature of moral and legal responsibility for one’s behaviour. In doing so, my main 
aim has been that of nurturing the more accurate and socially aware estimation of the value of 
taking responsibility for our actions, which critics of EBRs and appeals to responsibility in 
healthcare demand. The main advantage of such an empowerment perspective is that it 
refrains both from an overestimation of people’s freedom of choice – and hence responsibility 
– with regard to health-related behaviours, and an underestimation of the potential benefits 
that devolutions of responsibility for health may yield for people’s opportunities to pursue 
their vital goals19 (Nordenfelt 1995). It is in fact simplistic, if not wrong, to conclude both that 
people should be held responsible for their health-related behaviours under all conditions (Segall 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 It might be argued that my substantive requirement of freedom to be held responsible for one's health stands 
in contrast with the relativism of Nordenfelt's account discussed in Chapter 3. According to this potential 
reading, claiming legitimate only those health-related choices that are responsible under the ecological model 
would clash with the idea that levels of health should be relative to individual preferences. I maintain this 
contrast not to hold for the following reason. Nordenfelt's theory implies neither that all the choices with regard 
to one's vital goals stand on a par, nor that it is not possible to identify some criteria to judge better or worse 
choices with regard to one's vital goals. Rather, his theory of health only points to the importance of taking up 
evaluations of health that are relative to one's beliefs, values and preferences (i.e. one's vital goals). It might well 
be the case, under his theory, that a person's vital goals are inauthentic, that her vital goals are determined in full 
freedom, or also that the person is unaware of her vital goals. What I am positing here tries to identify a 
substantive requirement for discriminating among all of these possible scenarios, without therefore impinging 
upon the idea that health is relative to one's preferences and vital goals. 
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2009, Voigt 2013), and that conditions of freedom for responsibility for health hardly obtain 
when it comes to disadvantaged groups of our society (Brown 2013). Quite the contrary, 
empowering responsibility for health can be regarded as fostering a process whereby 
individuals can, if they wish so, enhance their control over their lives, health and welfare. 
Whether or not such process can be regarded as ethically desirable depends very much on the 
context, on the domain in which responsibilities are devolved, and on a variety of normative 
considerations.  
In this respect, my analysis goes along the same lines of the intuition encountered 
above, coming from the solidarity-based rebuttal of claims of responsibility in healthcare 
(Buyx and Prainsack 2012), that an ethical appreciation of these matters demands a focus 
which is much broader than questions of freedom of individual choice. Deciding whether 
access to healthcare, or costs for services, or merely their use, ought to be sensitive to 
individual responsibility and lifestyles is to ascertain whether the political circumstances of 
individuals favour the development and acquisition of the essential characteristics for 
responsibility. And, most importantly, it means also asking ourselves whether we – as a society 
– find reasonable and ethically desirable for people to bear the consequences of their 
behaviours. Moral responsibility (in the sense of the ‘choice view’ mentioned above) is only 
one among many considerations for judgements of responsibility for health (Wilkinson 1999), 
from the perspective here developed. Such judgements are a rather broader and contextual 
matter, which demands also interrogating ourselves on the social obligations of providing 
genuine opportunities for taking up responsibilities with regard to our health. The main 
outcome of this analysis is therefore that of potentially helping health educators to 
acknowledge the importance of working systematically on the various educational, 
organizational, administrative, and policy determinants that, if properly addressed, are likely to 
bring about the desired outcome of an empowered and responsible citizenship in healthcare. 
And for this reason, the next section of this thesis will focus on one possible way of cashing 
out this normative theorization of responsibility in planning and evaluating multilevel 
empowerment practice in healthcare.  
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Chapter 5. How to assess the effectiveness of empowerment in 
EBRs?  
Introduction 
Besides its influence on the development of what I called EBRs, the empowerment approach 
has increasingly gained currency across a number of healthcare contexts (Christens 2013). 
From the commitments upheld by the policy and reform documents (Colombo et al. 2012), to 
the practical development of strategies for the management and prevention of diseases 
(Wallerstein 2006, Herbert et al. 2009), empowerment is by now considered a “cornerstone of 
health promotion practice and philosophy” (Woodall et al. 2012, 742). Already a cursory 
review of the practice of empowerment confirms that this paradigm has now become influential 
both at the individual and the public health level. Empowerment plays a major role for the 
development of care strategies in a number of contexts, such as cancer care (Mok 2001, 
Wilson 2008, Stang and Mittelmark 2010, Ryhänen et al. 2012), end of life care (Martin 1998), 
health community action (Minkler 1997), mental health (Chamberlin 1997), diabetes 
management (Anderson and Funnell 2005, Asimakopoulou 2010), and more recently e-Health 
(Lodewijk 2012). Empowering initiatives have been shown to lead to better health outcomes 
and disease management in a variety of chronic conditions (World Health Organization 2002), 
and are deemed particularly suitable to contexts in healthcare where the agency and leadership 
of the people involved is key to the success of the intervention (Wallerstein 2006).   
Parallel to the proliferation of empowerment-based intervention in healthcare, a 
variety of methods for the evaluation of its effectiveness have been developed. Ranging from 
qualitative, to quantitative and mixed methods, research on the effectiveness of empowerment 
has been focusing on the development of different instruments for its assessment across 
various healthcare settings (Wallerstein 2006, Herbert et al. 2009, Hudon et al. 2010). This 
section of the thesis aims at investigating the theoretical underpinnings of all of these 
instruments, by identifying the challenges ahead for the development of standard and reliable 
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measurements of the effectiveness of empowerment. In addition, the goal of this chapter is 
also to identify available instruments for the measurement of empowerment that best meet the 
distinctive ethics of the approach defended throughout this work.  
In pursuing this goal, I will proceed as follows. First, I will reconstruct the existing 
controversy surrounding the variety of instruments that have been used for evaluating 
outcomes of empowerment (Wallerstein 2006, Herbert et al. 2009, Hudon et al. 2010). In 
particular, I will describe three recognizable pathways of research on the instruments for 
measuring of empowerment (i.e. instruments for psychological empowerment, instruments for 
health-related outcomes of empowerment, instruments for community-based empowerment), 
and discuss their methodological strengths and limitations. What I will show is that two main 
reasons are at the basis of the dispute regarding how to best measure empowerment. First, this 
range of instruments grapples with the consequences of the multi-level nature of the 
empowerment conceptual construct. Since empowerment can be understood, operationalized 
and implemented differently – depending on whether it is expected to lead to individual 
enablement, health-related outcomes, and community action for policy change – very different 
measurements may be required to capture indicators of its success across various healthcare 
settings. Second, the lack of definitional precision of empowerment is reflected, in a robust 
disagreement about how we should conceive its effectiveness, and the measurement of its 
outcomes.  
In an attempt to position my analysis within such dispute, the concluding section of 
this chapter will focus instead on whether my conceptual approach to empowerment 
privileges some methods to assess its outcomes. Accordingly, I start by summarizing the main 
normative tenets of empowerment presented in this work. I argue that the shift prompted by 
EBRs from control over life and health (Green and Tones 2010) to responsibility for health has at 
least one major implication for the design of empowerment interventions and their 
measurements. Methods for the evaluation of empowerment should privilege, under my 
interpretation, a multi-level assessment of its effects. From “active processes of change and 
transformation” (Rifkin 2003, 169), to psychological and health related outcomes, the 
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normative foundations of empowerment I identify demand methods that integrate all of these 
dimensions in the assessment of its outcomes (Woodall et al. 2012). This recognition, I 
conclude, calls for abandoning the mutually exclusive approaches to the design of 
empowerment measurements at the basis of the three recognizable pathways of research 
discussed here. 
How to measure the effectiveness of empowerment? 
To evaluate the effectiveness of empowerment is to do (i) an analysis of how a given 
definition of the concept is operationalized, and (ii) to estimate the reliability of the 
instruments we use to determine its successful implementation. On the one hand, the way we 
understand empowerment plays in fact a major role as to the variables, indicators and 
outcomes (Herbert et al. 2009) that we want to observe in operationalizing the concept. 
Otherwise stated, conceptual approaches to the implementation of empowerment are inseparable 
from the methodological considerations for their assessment. Whether we describe 
empowerment as the possibility to control one’s life and health (Rappaport 1987), or whether 
we understand it as the process of bringing about health-related social change – in terms of 
“skills, resources, opportunities and authority” (Rodwell 1996, 309) – will no doubt 
discriminate among empirical strategies for determining the success of the intervention. On 
the other, evaluating the effectiveness of empowerment demands that questions of 
generalizability and reliability of the data obtained are addressed. Apart from the variability in 
the definitions of concept, one major problem in measuring empowering outcomes lies 
therefore in the fact that empowerment is commonly described as a contextual and 
participatory process. Processes of empowerment tend to be tailored for use in a specific 
context or population: to what extent should we then expect them to produce generalizable 
knowledge for different healthcare settings? 
 The recognition of these difficulties in the operationalization and assessment of 
empowerment has led some scholars to conclude that the nature of the approach calls for 
refraining from lusts of reproducibility and generalizability (Rodwell 1996, Gibson 1991). 
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‘Universal measurements’ (Wallerstein 2006) of empowerment are, under this interpretation, 
not only insufficient, but also undesirable because they fail to take up the local culture, 
language and context in the design of practical strategies. According to this view, 
empowerment is a support process, a partnership between professionals and participants that 
can hardly be reconciled with a static view of the concept to be applied across different 
contexts. An appropriate means of generating knowledge on the success of empowerment is 
rather that of using “a qualitative approach such as ethnographic or phenomenological 
research” (Rodwell 1996, 310) 20. Some other scholars have instead tried to overcome this 
issue by demanding the construct of empowerment to gain “conceptual maturity” (Herbert et 
al. 2009, 126). The main reason for the difficulties in developing general instruments to 
measure empowerment, this line of reasoning goes, lies in the lack of clarity as to the 
theoretical underpinnings of the approach. Bringing the concept to its conceptual maturity can 
render the characteristics of the approach well-defined, regardless of the context of its 
application, and hence provide us with specific boundaries as to its conditions, variables and 
outcomes that is worth measuring. This view calls for the development of measurements, 
based on common attributes of the construct of empowerment, to be employed and 
compared across different contexts. 
 Despite the reluctance of some scholars to provide empowerment with conceptual 
and methodological strictness, growing evidence supports the view that standardization of 
(the concept of) empowerment across different contexts could indeed benefit the reliability 
and validity of the data obtained. In particular, studies assessing the effectiveness of 
empowerment have followed three major research pathways. Instruments for measuring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  Phenomenological research is a common design in sociology, philosophy and psychology. Under this 
approach, the researcher describes the lively experiences of individuals dealing with a phenomenon, by resorting 
to their description and perception of such experiences. The researcher’s task is typically to identify common 
traits among the experiences of several individuals through interviews and observations. Phenomenological 
research is characterized as ethnography when the researcher studies a certain phenomenon in terms of 
“behaviours, language, and actions of an intact cultural group in a natural setting over a prolonged period of 
time” (Creswell 2014, 14). Within empowerment studies, some authors have privileged phenomenological 
research because of its flexibility (Laverack 2005). By resorting to qualitative interviews and observational data, 
the researcher leaves open the possibility that concepts and variables emerge from the respondent’s perspective, 
thus accommodating the ideas of participation and capacity-building at the basis of these interpretations of 
empowerment. 
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empowerment have been developed for (i) psychological/enabling outcomes (Hudon 2010), 
(ii) enabling and health-related outcomes (Herbert et al. 2009), and (iii) community-based 
outcomes (Laverack 2005, Wallerstein 2006). As we will see, trends towards the establishment 
of general and context-independent measurements of empowerment are however at different 
stages of development. Measurements of empowerment in the case of psychological and 
health-related outcomes are in fact much more refined and generalizable than those used in 
community-based health programs. The attention to local context and health issues at the 
basis of the latter can in fact hardly be reconciled with the search for general instruments for 
the assessment of its effectiveness. To a discussion of each of these pathways, and their 
methodological foundations, I will now turn for the rest of this section. 
Pathway 1: Instruments for psychological empowerment 
The first pathway we take into consideration focuses on measurements of the psychological 
effects brought about by empowerment interventions. A controversy exists, however, as to 
what extent psychological empowerment should embrace an emphasis on skills, knowledge 
and awareness at the individual level. Some authors (Zimmerman and Rappaport 1988, 
Christens 2013) have argued that individually oriented conceptions of empowerment are 
limited because they neglect the importance of contextual considerations and community-
oriented actions. According to this line of reasoning, privileging the micro level (i.e. individual 
level) at the expenses of the meso level (i.e. community level) fails to take up the Freirian ideas 
of liberation and collective action at the roots of the approach (Freire 1972). Otherwise stated, 
there is a risk entailed in the focus on individuals within the framework of empowerment: the 
dilution of this approach into an individualistic enterprise, rather than “a discipline that 
focuses on addressing social justice and wider power structures through social and structural 
change” (Woodall et al. 2012, 743). Differently from this view, other authors have instead 
contended that an important component of empowerment lies in its enabling aspects, such as 
improved individual decision-making capacity, and ability to control health and life (Hudon et 
al. 2010). Typically, these scholars consider feelings of empowerment as the main goal of the 
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approach (Faulkner 2001b), and claim that psychological outcomes of empowerment should 
be distinguished from their link to health improvements (see Pathway 2) and/or the 
production of social change (see Pathway 3). Regardless of whether empowerment results in 
improved health or effective social agency, these authors argue, the element of individual 
enablement has to be considered as a dimension of empowerment valuable in itself 
(Wallerstein 2006).  
 Interpreting psychological empowerment in this sense means therefore devising an 
approach that focuses on individual perception of the situation, as separated from outcomes 
at the interpersonal/community level, as well as developing adequate instruments that may 
capture such effects. In following this line of reasoning, Hudon and colleagues (2010) provide 
us with a systematic review of the available instruments to assess the enabling aspects of 
empowerment in clinical practice. Instruments included in this study were selected from 
databases of academic literature only if they satisfied the three following criteria: 1) 
development and/or validation of an instrument; 2) evaluation of enablement defined as “an 
intervention by which the health care provider recognizes, promotes and enhances patients’ 
abilities to control their health and their lives” (Hudon et al. 2010, 1302); 3) quantitative 
results following administration of the instruments. Among the 3800 citations identified by 
this bibliometrical analysis, only 4 articles, coming from two different research groups, were 
retained on the basis of the criteria stated above (see Faulkner 2001a, 2001b, Kettunen et al. 
2001, Kettunen et al. 2006 in Hudon et al. 2010). All of these articles make use of two 
different constructs and instruments that have been respectively developed by the same 
groups of authors: the Patient Empowerment Scale (PES), and the Empowerment Speech 
Practices Scale (ESPS). Both of them can be defined Mixed Methods Research designs 
(Creswell 2014), as they both involve collecting quantitative and qualitative data and 
integrating them21. Let us now turn to an analysis of the methodological foundations of both 
these psychometrics of empowerment. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Mixed methods research is a relatively new approach in the humanistic sciences (Creswell 2014). It is deemed 
particularly useful because of its capacity of drawing both from qualitative and quantitative data. By doing so, 
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 The PES (Faulkner 2001a, 2001b) builds upon the assumption that empowerment 
processes are a matter of interaction between a professional and a patient. The key aim of 
empowerment, according to this interpretation, is maximising the independence of patients 
through actions undertaken by healthcare professionals, such as nurses. Starting from this 
assumption, the PES establishes a model of empowerment based on prototypical acts 
associated to empowering and disempowering behaviours, and consequently proposes a 
methodology for its evaluation. By identifying actions that are beneficial or detrimental for 
patient’s independence, “empowerment and disempowerment are transformed from invisible 
concepts to visible variables” (Faulkner 2001b, 938) that can be observed and quantified. The 
construction of such quantitative measure of empowerment follows what can be called an 
Exploratory Sequential Mixed Method (Creswell 2014). This approach is a particular design in 
mixed methods that begins with a qualitative phase followed by a quantitative stage. The aim 
of such strategy is to develop measurements with a specific sample of populations, and to 
determine whether data collected from a few individuals (qualitative stage) can be generalized 
to a larger sample of the population (quantitative stage). For this reason, Exploratory Sequential 
Mixed Methods typically involve a three-phase procedure (Creswell 2014). The researcher (i) 
collects focus group/interview data and analyses the results, (ii) devises an instrument by 
building on the results of the first phase, and (iii) finally administers the instrument to a 
sample of the population. According to Faulkner (2001b), the main components of 
empowerment measured by the PES consist of promoting (i) patient independence, (ii) 
awareness of patient needs, and (iii) information exchange. As to disempowerment instead, 
the primary components captured by the PES: (i) impeding patient collaboration in care 
planning, (ii) domination, (iii) indifference to patient needs.  
As stated above, the second instrument for measuring psychological empowerment 
identified by Hudon and colleagues (2010) is the ESPS (Kettunen et al. 2006). The purpose of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
mixed methods are deemed to minimize the limitations of both qualitative and quantitative approaches. On a 
practical level, mixed methods can provide a better explanation of quantitative results with a qualitative follow-up 
(e.g. enriching experimental results by incorporating the perspective of participants), and developing better 
quantitative instruments by first collecting and interpreting qualitative data. The latter interpretation of mixed 
methods will be problematized in the present analysis of measurements for psychological empowerment. 
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the ESPS is to assess the empowerment of counselling practices in nursing as a means to 
strengthen professional training and improve the quality of services. Differently from the PES, 
the ESPS starts from the assumption that the enabling aspects of empowerment should not 
be assessed through personal feelings of control, ability and independence on the side of 
professionals and/or patients. Rather, empowerment obtains within what the authors call 
dyadic counselling (Kettunen et al. 2006, 160). Empowerment, according to this view, obtains in 
the making of a cooperative relationship that improves individual ability for decision-making, 
and feelings of control over the healthcare process. It is therefore within the counselling 
encounter between a patient and a nurse that empowering outcomes can be achieved, and 
consequently measured. With this in mind, the authors developed the ESPS in a process that 
also falls under the category of Exploratory Sequential Mixed Methods (Creswell 2014). Six main 
categories of empowering communication acts can be investigated through the use of the 
ESPS: 1) “setting expectations for discussion, 2) offering individualized information and 
advice, 3) facilitating reflection, 4) constructing a positive atmosphere, 5) respecting and 
bringing up the patient’s competence concerning health and 6) the patient’s assertiveness” 
(Kettunen 2006, 161). The dimensions of empowerment that scored best in the experimental 
setting of this study were 4) and 1), while the rest of them called for further improvement of 
the interaction within the counselling encounter (Kettunen 2006, 163). 
No doubt, both the PES and the ESPS build upon the strengths of Exploratory 
Sequential Mixed Methods (Creswell 2014). Typically, this research design is particularly useful to 
explore concepts or phenomena in lack of an adequate instrument for their measure. The 
qualitative phase at the beginning of this design (the so-called ‘exploratory phase’) enables the 
resulting instrument to capture previously unknown themes, codes and actions that are 
relevant to the understanding of the phenomenon under study. Thanks to this design, the PES 
has the merit of having established, for the first time, a robust link between a given list of 
prototypical acts and (dis)empowering feelings of (in)dependence in patients. Similarly, the 
ESPS represents a first systematic attempt of structured analysis of counselling encounters, 
and makes some critical factors of empowerment visible and measurable. With the aid of both 
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these tools, professionals can evaluate their practices and critically determine possibilities of 
improvements of the services provided. However, it is also worth mentioning that the 
generalizability of data under the Exploratory Sequential Mixed Method could be limited. The 
richness of the qualitative data obtained through the exploratory phase is a great advantage in 
developing instruments that fit the sample under study. One consequence of adopting this 
design is, in other words, that the resulting instruments are less appropriate when considering 
a different sample of patients.  
Although the PES and the ESPS may be considered valid psychometric instruments, 
their reliability may be thus limited in healthcare contexts different from the one in which they 
were developed. The PES should be regarded as indicating no more than the extent to which 
a particular hospital unit is empowering or not (in light of a list of prototypical empowering 
acts); the ESPS, instead, as a measure for the empowering effects of a specific set of 
counselling interactions in hospital care. Feelings associated to empowerment may be different 
across different healthcare settings, and can be hardly captured by any of these instruments. 
This limitation embedded in Exploratory Sequential Mixed designs must be taken into account 
when dealing with this kind of approaches to the assessment of psychological empowerment, 
and calls for a further development and improvement of context-independent measurements 
(Hudon et al. 2010). 
Pathway 2: Assessing health-related outcomes of empowerment 
Within the second pathway, health improvements and health-related outcomes are deemed to 
be one of the relevant results of the empowerment intervention. Apart from generating 
feelings of enablement, this line of reasoning goes, empowerment should be evaluated also as 
to its effect at the level of health-related behaviours. It follows from such recognition that 
measurements of the effectiveness of empowerment should not limit themselves to its 
psychological and enabling aspects. Rather, the evaluation of empowerment should include 
also other quantifiable outcomes, such as disease or risk factors-related objectives.  
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The ways in which empowerment can and should bring about health improvements is, 
however, also a matter of disagreement. According to Wallerstein (2006), health-related 
outcomes of empowerment can follow two different approaches. On the one hand, 
empowerment has been shown to improve individual decision-making capacity, disease 
complication management and health-related behaviours. In this respect, empowerment can 
be considered to directly bring about health-related outcomes, such as a change in the lifestyle, 
or the adoption of a given treatment strategy. On the other, different approaches have 
focused on strengthened support groups, caregiver empowerment, and enhanced access to 
health services (regardless of a focus on a given lifestyle-related change, or treatment 
adoption), that are deemed to produce indirect health benefits for the people involved. No 
consensus exists as to whether this divide should be the driving force behind measurements of 
the link between empowerment and health improvements. As argued by Tones (1998b), both 
of these elements should be considered two inseparable components of a broader 
commitment to health-related outcomes in the discourse of empowerment. According to the 
author, group and community “participation is not only ideologically but also practically a sine 
qua non of effective healthy programs” (Tones 1998b, 185). From his perspective, healthy 
choices are not to be addressed by education for individual empowerment or social and 
organizational change. Quite the contrary, the promotion of people’s health is a salutogenetic22 
process that can only be achieved by addressing the reciprocal relationship between individuals 
and their environment. Whether or not empowerment can lead to better health levels, this line 
of reasoning goes, depends on the extent to which individuals are directly “self-empowered”, as 
well as on the degree of their participation to active community-action (Tones 1998b) from 
which health benefits are indirectly achieved. 
To the best of my knowledge no systematic approach exists at collecting evidence of 
empowerment and indirect health outcomes across different contexts. Although there is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22Such a relationship between empowerment and health builds upon the theoretical construct of salutogenesis 
proposed by Antonovsky (1984). Based on the idea of sense of coherence, the notion of ‘salutogenesis’ represents an 
orientation of individuals, which is expressed thanks to “a pervasive, enduring though dynamic feeling of 
confidence that one’s internal and external environments are predictable and that there is a high probability that 
things will work out as well as can reasonably be expected” (Antonovsky, 1984, 123). 
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widespread consensus on the effectiveness of empowerment in addressing health-related 
community issues, the field appears to be still in search of such tool (Tones 1998b, Rifkin 
2003, Wallerstein 2006). As we will see in the analysis of community-based assessment of 
empowerment (i.e. Pathway 3), this is mainly due to the difficulties of creating an instrument 
for community empowerment that is “practical, valid, and reliable”, and at the same time 
capable of moving across “local situations that are influenced by culture, history, and current 
social, political and economic factors” (Rifkin 2003, 177).  
On the contrary, measurements can be found when it comes to health-related 
empowerment at the individual and family level. However, little can be said about their validity 
and reliability. The methodological limitations of these instruments are the main subject of a 
systematic review of the available tools published by Herbert and colleagues (2009). The aim 
of the authors was to identify measurements of health-related empowerment matching some 
basic methodological standards. Instruments included in this study were selected from 
databases of academic literature only if they satisfied the two following criteria: 1) an English 
abstract reporting measurements of health-related empowerment in individuals or families; 2) 
a methodological discussion of (a) the theoretical basis of the questionnaire, (b) the number of 
items in the questionnaire, (c) the population studied, (d) data on reliability of the instrument, 
and (e) data on validity of the instrument. Among the total 8269 abstracts reviewed by this 
study, only one instrument was found to fully satisfy the two criteria stated above23, and thus 
classified as having good “evidence of reliability and validity” (Herbert et al. 2009, 124). Such 
instrument, the Parent Empowerment Survey (Trivette et al. 1996, in Herbert et al. 2009), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Herbert and colleagues (2009) found also that four further instruments produced moderate levels evidence 
(Koren et al. 1992, Man 1998, Akey et al 2000, Man 2001, in Herbert et al. 2009). I will not delve into the details 
of all these different measurements of health-related outcomes of empowerment. Suffice to say, for the purpose 
of this work, that common elements exist between the five questionnaires rated as having good (one) or 
moderate (four) evidence (depending on variability in levels of reliability and validity). All of them are based on 
similar empowerment constructs that are associated to health-related behaviours and outcomes: the Family 
Empowerment Questionnaire (Man, 1998) stems from an empowerment model understood as “knowledge, skill, 
and support at the personal, familial, and societal levels”. Likewise, the Empowerment Questionnaire (Man, 
2001) is based on “an empowerment model consisting of information, skills, support, and hope”. The Family 
Empowerment Scale (Koren et al., 1992) builds upon “a two dimensional framework of empowerment 
consisting of the level of empowerment and the way empowerment is expressed through attitudes, knowledge, 
and behaviours”. Finally, the construct at the basis of the Psychological Empowerment Scale (Akey et al., 2000) 
is “psychological empowerment including intrapersonal, interactional, and behavioural aspects” (Herbert et al. 
2009, 124). 
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measures the sense of control of parents over life events, and builds upon a conceptualization 
of empowerment that consists of “six dimensions including philosophy, paradigm, process, 
partnership, performance, and perception” (Herbert et al. 2009, 124). At the basis of this 
questionnaire lies the idea that empowerment spans across two distinct dimensions (Herbert 
et al. 2009). First, the intrapersonal dimension, where we can recognize factors related to what 
we called ‘psychological empowerment’ (i.e. knowledge, skills, attitudes, philosophy and 
perception). Second, the behavioural dimension that relates to health-related performance of the 
individuals involved in the intervention. Let us now turn to a methodological analysis of this 
kind of instrument. 
There are a number of reasons that can explain the modest strictness of most 
instruments measuring health-related empowerment, with the only exception of the Parent 
Empowerment Survey (Trivette et al. 1996). First, one problem lies in the definitional 
vagueness of the approach (Herbert et al. 2009). As mentioned above, a clear 
conceptualization of empowerment is a crucial component for the construction of a good 
instrument. Whether we establish clearly what are the relevant determinants of empowerment 
(and consequently its relevant measurable factors) has in fact an impact over the 
operationalization of the concept in the form of a questionnaire. One limitation of most of 
these instruments is, therefore, the poor congruence between the theoretical and operational 
definitions of empowerment they adopt (i.e. their construct validity). Second, constructing 
valid measurements of empowerment is no easy task due to the context-specificity to which 
the approach has been confined so far. As we already noted in the case of psychological 
empowerment, empowerment theorists and researchers tend to privilege local interventions 
and research approaches. In general, this attention to context stems from the declared 
commitment of empowerment to the promotion of a bottom-up approach to health programs 
and interventions. Overall, designs of empowerment programs are deemed to be concerned 
with “empowering” indicators (e.g. enabling/psychological factors, and disease management 
objectives) based on local culture and context (Labonte and Laverack 2000). Such contextual 
indicators are seldom characterized as general attributes of the construct, and are almost 
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unanimously considered a distinctive feature of the “radical” approach at the grassroots of 
empowerment (Tengland 2008, Wooddall et al. 2012). Yet, championing the “radicalism” of 
the approach can come at the expenses of validity and reliability of instruments for 
empowerment across different healthcare contexts. 
Despite the growing interest in comparing and evaluating measurements of health-
related empowerment (Herbert et al. 2009), it appears that methodological issues are still in 
need to be addressed also within the second pathway of instrument development just 
discussed. Very much like in the case of psychological empowerment, a trend towards 
standardized measurements can be observed in the literature. In this respect, the study by 
Herbert and colleagues (2009) represents a pivotal attempt at systematizing instruments for 
health-related empowerment, and provides good evidence of the need for their refinement. A 
consistent effort towards methodological considerations of reliability and validity of 
instruments is however required, before making context-independent measurements available 
to the scientific community. 
Pathway 3: Instruments for community-based empowerment 
We turn now to the analysis of how empowerment as a means might be expected to instigate 
change at the community level, and to the possible strategies for the measurement of its 
outcomes. As we noted previously, a central tenet of empowerment – for some of its 
proponents – is the importance of community participation in health promotion. Community-
based strategies are deemed to be a fundamental aspect of empowerment not only because 
they are an “integral part of the ethics” of the approach, but also because changes are unlikely 
“to occur or to be sustained” (Tones 1998b, 195) if citizens are not involved in relevant 
political decision-making processes. Such a potential of empowerment to produce health and 
societal outcomes is confirmed by an influential review on the effectiveness of empowerment 
published by the European Regional Office of the World Health Organization (Wallerstein 
2006). According to the author, citizen participation is in fact critical in “reducing dependency 
on health professionals, ensuring cultural and local sensitivity of programs, facilitating capacity 
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and sustainability of change efforts” (Wallerstein 2006, 8). Differently from psychological and 
health-related empowerment, community change through empowerment operates at the so-
called meso-level of action (Tones 1998b). Namely, the emphasis of this approach falls on the 
organizational level integrating the micro-level of individual education for health and the 
macro-level of participatory initiatives for policy change. Community engagement within 
empowerment is thus understood as a “complex and iterative process” of individual and 
community education, “which can change, grow or diminish based on the unfolding of power 
relations and the historical/social context of the project” (Wallerstein 2006, 8). The purpose 
of community empowerment is, in other words, that of challenging cultural and local power 
structures through ‘critical-consciousness raising’ (Freire 1972), addressing inequalities in 
health and healthcare provision (Rosenthal 1983), “advocacy and leadership training, 
organizational development, and transfer of power to participants” (Wallerstein 2006, 9).  
These characteristics of community empowerment make it an approach that is hardly 
controllable or predictable – and hence measurable – in its outcomes. For this reason, 
community levels projects have rarely committed themselves to the development of standard 
measurements of their outcomes (Laverack 2005). Rather, instruments for community 
empowerment have more often resorted to social inquiry techniques like qualitative 
interviews, and observational methods. In particular, two main types of interviews have been 
used under this approach (Laverack 2005). Unstructured interviews, which cover only a few 
issues and are generally directed at eliciting the view of participants; and semi-structured 
interviews, which are conducted on the basis of a loose structure made of open-ended 
questions (Creswell 2014). Choosing between the two depends very much on the aims of the 
empowerment intervention under study. Unstructured interviews have in fact the advantage of 
letting participant’s opinion direct and structure the encounter with the professional, while 
semi-structured interviews represent an attempt at trading off the interest of the 
researcher/professional in exploring a particular issue, and the expression of the interviewee’s 
view.  
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Both kinds of interviews are generally aimed at evaluating the accomplishment of the 
agenda of an empowerment intervention. Whether the researcher thinks that her role is 
primarily the collection of views from the participants, unstructured interviews may be 
however the best tool for ‘taking a back seat’ (Laverack 2005) and letting people set their own 
community agenda for empowerment. By contrast, semi-structured interviews emphasize the 
role of facilitator that the professional can play in determining the most relevant actions to be 
undertaken (Charmaz 2006). Parallel to the use of one-to-one interviews, a convenient way to 
reach this result is represented by group-interviews, or focus groups that guarantee the 
simultaneous collection of data from several participants. By gathering groups of stakeholders 
around the task of identifying and discussing health-related issues, researchers can gain depth 
and comprehension of the main disempowering factors in the life of a community. Detailed 
observation of behaviours and conversation among participant can in fact reveal and promote 
in many ways the awareness of social causes related to health-issues in the community. First, 
people coming together to discuss a topic will “inspire” each other, and can come up with 
“facts” about their community that they might not come up with in one to one interactions. 
Second, there is a dynamic in the group that can be studied (e.g. gender-based and other 
power relations), which might be important in a small community, since it might have 
disempowering and health-related consequences alike (Tengland, personal communication). 
As noted above, community empowerment is not limited, however, to the collection 
of data about members’ perception and attitudes towards health. Such in-depth analysis of 
dynamics and meanings in a community is no more than what could be called the first 
‘exploratory stage’ of community empowerment. The main aim of these projects is a rather 
different one: working as catalysts in stimulating local health-related action for change (Tones 
1998b). With regard to the ‘action stage’ of community empowerment, it should be noted that 
a robust disagreement exists as to how to characterise it, and consequently measure it. Some 
authors interpret “action” as disrupting social structures that run against health (Fals-Borda 
1987, Minkler 2000). According to this interpretation no community empowerment really takes 
place until a change in the social arrangements and determinants of health is achieved. 
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Typically, this entails the production of tangible and positive policy changes, in terms of 
institutional commitments or health programs that should be then included in the indicators 
for the measurement of the intervention. Some different scholars have instead put a strong 
emphasis on critical consciousness to be raised through educational programmes (Freire 1972, 
Tones 1998a). Empowerment obtains, under this interpretation, when educational programs 
put individuals and communities in the position of dealing better with consequences and 
determinants of the health-related issues that they themselves have identified. One declared 
strength of this approach is that of addressing an important ethical dilemma of health 
promotion: promoting the health of the public, while at the same time respecting individual 
freedom. No special commitment to the prevention or treatment of diseases is in fact entailed 
in the emphasis on education for community empowerment. From this perspective, 
empowerment has a special moral standing because it educates everyone to make health-related 
decisions in freedom, “including the freedom to adopt unhealthy lifestyle” (Tones 1998a, 57). 
Consequently, measuring this kind of ‘action for change’ within empowerment means 
assessing individual and community awareness, and knowledge resulting from the educational 
programs undertaken. Finally, other authors have championed community empowerment as 
to its capacity of reducing health inequalities (Wallerstein 2006) through the removal of 
psychosocial, cultural, or institutional barriers to health in marginalised groups of society. 
Empowerment strategies are, according to this view, effective insofar as they challenge 
“control and social injustice through political, social and psychological processes” (Wallerstein 
2006, 18) that enable oppressed people to develop their social capital.  
I will not delve into the details of each of these different understandings of what I 
called the ‘action stage’ of community empowerment. For the sake of this analysis, it is 
however important to keep in mind that the diversity among these accounts of the ‘action 
stage’ is another major contributor to the present lack of standard tools for the measurements 
of community-based interventions. Evaluating the effectiveness of healthy community 
empowerment programs rests in fact upon a wide range of social, political and economic 
factors that impair the identification of standard indicators for their success.   
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The ethics of empowerment in EBRs: suggestions for a methodological 
framework 
The three research Pathways currently dominating the practice of empowerment point to a 
number of deployable methodologies to quantify relevant empowering outcomes. Yet, no 
methodology exists which can demand empowerment scholars a unilateral commitment to 
one kind of research model or method. In general, it could be argued that instruments for the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of empowerment consistently show the multi-level construction 
of the approach (Wallerstein 2006). Empowerment is a viable health strategy that spans across 
psychological, health-related and community levels of intervention and thus demands different 
strategies for its evaluation. At these three distinct levels, it is also clear that some studies have 
at least tried to develop these instruments and expand their viability beyond the local context. 
From personal perception or self-efficacy, to collective and community action, indicators of 
the success of an empowerment intervention are however still determined locally. 
Nevertheless, many examples of a trend towards the identification of context-independent 
measurements can be identified in the literature on the methodological foundations of 
empowerment. The key message of the previous analysis is therefore that measuring the 
success of empowerment strategies still depends very much on the conceptual construct we 
adopt. Methodological approaches to measurements of empowerment privilege in fact either 
the psychological, or the health-related, or the community-based goals of a given intervention.  
What remains to be shown at this stage of my thesis is however the kind of 
measurement of empowerment that is more consonant with the perspective defended 
throughout this work. To address this issue it may be worth reiterating briefly the main 
conclusions of Part 1. Chapter 1 started from a historical analysis of what I called EBRs in 
(relevant) recent policy-making literature (see infra Chapter 1). Here, I noted how a “new 
wave” of empowerment in healthcare policy and reforms has produced a shift in the 
substantive foundations of empowerment. The emancipatory discourse of control and 
liberation from social oppression traditionally associated to the concept (Freire 1972, 
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Tengland 2008) has recently become a discourse allegedly aimed at a renegotiation of power 
relationships in healthcare through devolution of responsibility for health. Moving on from 
this descriptive analysis, I then argued that this paradigm-shift in the bundle of values at the 
basis of empowerment is likely to generate some ethical controversies. In particular, I 
discussed issues related to paternalism in EBRs (see infra Chapter 2), to what I called the ‘charge 
of healthism’ (see infra Chapter 3), and finally to the potential unwanted consequences of 
different evaluations of responsibility within this context (see infra Chapter 4). 
Briefly put, a number of distinctive ethical aspects of empowerment emerge from my 
analysis. First of all, I argue that the sustainability of EBRs requires professionals to refrain 
from paternalistic attitudes towards their clients (Dworkin 2010, Hershey 1985). More 
specifically, I show that an anti-paternalistic empowerment process demands professionals 
and healthcare policy-makers to act as facilitators (rather than leaders) (Tengland 2008), by (i) 
refraining from attitudes discounting patient perspective, and (ii) by putting in place a number 
of support mechanisms that may provide the opportunities to enhance citizens’ freedom and, 
in the long run, their ability to acquire responsibility for their own health. This conclusion 
draws both on considerations of healthcare client’s autonomy and the need to keep up with 
the anti-paternalistic promise of the discourse of empowerment in contemporary medicine 
(see infra Chapter 2). Secondly, I also show how the ways in which we evaluate the concept of 
health is not neutral with respect to an ethical appraisal of EBRs. Rather than understanding 
health as an objective standard to which citizens are “empowered” to conform (Veitch 2010), 
I argue that the empowered responsibility entailed in EBRs requires privileging individual self-
determination in choosing what levels of health are relevant to the achievement of one’s own 
vital goals (see infra Chapter 3) (Nordenfelt 1993, 1995, 2001, 2012, forthcoming). This means 
that the normative appreciation of empowerment I defend, calls for opening up opportunities 
for citizens to formulate their own relevant health goals. But also, if we combine this 
conclusion with the one from Chapter 2, that such a decision should not be subjected to 
paternalistic interferences by professional expertise. 
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This conclusion raises however another important question regarding the legitimacy of 
EBRs. Namely, it points to the question of whether all kinds of choices with regard to one’s 
health and vital goals can be legitimately considered to be responsible ones (Wilkinson 1999, 
Feiring 2008, Voigt 2013). As to this matter, I show that we have convincing arguments (Buyx 
and Prainsack 2012, Albertsen 2013, Brown 2013) against the thesis that it is morally 
legitimate to interpret the shift towards responsibility in EBRs as liability and accountability 
for one’s choices. Rather, I argue that an empowerment-based perspective on these matters 
points to the necessity of a full appreciation of individual capacity together with its broader 
social environment. For this reason, I develop an ecological model of responsibility for health 
(Minkler 1999), which points to freedom as opportunity, rather than freedom of choice, as the 
relevant condition for an empowerment-based notion of responsibility. Instead of seeing 
responsibility as liability for one’s behaviours, the view I present maintains that ascriptions of 
responsibility are conditional to a state of freedom (or power) over ourselves, which consists 
of the opportunities (i) to transform our behaviour with the non-paternalistic support of 
professionals (see infra Chapter 2), and (ii) to affirm our presence and influence in the social 
life to which we belong. 
 It is worth noting here how this normative theorization of empowerment could 
represent the basis for the development of specific methodological approaches to its 
evaluation, which span across all of the three separate Pathways I identified in the literature. 
The focus on non-paternalistic attitudes of professionals (Dworkin 2010, Hershey 1985) has 
in fact the implication of demanding an evaluation of (my account of) empowerment, which is 
able to take up the enabling outcomes of the approach (i.e. those relevant to Pathway 1). Very 
much like in the case of the PES (Faulkner 2001a, 2001b) or the ESPS (Kettunen et al. 2006) 
analysed above, my approach to empowerment points to psychological enablement of 
healthcare clients (which obtains through non-paternalistic professional support 24 ) as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The emphasis upon non-paternalistic professional support entailed by my approach to empowerment should 
not be confused with existing notions of non-directiveness in genetic counselling and shared decision-making 
(Petersen 1999, Elwyn et al. 2000). While paternalistic actions – under my understanding – pertain to the attitude 
of the professional towards the client (see infra Chapter 2), directiveness is instead concerned with the content of 
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fundamental component of its effectiveness. In particular, the emphasis the ESPS puts on the 
importance to target the cooperative relationship between a professional and a patient, as the 
relevant locus where empowerment occurs (Kettunen et al. 2006, 160), goes in the same 
direction of the requirements to (i) refrain from attitudes discounting patient perspective, and 
(ii) to support citizens’ enhancement of freedom I defend in Chapter 2.  
At the same time, health-related outcomes of empowerment (i.e. those concerning 
Pathway 2) are of no less importance in the conceptual framework I propose. Even though 
my focus on behavioural outcomes of empowerment has to do with the identification of one’s 
own relevant conception of health (Nordenfelt 1993, 1995, 2001, 2012, forthcoming) – rather 
than the achievement of disease-related objectives – a second relevant component of my 
normative analysis of empowerment points to the importance of producing (and hence 
measuring) health-related outcomes. In particular, the approach to health I defended from 
moral grounds points to the need to evaluate the capacity of empowerment to produce indirect 
health benefits for the people involved (Wallerstein 2006, Tones 1998b). By providing support 
to individuals in the identification of their vital goals (Nordenfelt 1993, 1995, 2001, 2012, 
forthcoming), and the consequent levels of health, my account of empowerment requires an 
appreciation of how the empowered individual effectively takes up a commitment to (what she 
deems to be) health improvements. 
Finally, the ecological model of responsibility I defend for the ethical sustainability of 
EBRs suggests that an important dimension of empowerment lies also in one’s freedom of 
opportunity to affect the broader social system of which we are part, and consequently the 
social factors influencing our health. I further specified this ecological model of responsibility 
(Minkler 1999) as the opportunity to (i) have access to relevant information and knowledge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the communication process underlying medical encounters. As argued by Elwyn and colleagues, (non) 
directiveness means in fact (not) guiding the client “towards any particular decision (for example, to test or not to 
test, to terminate a pregnancy or to continue it)” (Elwyn et al. 2000, 135). This implies that it may well be the 
case that both directive and non-directive counselling may either qualify as paternalistic or not. Independently 
from the content of professional advice (i.e. what concerns the criterion of directiveness), counselling processes 
may be deemed paternalistic if and only if they are (i) intended to promote the good of the recipient in terms of 
individual welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values, and (ii) the consent or dissent of the recipient is 
not a relevant consideration for the initiator of the act (see infra Chapter 2). 
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(Chamberlin 2013), (ii) to have a range of options from which to make choices (Chamberlin 
2013), (iii) to participate to group and community action through the identification of 
common values, needs and goals (Feste and Anderson 1995, Laverack 2005), and/or (iv) to 
have the adequate material and economic resources to make a change in one’s own life with 
regard to health (Chamberlin 2013). This means that relevant empowered agency is framed, 
from the perspective I defend from ethical grounds, as inextricably related to transformations 
at the interpersonal, community and institutional levels (World Health Organization 1986, 
Wallerstein and Bernstein 1988, Laverack 2005, Tengland 2008, 2012). And consequently, this 
view demands also an appreciation of the effects of empowerment in the social context in 
which the individual is embedded, as emphasized by scholars in Pathway 3. 
In a nutshell, the normative theorization of empowerment presented through this 
thesis claims that the state of being empowered (i.e. being responsible for the pursuit of one’s 
own health-related goals) depends also on the mastery (enhanced through non-paternalistic 
professional support) of the politically and socially contextual process of generating the goal of 
empowerment. As a result, a methodological evaluation of its effectiveness calls for 
measurements that are able to capture its enabling, health-related and community-based 
outcomes alike. Unfortunately, the range of literature presented in this chapter shows that 
such a comprehensive methodological approach to empowerment is still in need. The key 
message here is therefore that, what I defended as genuine empowerment (from normative 
grounds) in the context of EBRs, demands the development of multi-level measurements, and 
consequently the abandonment of the compartmental/three-tier view pulling apart its 
indicators of effectiveness. 
Conclusions 
It is clear from the analysis of the three Pathways of research on measurements of 
empowerment that growing evidence within the literature promises to produce valid and 
reliable tools for the evaluation of its effectiveness. However, further research is needed to 
bring all of these instruments to conceptual and methodological maturity. In order to ground 
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this conclusion, I have described each of these three pathways for the establishment of 
measurements of empowerment. First, I showed how some scholars have focused on the 
enabling aspects of empowerment as the standard set of indicators for its effectiveness. In 
particular, I showed how, despite the availability of some instruments measuring psychological 
effects of empowerment (see Faulkner 2001a, 2001b, Kettunen et al. 2001, Kettunen et al. 
2006 in Hudon et al. 2010), their methodological design entails limitations in terms of 
generalizability of data produced. Similar methodological issues were found also in the case of 
instruments for health-related outcomes of empowerment, namely those methodologies for the 
implementation and measurement of empowerment that look at the health-related outcomes 
of the intervention. Finally, approaches to the evaluation of outcomes of empowerment at the 
community level were discussed. Within this context, I showed that empowerment is 
understood as an “action-oriented concept” (Wallerstein 2006, 18) with a commitment to the 
removal of context-specific social barriers to health through a wide range of strategies – from 
education and critical consciousness raising, to advocacy and participatory policy-making for 
the reduction of health inequalities (Tones 1998, Wallerstein 2006). Such wide range of 
domains covered by community approaches to empowerment, I concluded, is the major cause 
for the lack of cross-contextual indicators for its measurement. 
Then I turned to the potential methodological approach required to assess the 
effectiveness of the normative understanding of empowerment I defended in Part 1. With 
regard to this, I argued that the bundle of substantive domains (i.e. anti-paternalism, health, 
responsibility) at the basis of the approach within EBRs calls for the development of multi-
level empowerment measures, which are able to capture its enabling, health-related and 
community-based outcomes alike. The recognition that such a methodology for measuring 
empowerment may be required in the context of EBRs fleshes out the need to abandon the 
mutually exclusive Pathways of research on the effectiveness of empowerment, in order to 
embrace the development of methodologies capturing all of this (normatively) relevant 
dimensions of the concept.  
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Even though I side with scholars pointing to the fact that there is no universally valid 
participatory medicine which empowers patients (Kelty et al. 2014, Kelty and Panofsky 2014), 
I hope that my analysis of the substantive foundations of empowerment can be regarded as a 
useful attempt to bring the approach and its applications to “conceptual maturity” (Herbert et 
al. 2009, 126) in the context policy-making. The substantive dimensions of the concept I 
identify in the thesis (relating to anti-paternalism, health, and responsibility), demand to be 
further tailored to a specific context and empirically assessed. The aim of the present chapter 
was thus to provide a foundation to the search of scalable and generalizable measurements of 
empowerment. Characterising the ethical underpinnings of empowerment could indeed render 
the characteristics of desirable power relationships in medicine well-defined (Prainsack 2014, 
forthcoming), and hence provide specific boundaries as to the conditions, variables and 
outcomes that is worth measuring in a particular application of the empowerment language. 
This, as the analysis above wishes to show, may not necessarily come at some cost for the 
distinctive ethics of active, context-sensitive involvement and participation associated with the 
empowerment approach (Freire 1972, Tengland 2008, Tengland 2012). 
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Chapter 6. The promises of epigenomics for Personalised 
Medicine 
Introduction  
This chapter elucidates how novel approaches to prevention, diagnosis and treatment brought 
about by epigenomics are a fundamental tenet of the personalization project inaugurated by 
what I called EBRs. In particular, I start from a map of the contribution of epigenomics to the 
development of Personalised Medicine (PM) across three of the most relevant domains of 
healthcare. These three areas of medicine are cardiovascular diseases, neuropsychiatric 
disorders and cancer, which together account for 74% of the total causes of death in high-
income countries (World Health Organization 2010). This analysis points to the vast range of 
health benefits that epigenomics science will most likely produce for the wider society, but 
also to its unique potential to move ahead the implementation of PM. Briefly put, what I will 
show is that epigenomics may bring into the picture of PM the elements of time, variability 
and dynamic adaptations to environment (in its broadest sense, from the intrauterine 
environment to the physical, nutritional and social environment) as fundamental facets of 
individual health and illness.  
Consequently, a consistent number of promising approaches within developing 
epigenomic PM are reviewed throughout the chapter. What I will highlight from this analysis 
is, however, not only how the promise of epigenomics to make increasingly visible the 
‘contextual nature’ of health (i.e. illuminating the biological mechanisms underlying the 
interaction between lifestyle, living conditions and individual health) has a significant impact 
on medicine, but also how careful scrutiny should be granted to the social program 
(Landecker and Panofsky 2013) potentially instated by epigenomic medicine. The 
individualization of care entailed in epigenomics, should in fact be poised with some potential 
concerns arising from its participation to the “sociotechnical imaginary” (Jasanoff and Kim 
2009, Jasanoff and Kim 2013) of PM described in Chapter 1. Building upon evidences of the 
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malleable mechanistic underpinnings of the environmental and developmental roots of health, 
I will emphasize how epigenomics may constitute a powerful biotechnological resource to 
successfully rise to the empowerment project of EBRs (and PM) identified in Chapter 1. On 
the one hand, epigenomics is finally able to grant PM an appreciation of the biological 
variability in disease development and treatment responses across the general population. By 
confronting the complex interplay of individual predispositions, environmental triggers and 
life experiences at the basis of disease aetiology, epigenomics is the unifying molecular 
language that both makes visible (Nowtony and Testa 2011) and manageable (Meloni and 
Testa 2014) the unique biological and biographical makeup determining individual health. 
Very much like other biotechnologies of contemporary biomedicine (e.g. genomics, 
proteomics pharmacogenomics), epigenomics fuels the reconfiguration of the fundamental 
categories of medicine under the language of molecular biology. In this respect, epigenomics 
provides solid epistemological and technological ground to the project of PM and its emphasis 
upon empowerment, because it represents a set of scientific advancements, in the 
understanding of disease and illness, dissecting the interaction among the players behind 
individual’s health. On the other, the reversibility and malleability of epigenetic modifications 
entails the danger of further instating the emphasis upon individual responsibility in PM, thus 
fuelling also the political narrative of empowered and proactive agency in healthcare at its 
basis. By showing how social and environmental influences inherently affect individual health, 
epigenomics may in fact be taken to support normative claims of responsibility to protect and 
change one’s epigenome from the wide range of external insults under individual control 
(Meloni and Testa 2014).  
It is not only worth noting, therefore, that epigenetic science will profoundly affect the 
achievement of a new model of medicine established by the proponents of PM, but also that 
the emerging model of PM can finally reinforce, through epigenomic science, its constitutional 
project of the empowered patient citizenship discussed in Part 1. Whether or not the potential 
concerns arising from this recognition can be met from the empowerment perspective 
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defended throughout this work will then be the subject of the next and final chapter of the 
thesis (see infra Chapter 7). 
Epigenetics and its ‘omics descendant 
Identifying a received view on the meaning of ‘epigenetics’ is no easy task. Since its original 
coinage by Conrad Waddington in 1942 – as “the branch of biology which studies the causal 
interactions between genes and their products, which [in turn] bring the phenotype into 
being” (Waddington 1942, 18) – the term has come to assume very different meanings to 
different scientific communities. First, the term has been widely used by functional 
morphologists with reference to the numerous processes and cellular interactions that lead to 
morphogenesis and organogenesis. From this long-standing perspective (Van Speybroeck 
2002), the word “epigenetic” is an adjective of ‘epigenesis’, meaning that it refers to all 
phenomena that are inherently associated to processes of organism development or genesis 
(Herring 1993). This means that when Waddington invented the term ‘epigenetics’, the role of 
genetics in developmental processes was not considered to be central (Jablonka and Lamb 
2002). Rather, if we wanted to capture the essential feature of this original formulation of the 
concept, it would be worth emphasizing how biological questions related to organism 
development, beyond genetics, play a fundamental role in its original understanding: 
 
Some centuries ago, biologists held what are called “preformationist” theories of development. 
They believed that all the characters of the adult were present in the newly fertilized egg, but 
packed into such a small space that they could not be distinguished with the instruments then 
available. If we merely consider each gene as a determinant for some definite character in the 
adult (as when we speak loosely of the ‘gene for blue eyes, or for fair hair’), then the modern 
theory may appear to be merely a new-fangled version of the old idea. But in the meantime, 
the embryologists, who are concerned with the direct study of development, have reached a 
quite different picture of it […]. This is the theory known as epigenesis, which claims that the 
characters of the adult do not exist already in the newly fertilized germ, but on the contrary 
arise gradually through a series of causal interactions between the comparatively simple 
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elements of which the egg is initially composed. There can be no doubt nowadays that this 
epigenetic point of view is correct (Waddington 1952, 155). 
 
It is with the advent of genetics and molecular biology, however, that the term ‘epigenetics’ 
has acquired further distinct characterizations. This view originates from an alternative 
etymological interpretation of the term (Nanney 1959), which stresses how the prefix epi 
(‘above’) in ‘epigenetics’ refers to ‘genetics’ rather than ‘genesis’, thus coming to assign it the 
meaning of an upper and sequence-independent layer of gene regulation. Otherwise stated, 
this second interpretation defines the term as the study of those molecular processes that 
cannot be explained by genetic principles (Goldberg et al. 2007), or as “the study of mitotically 
and meiotically heritable changes in gene function that cannot be explained by changes in 
genetic sequence” (Bird 2002, 6; emphasis added). It is worth noting here how crucial it is, for 
the sake of drawing the semantic boundaries of the term, that only some kinds of ‘changes’ in 
gene function count as epigenetic ones: a theoretical endeavour that may raise some significant 
issues for contemporary biology (Jablonka and Lamb 2002). The main difficulty of this 
definition is in fact that, although it usefully distinguishes between DNA-based and non-
DNA-based inheritance of phenotypes, it provides no simple criterion to identify what are the 
relevant epigenetic changes (Jablonka and Lamb 2002). On the one hand, a broad view would 
claim that ‘changes’ in each and every level of function beyond the level of genes counts as 
epigenetic in this definition. In this respect, “the transcriptome, the proteome and the various 
omic- slices into which life’s complexity has come to be parsed along the biochemical 
classification of its constituent molecules” (Meloni and Testa 2014, 4) fall within the scope of 
term. On the other, a different and narrower view would restrict this scope by discriminating 
among sources of the information that gets stably integrated with DNA. To this view, only 
those “change[s] in gene function that [persist] even when the initial trigger is long gone [and] 
that [do] not involve a change in gene sequence or structure” count as epigenetic (McGowan 
and Szyf 2010, 67). In light of this second and more recent meaning of the term, an epigenetic 
trait is “the molecular memory of past stimuli”, or the set of chemical marks and signals that 
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allow a cell to “remember past events, such as changes in the external environment or 
developmental cues” (Bonasio et al. 2010, 612). In doing so, the recent meaning of epigenetics 
turns the field into the study of the molecular roots of organism development, thus re-
comprising and re-elaborating the semantic space originally covered by the concept. 
Contemporary epigenetics brings to forth the contextual and molecular nature of 
developmental processes by highlighting how epigenetic patterns are both a stable and plastic 
process, as well as an acquired and/or heritable phenotype (Feinberg 2008), consisting of multiple 
changes in a chromosome that do not alter the DNA sequence: 
 
Because of this, there is a continuity between epigenetics in Waddington’s sense and 
epigenetics today: both focus on alternative developmental pathways, on the developmental 
networks underlying stability and flexibility, and on the influence of environmental conditions 
on what happens in cells and organisms (Jablonka and Lamb 2002, 88-89).  
 
To recapitulate, looking for a definition of epigenetics means firstly resorting to the common 
use of the word in experimental practice. Within this context, epigenetics arose essentially as 
“the study of the mechanisms of temporal and spatial control of gene activity during the 
development of complex organisms” (Holliday 1990, 329), and has recently become 
shorthand for the set of chemical marks that affect gene expression upon certain 
environmental stimuli or during cell state transitions (Riddihough and Zahn 2010). At a 
general level, the operational definitions of the term presented here reveal that epigenetics has 
been historically concerned with a progressive detachment from the gene-centric focus of 
molecular biology (Rivera and Ren 2013). Briefly put, epigenetics adds an additional layer of 
complexity to the view that the genotype determines the phenotype. By plunging into the 
open question of phenotypic variation in human populations and individual organisms, 
epigenetics has gradually come to focus on how genomic information gets directed both 
spatially and temporally by a number of non-genetic inputs contributing to phenotype. This is 
in essence, according to some authors (Landecker and Panofsky 2013), the paradigm shift that 
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stems from the epigenetic endeavour.  After a few decades of dominant genetic logic, seeking 
to identify the sequence variation that underlies different physical and behavioural outcomes, 
the epigenetic logic seeks to establish “how different bodily outcomes arise from essentially 
similar genetics” (Landecker and Panofsky 2013, 336). Let us now briefly turn to the analysis 
of some of the most studied epigenetic mechanisms, and their application to human health, 
before problematizing further the societal aspects of competing epigenetic epistemologies 
(Meloni and Testa 2014) in Chapter 7. 
Nuclear structure and the ‘epigenome’ 
In the nucleus of eukaryotic cells, DNA is packed together with proteins into a highly 
complex macromolecular structure termed chromatin (Bernstein et al. 2007). There are several 
levels of DNA compaction that can be achieved during different phases of the cell cycle, from 
the looser compaction required by DNA replication in S Phase up to the hypercondensed 
state that is represented by metaphase chromosomes. Yet, the base unit of DNA packaging in 
eukaryotes is represented by the nucleosome, whose structure was firstly elucidated in 1997 
(Luger et al. 1997). Each nucleosome is composed by a strand of approximately 147 DNA 
base pairs wrapped around a globular octameric protein core, formed by 2 copies of each of 
the histone proteins H2A, H2B, H3, H4. The H1 linker histone and its isoforms also 
participate in chromatin compaction by interacting with the nucleosome near the entry and 
exit points of DNA (Allis et al. 2007). It is by zooming in and out on these scales of nuclear 
organization (DNA, histones, nucleosomes, chromatin) that we can meet the most 
characterized and well-studied epigenetic mechanisms. 
Much of today’s epigenetic science means in fact studying the multiple modifications 
to which DNA or histone proteins are subjected, and consequently how such modifications 
affect overall nucleosome and chromatine structure (Goldberg et al. 2007). In addition, the 
last few years have seen an overwhelming technological development, which finally made 
possible not only to assay such modifications at the level of a single gene or modification, but 
also to describe them across the whole genome (Callinan and Feinberg 2006). This is the 
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emerging science that goes by the name of epigenomics, and that consists of a “global, 
comprehensive view of sequence-independent processes [namely, the ‘epigenome’] that 
modulate gene expression patterns in a cell” (Rivera and Ren 2013, 39). By resorting to 
cutting-edge technologies of next-generation sequencing (Koboldt et al. 2013), epigenomics 
promises to survey the entire set of epigenetic modifications in the genome in an unbiased, 
nucleotide-based and comprehensive manner (Rivera and Ren 2013). This unprecedented and 
monumental shift in assay capacity, can therefore elucidate the unique gene expression 
patterns of each cell type, thus answering to the question of how cells that are invariant with 
respect to their DNA sequence can actually give rise to very different tissues in our bodies 
(Callinan and Feinberg 2006).   
The most characterized covalent modifications that can affect chromatin function 
include DNA methylation and post-translational histone modifications (Callinan and Feinberg 
2006). In mammals, DNA methylation on the fifth position of cytosine (5mc) is mainly 
restricted to the CpG dinucleotides, and commonly occurs at centromeres, telomeres, and 
repeated sequences. CpG-rich DNA stretches, or “CpG islands”, are usually about 1000-bp 
long and frequently unmethylated. CpG islands are usually associated with regulatory 
functions, located at the 5’ of genes, and can be identified in about 70% of all mammalian 
promoters. This evidence suggests a role for DNA methylation in the global maintenance of 
the genome, and several functional models have been proposed (Weber and Schübeler 2007). 
First, a number of genetic studies indicate that global hypomethylation is associated with 
increased genome instability in mammalian cells (Dodge et al. 2005). In particular, this 
connection has been well documented in the context of cancer, where many cells display 
global hypomethylation associated with increased chromosomal instability and tumour 
progression (Weber and Schübeler 2007). Second, DNA methylation has been hypothesized 
to play an important role in cell-type-specific gene expression, on the basis of its potential to 
silence promoters. To this view, the main role played by methylation of CpG islands lies in 
transcriptional regulation and transcriptional silencing (Deaton and Bird 2011), which is 
performed by three different DNA methyltransferases (DNMTs) proteins in higher 
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eukaryotes (Okano et al. 1999). DNA methylation has been regarded as a stable DNA 
modification until 5-hydroxymethylcytosine (5hmC) was discovered, suggesting for the first 
time that 5mC mediate lineage restriction by silencing the expression of portions of the 
genome that are not specific to a given tissue (Kriaucionis and Heintz 2009). Quite the 
contrary, global DNA methylation technologies have recently progressed beyond the narrow 
view that 5mc is only a stable repressive mark (Rivera and Ren 2013). DNA methylation is 
currently regarded to display a variable pattern among individuals, and an epigenetic mark that 
is dynamically deposited and removed on the basis of environmental influences. This 
recognition opens up a whole range of possibilities for the study of phenotypic diversity and 
disease susceptibility, pointing to the critical role of DNA methylation as a proxy for 
embedding environmental cues in the genome through imprinting, gene (in)activation and 
chromosome inactivation (Suzuki and Bird 2008).  
As mentioned above, the second and most widely studied family of epigenetic 
mechanisms are the modifications of histone tails and their globular domains. Histones are in 
fact the substrate of more than 130 covalent modifications (Rivera and Ren 2013), which can 
alter the structural organization of the nucleosome and ultimately influence DNA access, 
conformation and function. More specifically, post-translational modifications of histones can 
function as docking sites for proteins and complexes, thus establishing global chromatin 
domains that are functional to the execution of different DNA-based programs in different 
cell types, such as genomic imprinting, transcription, DNA repair, DNA replication and 
chromosome condensation (Kouzarides 2007). Histone modifications have been shown to 
serve both purposes of activation and silencing of genomic regions, and can in general be 
considered as binding substrates for the recruitment or exclusion of protein complexes 
(Rivera and Ren 2013). The N-terminal tails of histones emerge from the octameric core and 
constitute the most dynamic regulatory domain of histones. Several post-translational 
modifications, mainly targeting lysines and arginines, have been described. Such modifications 
include acetylation, methylation, phosphorylation, ribosylation, ubiquitylation and sumoylation 
(Karlic et al. 2010). One of the main consequences of these modifications is the alteration of 
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the surface charge of histones and the ensuing change of the overall strength of histone-
histone and histone-DNA interactions, with a profound effect on the compaction state of 
chromatin. As an example, phosphorylation (Wei et al. 1999) or acetylation (Görisch et al. 
2005) can loosen the chromatin fiber by reducing the overall positive charge of the histone 
tail, thus making DNA more accessible to transcription factors and therefore potentially more 
transcriptionally active. Histone modifications can also favour or hinder the recruitment of 
other proteins to the modified histone tails. The concerted action of histone modifications 
and non-histone proteins contributes to the recruitment of protein complexes that can allow 
mRNA transcription, DNA repair or replication, and chromosome condensation (Kouzarides 
2007). Importantly, most of these modifications are dynamic, and enzymes have been isolated 
that can add and remove histone marks. Thus, for example, histone acetylases (HATs) and de-
acetylases (HDACs) have been described, as well as histone methyltransferases (HMTs) and 
demethylases (KDMs) (Karlic et al. 2010).  
Histone lysine methylation is central to processes of cellular differentiation, since the 
expression of genes involved in differentiation is dynamically regulated through changes in 
histone methylation at specific lysines. Most notably modifications of H3K27 (i.e. histone 3, 
lysine 27) is associated with transcriptional repression, while H3K4 is associated with 
transcriptional activation. Genome-wide analysis showed that H3K27me3 (i.e. tri-methylation 
of histone 3, lysine 27) labels transcriptionally repressed domains that are present in 
Embryonic Stem (ES) cells, which extend to differentiated cell types in order to maintain cell 
type-specific repression (Kouzarides 2007). Functionally, these regions might serve for lineage 
restriction during differentiation as they cover only approximately 4% of the genome in 
undifferentiated mouse ES cells, compared to 31% in differentiated ES cells (Wen et al. 2009).  
By zooming out on the hierarchy of genomic organization, we then find the epigenetic 
patterns of regulation that go beyond modifications of DNA sequences and histone proteins. 
The positioning of nucleosomes along the genome is in fact another important, yet highly 
debated, epigenetic player (Rivera and Ren 2013). As mentioned above, our genome at its 
most basic level is constituted by “repeating units of 147 base pairs wrapped 1.7 times around 
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each nucleosome with varying distances of linker DNA between each unit” (Rivera and Ren 
2013, 44). Yet, this simplistic model overlooks the role that nucleosome positioning can play 
in both inhibiting and promoting factor binding, as well as in regulating the expression of the 
genome (Bell et al. 2011). On the one hand, the position of nucleosomes along the strands of 
DNA obstructs or reveals specific DNA sequences. Roughly put, depending on the loci of the 
genome that are wrapped around histones, some portions of DNA may be more or less 
accessible to transcription factors. On the other, the plethora of modifications on histone tails 
and globular domains showed above is in itself dependent from nucleosome positioning, 
which affects their capacity for recruitment of transcriptional regulators. As showed by Rivera 
and Ren (2013), the contribution of nucleosome positioning to disease aetiology is still in its 
infancy. Most of the knowledge regarding the consequences of aberrant nucleosome 
positioning still regards studies of animal models, such as yeast and fly (Jiang and Pugh 2009). 
However, this information remains of pivotal importance for the understanding of diseases 
associated to unfavourable composition and packing of the DNA sequence (Rivera and Ren 
2013). 
Finally, another level of epigenetic patterning deserves here a special mention. The last 
few years have in fact experienced the “collision” (Bernstein and Allis 2005) between two 
separate worlds of molecular biology: noncoding RNAs on the one hand, and chromatin on 
the other. As showed by Goldberg and colleagues (2007) the reason for including RNA 
activity among epigenetic mechanisms lies in its newly discovered role in the regulation of 
chromatin states. Accumulating evidences in a variety of model systems show in fact that 
noncoding RNAs are responsible for the formation of “active” (euchromatic) or “silent” 
(heterochromatic) chromatin domains, one of the pivotal domains of epigenetics. A 
paradigmatic example of noncoding RNAs’ involvement in chromatin (in)activation comes 
from the study of mechanisms of dosage compensation in animal models. Within this context, 
it has been shown that noncoding RNAs allow to “choose the dosage” of expression between 
the chromosome coming from paternal lineage and the one inherited from the mother: an 
epigenetic mark that persists even after cell division (Heard 2004, in Bernstein and Allis 2005). 
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In particular, RNA-mediated epigenetic silencing of genes happens either by post-
transcriptional (PTGS) and transcriptional (TGS) RNA interference.  
It is on the basis of these two different levels of RNA-chromatin interaction that the 
view holding noncoding RNAs as an additional epigenetic player is still in need of complete 
appreciation. On the one hand, researchers have shown that RNAs act in concert with various 
components of the cell's chromatin and the DNA methylation machinery to achieve stable 
transcriptional silencing. TGS-evoking RNAs are thus “more clearly epigenetic” (Goldberg et al. 
2007, 637) since they squarely fall within currently dominant definitions of what counts as 
epigenetic and what does not. Namely, RNA-mediated TGS pertains to non-DNA-based 
changes in gene function, which can induce effects that can be inherited through cell division 
(Allis et al. 2007). On the other, other scholars have argued for not considering PTGS-
inducing RNAs to be epigenetic in nature, since they do not regulate the expression of the 
genome, but rather affect processes of protein translation (Bernstein and Allis 2005). It is 
because of this “detachment” from the DNA sequence, that the epistemic status of RNAs as a 
component of cellular epigenetic machinery is currently under dispute. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting how, although the molecular basis of crosstalk between RNA and chromatin 
remains unclear, understanding how these states are established and maintained during the 
development of an organism can be considered one of the pressing epigenetic imperatives in 
contemporary biology. 
The power of epigenome mapping techniques 
Epigenetics and its ‘omics descendant are, in other words, a moving target in contemporary 
biomedicine, which is liable to more than one interpretation. A profound disagreement can be 
currently identified in the definition of the terms ‘epigenetics’, as well as on the boundaries of 
what constitutes an epigenetic phenomenon (Meloni and Testa 2014). Nevertheless, it is 
undoubted that the field has experienced a remarkable expansion in the last few years. 
Propelled by the technological development of epigenome mapping techniques (Rivera and 
Ren 2013), epigenomics is in fact widely considered the “next big thing” in biomedicine 
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(Ebrahim 2012). Yet, the technological power of next-generation sequencing techniques is 
only but one of the factors contributing to the rise of epigenomics. Another important one is 
in fact the formation of several research consortia that, worldwide, are currently trying to 
standardize the field and to specify the blurred boundaries of relevant epigenetic science. 
Modelling after the success of the Human Genome Project (Lander 2011), these consortia 
include the US Roadmap Epigenome Project, the ENCODE Project, and the International 
Human Epigenome Consortium (IHEC), which find their European counterpart in a number 
of national and supranational initiatives such as the Italian EPIGEN consortium, DEEP, 
Epigenesis and Blueprint.  
 It is thus also because of the standardized experimental protocols, data analysis 
procedures, and most importantly the large amounts of data sets publicly released by these 
consortia that epigenomics has grown dramatically in the last few years. As reported by Rivera 
and Ren (2013, 47), “the number of epigenome maps generated has grown exponentially, 
from a handful in early 2007 to several thousand as of today”, meaning that the epistemic 
contribution of epigenomics to the understanding of human biology and health is growing at a 
very rapid pace. For instance, the ENCODE Consortium has recently released comprehensive 
maps of chromatin modification states in 46 human cell types, highlighting how distinct 
patterns of histone modification, spanning across approximately 56% of our genome, are 
indicative of the specific biochemical activities of each cell type (ENCODE Project 
Consortium 2012). Otherwise stated, epigenome mapping techniques promise to illuminate 
the set of chromatin modifications, at the basis of tissue specification, by segmenting the 
regions of the genome specific to each cell type.  
Rather than simply being a collection of elements, epigenomics is bestowed the 
capacity to finally provide a comprehensive view of the nuclear “regulome” (Rivera and Ren 
2013, 48) in its three-dimensional space. As argued by Haig (2012), it is reasonable to expect 
that the epigenomic research will soon annotate completely the catalogue of functional 
variants of the human genome, and consequently will bring a valuable contribution to the 
understanding of human health and disease development. As detailed below, epigenomic 
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maps are already in the process of rendering their contribution an essential element of the 
understanding of pathogenesis in the most common diseases. The question we face today is 
therefore not whether epigenomics may constitute an essential facet of the ‘personalization 
project’ in medicine (Chadwick 2013) described in Chapter 1. Quite the contrary, what we 
should ask ourselves is ‘what are the domains of medicine where these new technologies and 
tools will firstly becoming available?’ 
The contribution of epigenomics to Personalised Medicine (PM) 
This section explores the potential of epigenetic science as a key driver for the development of 
PM. As we will see, the application of epigenetics (and increasingly of epigenomics) to 
different domains of healthcare is likely to further instate the focus on the individual patient at 
the basis of the sociotechnical imaginary (Jasanoff and Kim 2009, Jasanoff and Kim 2013) 
depicted by PM (see infra Chapter 1). Medical applications of epigenetics encompass in fact a 
wide range of developments that will constitute an important driver of PM. First, the 
reversible nature of epigenetic changes “gives drug developers and biomedical researchers 
reasons to dream about how their efforts might reverse changes that contribute to disease” 
(Marx 2012, 146). The plasticity and malleability of the epigenome, as well as its unique 
individual patterning, is widely considered as a promising target for the development of 
pharmaceutical compounds (Marx 2012). The rise of epi-drugs for different tumour types, 
eight of which have already been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
and/or the European Medicines Agency (EMA) (Damjanovicova, unpublished data), already 
testifies the impact of epigenomics on clinical treatment of common diseases.  
Second, the technological development of epigenomics is also a promising field for a 
steep increase in the number of tissue and individual-specific biomarkers for predictive 
diagnostics and screening tests. As we will see below, molecular biomarkers of changes in 
epigenetic modifications of a number of genes are already being used to guide clinical 
decisions in cancer, and more of them are on their way. In addition, the last few years have 
also witnessed the appearance of companies (e.g. Oncomethylome Sciences, Epigenomics 
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AG, Sequenom, Exact Sciences) beginning to offer a range of in vitro tests for several 
epigenetic markers in cancer treatment. For instance, the company Exact Sciences has recently 
received approval from the FDA (decision held on August 11, 201425) to market a combined 
four methylation markers test for early detection of colon cancer. As reported by the FDA, 
this test fared much better than commonly used methods for non-invasive screening tests as 
to its sensitivity, both with regard to detection of colon cancers and advanced adenomas.  
Third, epigenetics might well contribute also to the preventive aspects of PM. As 
research on epigenome maps progresses, epigenetic markers may account for environmental 
and lifestyle exposures responsible for disease development, well in advance the emergence of 
clinical symptoms (Relton and Davey Smith 2010). Several factors are currently under study as 
to their influence on aberrant epigenetic patterning. Nutritional factors such as high-fat diet 
(Widiker et al. 2010), environmental pollutants (Baccarelli et al. 2009), smoking (Philips and 
Goodman 2009) have all been shown to contribute to plastic modifications of the epigenome 
across the individual life span with potentially disruptive health consequences. The potential 
of epigenome mapping techniques to provide us insights on the aberrant effects of 
environmental and lifestyle exposures, hints therefore at the possibility that unique individual 
epigenetic read-outs may become commonplace in the future of medicine. A simple blood 
test, may in fact constitute the viable means to monitor individual epigenetic patterning in its 
plastic responsiveness to environmental cues, and consequently constitute precious knowledge 
for the prevention of diseases in the general population. If the costs of sequencing will 
continue to plummet (Koboldt et al. 2013), genome sequencing and epigenome mapping may 
come into being an integral part of healthcare routine for many patients, and perhaps even 
part of regular medical examination.  
Epigenomics and cardiovascular diseases 
Cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) are widely acknowledged as the biggest cause of deaths across 
the world (World Health Organization 2011). Although declining in most European countries, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  More information available at the following web address: http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm409021.htm (Last Accessed: 29/9/2014).  
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the prevalence of CVDs is currently increasing astonishingly in low and middle-income 
countries, and will most likely remain a global major health concern for the next two decades. 
No doubt, ‘omics’ technologies (e.g. genomics, epigenomics transcriptomics, proteomics, and 
metabolomics) promise to fundamentally change also our understanding of CVDs and 
consequently to improve strategies to tackle them. In particular, epigenomics has emerged as 
one of the most promising approaches that will help to address gaps in our knowledge on 
CVDs aetiology (Ordovàs and Smith 2010). As we have seen above, epigenetic science can 
provide an understanding of all those mechanisms allowing organisms to quickly react to 
environmental changes. In this respect, epigenetics is therefore a promising candidate to 
illuminate the link between genes and the wide range of environmental and lifestyle-related 
cues (e.g. tobacco use, physical inactivity, diet, overweight, pollutants) associated to incidence 
and morbidity of CVDs. Individual variation in the epigenetic modification of genes can 
explain a larger part of the phenotypic variation observed in humans better than differences in 
genotype alone (Baccarelli et al. 2010).  
A first set of evidences pointing to the role of epigenetic modifications in CVDs-
related phenotypes, concerns data on genomic DNA isolated from human atherosclerotic 
lesions, which is generally held to be globally hypomethylated (Ordovàs and Smith 2010). 
Secondly, another set of studies has reported specific methylation patterns of changes (usually 
hypermethylation) in the promoter region of genes associated with atherosclerosis (Dong et al. 
2002). Third, inflammatory states – which play a major role in the formation, progression, and 
rupture of atherosclerotic states – have been frequently observed to involve epigenetic 
changes (Shanmugam and Sethi 2013). Different studies on peripheral blood lymphocytes in 
patients with coronary heart disease have however reported both increases and decreases in 
methylation status (Turunen et al. 2009). This means that knowledge on the involvement of 
methylation patterns in CVDs should be taken with caution, since the field is still in its 
infancy, and the evidences still disputed and inconsistently reported. Whether epigenetic 
changes have a causal role in pathogenetic features of CVDs, or whether they merely 
represent a consequence of the ongoing pathological process, remains thus unclear. However, 
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it is worth noting that epigenetic science promises to explain the poorly understood 
environmental and dietary effects on human metabolism, and the differences in the incidence 
of CVDs across the population. The emphasis of current research is in fact on the 
environmental roots that cause epigenetic changes, whose plasticity triggers aberrant processes 
related to CVDs risk (Ordovàs and Smith 2010).  
Within this context, a seminal study by McGuinness and colleagues (2012) has recently 
come to the attention of both media and social analysts because of its proposal of methylation 
states as a “bio-dosimeter” of socioeconomic status (SES) (Landecker and Panofsky 2013, 
Meloni and Testa 2014). The study provides evidences that levels of global methylation across 
the genome (i.e. total DNA methylation levels as a percentage of total DNA in the samples) 
mirror SES. To show this, researchers used as a base model an already established cohort of 
subjects from a previous study, named “pSoBid”, which clustered citizens of Glasgow 
(Scotland) on the basis of “deprivation groups”. Blood samples from these participants were 
then analysed as to their levels of global methylation, revealing that SES, lifestyle factors 
(smoking, diet, housing, physical activity) and a set of biomarkers for CVDs (e.g. blood 
pressure, cholesterol, glucose levels) correlate with epigenetic status, and that global DNA 
hypomethylation associates with the most deprived group of study participants (McGuinness 
et al. 2012, 7).  
A related, and yet different, example of how molecular environmental epigenetics can 
provide us insightful knowledge on social conditions and their impact on health, comes 
instead from a study on the long-term consequences of the Dutch Hunger famine, which took 
place during the winter of 1944-1945 (Heijmans et al. 2008). The events concerning this 
famine escalated when the Dutch government called for a national railway strike to hamper 
the manoeuvres of the German army. As a consequence, German authorities imposed an 
embargo over the western part of The Netherlands concerning all food supplies over the 
month of October 1944. During this period, official rations remained well documented 
(mostly bread and potatoes were available in little quantity), thus allowing researchers to 
establish that, as of April 1945, concerned Dutch citizens were surviving on as little as 500 
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calories per day. The unique features of this famine (mainly its intact reports on the side of 
healthcare and local authorities) enabled Heijmans and colleagues to assess its long-term 
epigenetic and health consequences over the population. In particular, investigators found out 
that individuals who were exposed in utero to the deprivation of the famine showed significant 
reductions in the methylation patterns of the IGF2 gene in comparison to their unexposed 
siblings: a key factor in human growth and development that is maternally imprinted, and is 
physiologically tied to diabetes (Heijmans et al. 2008). In addition, a sex-specific increased risk 
of obesity and CVDs-related deaths has been reported by this study among those whose 
mothers were exposed to famine early in gestation, up to six decades later. Since extensive 
modifications of the epigenome occur in two phases during development (during fertilization 
and during maturation of primordial germ cells), it is likely that these two time points 
represent very sensitive time periods during which exposure to extreme conditions might have 
lifelong consequences. Indeed, more and more research focuses on epigenetics in embryonic, 
fetal and neonatal development to understand the basis of adult onset disease 
(Damdimopoulou et al. 2012). 
Taken together these observations confirm the view, anticipated above, that a new 
conceptual model for the understanding of disease aetiology of CVDs emerges from 
evidences in the studies of their epigenetic bases (Baccarelli et al. 2010). Studying the plastic 
and dynamic changes in the epigenome over the life course may constitute insightful 
knowledge on the adaptive and deviant gene-expression states at the basis of CVDs. The fact 
that age, sex, and cardiovascular risk factors can be mapped onto specific patterns of DNA 
methylation, constitutes an attractive set of knowledge that, in principle, might help to explain 
how environmental and lifestyle factors can impose aberrant and individually unique gene 
expression patterns in an individual’s lifetime. Consequently, it is reasonable to argue that 
epigenomics currently promises to provide valuable ground for the prevention and treatment 
of individual cardiovascular risk (Baccarelli et al. 2010).  It is not difficult to imagine in fact 
how a personalised epigenomic read-out, following the individual throughout the life span, 
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may constitute an important player for the development of individually tailored management 
of CVDs even in their asymptomatic stage. 
Epigenomics and neuropsychiatric disorders 
Another set of evidences, pointing to the role of epigenomics for the personalization of 
healthcare services, relates to the epigenetically regulated gene expression patterns in the arena 
of psychiatric illness (Persico and Burgeron 2006). First, a number of studies have reported an 
association between prenatal and early life epigenetic mechanisms and long-term psychiatric 
outcomes. Data from both human populations and animal models have found that responses 
to psychosocial stress, epigenetically mediates the functioning of glucocorticoid receptors 
(Meaney and Szyf 2005). In particular, these evidences suggest that epigenetic changes 
fostered by individual upbringing, or behavioural stimuli have long-lasting neurobiological 
consequences caused by brain region–specific changes in signalling and neuroplasticity 
(Pascual et al. 2009). Research findings on drug abuse show also that addictive behaviours may 
follow a similar pattern. Emerging data suggest that epigenetic regulation may be “the 
molecular basis of drug-induced changes in gene expression in brain reward regions” (Wang et 
al. 2013, S17), thus also shaping the neural and behavioural plasticity underlying addiction-
related habits. Taken together, all of these studies point to a promising aspect of epigenomics, 
which could finally elucidate the link between inherited predispositions, environment, 
behavioural stimuli, and exposure to drugs, hence providing a molecular basis for the long-
lasting alterations in gene expression that influence susceptibility to impaired stress response 
mechanisms as well as addictive behaviours (Wong et al. 2011). 
Second, epigenetic factors have also been suggested to play a preeminent role in the 
aetiology of neurodevelopmental diseases, such as autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). 
Differently from what was commonly held (Schanen 2006), ASDs (including autism, Asperger 
disorder, childhood disintegrative disorder, etc.) may not be solely genetic in origin with a 
polygenic, epistatic model largely dominating biological understandings of this family of 
conditions. Quite the contrary, the last few years have seen a proliferation of lines of 
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evidences pointing to the role of environmental and epigenetic factors in ASDs (Persico and 
Bourgeron 2006). The reason behind this paradigm-shift in the understanding of the complex 
phenotypes behind ASDs lies in the inconclusive nature of studies focusing on the interacting 
genetic loci contributing to ASDs susceptibility, which “has been estimated to range between 
two and 15 genes of varying effect” (Schanen 2006, 138). These risk alleles for ASDs have 
been in fact “remarkably elusive” (Schanen 2006, 138), despite the considerable effort to 
identify the genetic basis of autism-related diseases. One explanation for the limits of an 
exclusively genetic aetiology of ASDs lies in the fact that this unifying label hides a significant 
clinical heterogeneity of conditions, ranging from dramatic debilitating mental impairments to 
mild personality traits. In this respect, the purpose of finding a common genetic ground for a 
variety of complex mental and behavioural phenotypes may be considered as the main 
limitation hindering the advancement of these studies (Persico and Bourgeron 2006). Yet, the 
underlying genetic heterogeneity within and among the diagnostic categories in ASDs, may 
only partially explain the lack of progress on the understanding of their developmental origins. 
To this second view, the obstacles encountered in mapping the risk alleles of ASDs are rather 
due to an incomplete model of inheritance and development of these diseases, which does not 
take into account the role of environmental and epigenetic factors contributing to them 
(Ladd-Acosta et al. 2014). Reinforcing this idea, is also the striking rise in the incidence of 
ASDs observed in the last couple of decades (from 2-5 to 15-60 children per 10000 affected 
by these disorders), as well as the dramatic behavioural and neuroanatomical differences 
displayed by monozygotic twins discordant for an ASDs diagnosis (Persico and Bourgeron 
2006). The fact that genetically identical twins display significantly different disease-related 
phenotypes points to the need of including contributions of acquired epimutations and/or 
epigenetic mechanisms in the underlying genetic susceptibility to ASDs (Schanen 2006). In 
particular, epigenetic modifications including cytosine methylation (Ladd-Acosta et al. 2014), 
genomic imprinting and post-translational modification of histones (Grafodatskaya et al. 2010) 
qualify as potentially insightful mechanisms for modulation of gene expression that can be 
influenced by exposure to environmental factors and parent of origin effects.  
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Finally, epigenetic mechanisms such as DNA methylation and histone modifications 
have also started to be described for neurodegenerative disorders such as Alzheimer's disease, 
Parkinson's disease, and Huntington's disease, as well as in other neurological disorders such 
as multiple sclerosis, epilepsy, and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Urdinguio et al. 2009). In 
particular, relevant gains (hypermethylation) or losses (hypomethylation) of methylation are 
currently under study with regard to their potential role as biomarkers for each of the 
disorders listed above, or as promising targets for DNA-demethylating drugs. For instance, 
altered DNA-methylation patterns have been reported in Alzheimer’s disease, with regard to 
the promoter loci of two important genes (S100A2 and SORBS3) regulating synaptic pathways 
(Urdinguio et al. 2009), together with a number of histone modifications (Balazs et al. 2011). 
Stressing the importance of epigenetic modifications characterising neurodegenerative diseases 
is of utmost importance for the understanding of their disease aetiology, since genetic 
mutations can account only for 5% of Alzheimer's disease cases (Mastroeni et al. 2010). These 
diseases are in fact largely explained by lifestyle and environmental risk factors, which have the 
greatest impact in terms of prevention and delayed onset of Alzheimer's disease, as showed by 
epidemiological studies (Balazs et al. 2011). Combined together, these evidences indicate that 
epigenetically mediated cardiovascular risk factors, diabetes and metabolic disorders could also 
provide an explanation for the onset of Alzheimer's and other neurodegenerative diseases. 
Careful experimental studies are thus required to assess the role of CVDs epigenetics in 
neurodegenerative disorders, and especially its potential to illuminate individual risk and 
susceptibility to disease development.  
Potentially, epigenetics may reveal what kind of lifestyle triggers are required for 
neurodegeneration, how many and what insults account for pathogenesis, as well as how brain 
cells react mechanistically to environmental and lifestyle-related stimuli in a way that alters 
epigenetic marks (Mastroeni et al. 2010): all of this, with a resolution that gets to the level of 
individual experiences, upbringing and lifestyles. This promising pathway for the 
understanding and treatment of neurodegenerative disorders calls therefore for the 
establishment of reproducible profiles of the DNA methylomes and histone modifications of 
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these diseases that could generate single markers to test in healthy and disease-associated 
populations (Balazs et al. 2011).  
Excitement for a significant role played by epigenetic modifications in neurological 
diseases is, in other words, increasingly building in contemporary biomedicine. Yet, a few 
decisive challenges are waiting ahead researchers willing to establish whether or not 
epigenetics “is the crucial missing piece in the neurotherapeutic puzzle” (Ratan 2009, 976). 
This is no easy task for the field, since an additional difficulty hindering studies of 
neuropsychiatric disorders comes from the challenges attached to the collection of the right 
sample for each study (Urdinguio et al. 2009). The collection of brain samples for Alzheimer's 
disease or Parkinson's disease is in fact very burdensome for the patient, thus complicating the 
pathway towards the achievement of tangible therapeutic benefits. 
Epigenomics and cancer 
By far the most developed sub-field of epigenetic science, cancer epigenetics is an already 
established set of precious biological insights as well as mainstream clinical applications 
(Esteller 2007). Recently, the field has moved towards genome-wide approaches, propelled by 
the availability of next-generation sequencing technologies (Sandoval and Esteller 2012). An 
important way in which epigenomic techniques have already reshaped our picture of cancer 
biology regards the elucidation of aberrant DNA methylation patterns at gene promoters. 
Aberrant DNA methylation has long time ago been associated with tumorigenesis (Feinberg 
and Vogelstein 1983), due to the alterations it produces on normal gene regulation (Esteller 
2007). As reported by Sandoval and Esteller (2012) cancer-related alterations in methylation 
can be divided into three main subgroups: hypermethylation (Herman and Baylin 2003), 
hypomethylation (Kulis and Esteller 2010) and loss of imprinting (Sandoval and Esteller 
2012). Long lists of hypermethylated genes exist for very different human neoplasias, leading 
to the conviction that this type of epigenetic alteration ought to be considered the “common 
hallmark of all types of human cancer” (Esteller 2007, 291). Evidences on different 
methylation patterns in cancer support the view that, in the near future, each tumour subtype 
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may potentially be assigned a specific “DNA methylome”, which could help better define the 
malignancy, and consequently provide a number of individual diagnostic and prognostic 
markers for its management.  
A paradigmatic example of how this contribution of epigenomics to personalised 
diagnostics and prognostics of cancer may soon become common practice comes from a 
review study by Schweiger and colleagues (2013). Here, the authors show how altered DNA 
methylation patterns have been reported in a diverse array of both preinvasive and invasive 
cancers, and have already been used for the stratification of patients in clinical subgroups. As 
argued by the authors, specific alterations in the cytosine methylation patterns of CpG islands 
in promoter regions are highly predictive as to the concerned tumor entities or stages, and 
represent a very effective approach to the prediction of cancer formation and progression. 
Tangible examples of epigenetic prognostics and diagnostics in cancer is provided by the 
biomarker of hypermethylation for the MLH1 gene (coding for a protein of the DNA 
mismatch repair machinery), which predicts sensitivity to cisplatin (a chemotherapy drug) in 
colorectal cancer; or, the biomarker of hypermethylation for the GST P1 gene (coding for an 
enzyme involved in cellular detoxification), which is highly predictive of proliferation in 
prostate cancer and a number of additional cancer types (Heyn and Esteller 2012). In 
comparison to genetic approaches, epigenetic biomarkers display the main advantage of 
requiring just the analysis of a given gene region (i.e. the CpG island at the promoter locus), 
rather than having to account for a mutational analysis throughout the length of a gene. It is 
also for this reason that, overall, the clinical value of epigenetic modifications for the 
identification of biomarkers in cancer tissues can be considered “a technological revolution 
[…] around the corner” (Sandoval and Esteller 2012, 51). 
Another important epigenetic player in tumorigenesis is the patterning of 
modifications to histone proteins. In particular the alterations in histone modification patterns 
can be explained by two biological events characterising cancer. On the one hand, 
hypermethylation of CpG islands in tumour cells is known to yield a characteristic 
combination of histone marks: deacetylation of histones H3 and H4, and gain of H3K9 
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methylation and H3K27 trimethylation (Esteller 2007). This is mainly due to the fact that a 
number of proteins involved in DNA methylation (e.g. DNMTs) interact directly with 
histone-modifying enzymes such as Histone Methyltransferasc (HMT) and Histone 
Deacethylases (HDACs). For example, DNMTs recruit HDACs leading to histone 
deacetylation that is commonly associated with transcriptional repression. In addition, 
methylated DNA strands are also the binding sites for a variety of other proteins, which 
recruit HDACs as well as other chromatin-remodelers, thus resulting in chromatin 
compaction and transcriptional inactivation. On the other, an explanation for the role of 
histone modifications in cancer comes from the analysis of genetic lesions in the loci coding 
for histone-modifying complexes (Sandoval and Esteller 2012). To this second and 
complementary view, the disruption of patterns of histone modifications in cancer is 
explained by mutation, deletion and/or altered gene expression of genes encoding for 
enzymatic components of the epigenetic machinery (Rodriguez-Paredes and Esteller 2011).   
Little can be done, to this moment, to reverse the genetic mutations that are inherited 
in cancer proliferation, and affect protein-coding processes of histone modifiers. Yet, things 
stand differently in the case of epi-mutations (i.e. the transcriptional regulation of a gene that 
does not concern the DNA sequence) in histone modifications patterning, which are 
reversible and hence constitute a promising target for the development of specific 
compounds. At the basis of this recognition, is the observation that inhibitors of aberrant 
epigenetic mechanisms display dramatic effects in malignant cells, in comparison to their 
normal counterparts (Dawson and Kouzarides 2013). This is mainly due to the fact that, under 
normal cellular conditions, the epigenetic machinery may act together to ensure the 
achievement of correct chromatin conformation and accessibility, even by devising some 
semi-redundant mechanisms of interplay among its players (Sandoval and Esteller 2012). 
Cancer may consequently represent a disruption of this secured concerted activity, actually 
pertaining only the epigenetic regulation of a few pivotal target genes, thus rendering “a slight 
tip in the balance of this regulation […] sufficient to result in a cell catastrophe” (Dawson and 
Kouzarides 2012, 23). Otherwise stated, cancer cells may in many respect display an 
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‘epigenetic vulnerability’ that opens up numerous possibilities for therapeutic intervention. 
Some cancer cells are reliant on specific epigenetic pathways, whereas normal cells have 
alternative compensating pathways to rely on. This recognition has led to a huge effort in the 
quest for epigenetic drugs, which has already brought about some tangible clinical results. 
Among the compounds that target epigenetic processes, the most extensively studied are 
inhibitors of DNMTs and HDAC, which (as reported above) have already reached 
mainstream oncology both in Europe and the US (Damjanovicova, unpublished results). 
Taken together, these evidences from epigenomics support many of the hypotheses 
concerning the molecular roots of cancer, but they also challenge some others. Although it is 
still commonly held that cancer is a disease fundamentally driven by genetic anomalies, it is 
now clear that epigenetic pathways should not be underestimated as to their role in 
oncogenesis (Dawson and Kouzarides 2012). In fact, little doubt exists that some of the 
hallmarks of cancer, such as malignant self-renewal, differentiation blockade, evasion of cell 
death, and tissue invasiveness are deeply determined by changes in the epigenome (Esteller 
2007). However, the major rewriting of the biography of cancer that epigenomics has just 
begun, concerns a rather different theoretical shift in the understanding of its aberrant 
biology. Differently from cancer genomics, emphasizing the potential of sequencing for the 
identification of relatively few and well-defined genetic alterations at the basis of the disease, 
epigenomics brings into the picture of the molecular understanding of cancer complexity, 
stochasticity and environmental interactions as key elements of its biology (Bock 2009). 
Epigenetic alterations not only complement the widely acknowledged role of genetic 
alterations in tumours, but also purport to finally embrace and unveil the complex tapestry of 
underlying molecular events that administer the development of cancer processes. The 
combination and integration of high-resolution epigenome mapping technologies with 
genomics all the other ‘omics promises, in other words, to identify the set of individual 
predispositions, lifestyle behaviours, environmental cues that are reflected in particular cancer 
signatures, thus constituting a new and exciting prognostic, diagnostic and therapeutic tool in 
the personalization of cancer care (Sandoval and Esteller 2012).  
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Conclusions 
The present analysis of the impact of epigenomics on Personalised Medicine (PM) shows that 
the interest in epigenetic phenomena – notwithstanding their blurred boundaries – has 
experienced an exponential growth over the past few years. Currently, epigenetic mechanisms 
are regarded as an integral part of our understanding for several common human diseases, 
such as cardiovascular diseases, neuropsychiatric disorders and cancer (World Health 
Organization 2010). With regard to these important domains of healthcare, we have seen how 
epigenomics promises to elucidate the relationship between genetic and (some) non-genetic 
determinants of complex diseases, and to progress our understanding of the multi-factorial 
nature of disease development. In a nutshell, epigenomics may finally put the genotype into the 
context of the myriad of environmental triggers (broadly understood) that contribute to any 
phenotype, and have long-lasting consequences for individual health.  
Beyond the details of this fascinating endeavour, it is now important to recapitulate 
how this aspect of epigenomics has a fundamental bearing on the project of PM. Going 
beyond the rhetoric of PM that “starts with the patient” (European Commission 2013, 6), 
evidence from epigenomic studies suggests a unifying molecular language for both 
biographical and biological marks, which – I shall say – stays with the patient throughout the 
whole lifespan. From lifestyle behaviours and environmental pollutants, to stress reactions and 
cognitive functions, epigenomics promises – and has already started – to provide a unified 
digital heuristics (Meloni and Testa 2014) for measuring the complex interactions in health 
and disease. In doing so, epigenomics plunges into – and lumps together – the unique 
combination among these factors at the basis of individual illness. This represents a 
fundamental shift in the ontologies of both disease aetiology and health outcomes, and also a 
monumental leap forward in the implementation of the project of PM. The stratification of 
patients based on their multiple and evolving epigenomic profiles (Costa 2010) may become in 
fact the best way to subgroup patients, and to optimize preventive and therapeutic care on the 
specificities (both social and biological) of each individual. As showed above, epigenomics may 
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soon provide us with an outlook of how social forces, such as socio-economic status and 
environmental exposures, get embodied with consequences for adult cardiovascular risks and 
health (McGuinness et al. 2012). In addition, we have also seen how these groundbreaking 
discoveries open up huge opportunities for the development of tailored and personalised 
therapies. Epigenomics has already begun to radically change the approach of pharmaceutical 
companies to the identification and testing of new cancer drugs, and will most likely extend its 
influence over other domains of healthcare. The idea of a blockbuster drug that could treat a 
broad spectrum of tumour types has become even less likely after the advent of epigenomics. 
Cancer is a complex disease, and even a specific cancer type has a variety of subclasses, or 
specificities, with completely different pathological and molecular features, which could be 
captured (also) by epigenomics maps (Costa 2010). These recognitions point to a unique role 
played by epigenomics in PM, since it can help in the identification of groups of patients with 
the same epigenetic changes – being them life experiences, or environmental exposures – 
shaping the characteristics of their medical conditions. 
And yet, as we will see in the next chapter, there is more to epigenomics than just 
providing a molecular gaze on individual aetiology of complex diseases (Nowotny and Testa 
2011). The recent developments in the field reviewed above, assign in fact a rather different 
(and complementary) role to epigenomics in the public unfolding of PM. As elegantly put by 
Meloni and Testa:  
 
this openness to the environment, in its broadest sense, invites [also] the expectation of 
change, the notion that once the genome has been downgraded from the high citadel of causal 
primacy, to the messy roundabouts of reactive developmental resources, biological fates 
become inherently reversible and porous to intervention” (Meloni and Testa 2014, 13-14).  
 
To this view, what is worth noting about emerging epigenomic healthcare is its alignment with 
the new “sociotechnical imaginary” (Jasanoff and Kim 2009, Jasanoff and Kim 2013) of 
individualized, environmentally situated and empowering medicine problematized throughout 
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this work. Epigenomics is already entering the public arena as a resource for reconfiguring 
individual and collective responsibilities for health (Hedlund 2012, Chadwick and O’Connor 
2013), be they inflected as a demand of accountability for damaging one’s epigenetic makeup 
(due to lifestyle, environmental exposures, etc.), or as a prospective responsibility to act upon 
this information and improve one’s own epigenome (Meloni and Testa 2014).  
There is, in other words, a dark side of the promise of epigenomics to make 
increasingly visible the ‘contextual nature’ of health (Landecker and Panofsky 2013, Meloni 
and Testa 2014), and its potential to fuel the power of post-genomic narratives to provide “the 
right therapeutic strategy for the right person at the right time” (European Commission 2013, 
5). By illuminating biological mechanisms underlying the interaction between lifestyle, living 
conditions and individual health, epigenomics should not be regarded as merely providing a 
“bio-dosimeter” (Landecker and Panofsky 2013) of the social and environmental influences 
inherently affecting individual health. Rather, epigenomics is best understood as partaking to 
the constitution of the patient citizenship project criticised throughout this work, which 
integrates knowledge of our somatic individuality (this time at the crossroad of biological, 
environmental and behavioural factors, and not only genetic) with moral and political claims 
of individual responsibility and empowerment to protect our epigenome from external 
aberrant influences. 
This recognition calls for abandoning the narrow view of the epigenetic discourse as a 
mere configuration of molecular knowledge on social phenomenas and their impact over 
health (Landecker and Panofsky 2013). Rather, this view calls for embark upon the scrutiny of 
the potential tensions generated by epigenomics’ promise and demand of intervention upon one’s 
health vulnerabilities. Once we recognise that epigenomics may be a major driver for the 
political constitution of the ‘empowering PM’ scrutinized in this work, it automatically 
becomes a promising terrain to put to test the normative theorization of empowerment 
resulting from Part 1. For this reason, in the remaining of this work, epigenomics will be 
addressed as one of the pillars of the social and political program of EBRs, where its 
representation of complex social phenomena (such as the adverse social conditions to which we 
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are exposed) in the molecular language of DNA methylation, histone modifications and RNA-
chromatin interactions, gets translated into the allegedly empowering normative dimension of 
responsibility to reshape one’s epigenetic biology.   
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Chapter 7. The epigenomic hype: between responsibility and 
empowerment 
Introduction 
As argued in Chapter 6, investigating the plasticity of our epigenomes to environmental triggers 
can mobilize a narrative of individual responsibility with regard to health and diseases (Meloni 
and Testa 2014). Epigenomics promises in fact to illuminate the interplay between genetic and 
non-genetic determinants of health, with a significant impact on our understanding and 
personalised management of complex diseases (Rakyan et al. 2011). In particular, we have seen 
how next-generation sequencing techniques for epigenomic analysis promise to make 
increasingly visible (Nowotny and Testa 2011) the biological mechanisms underlying the 
interaction between lifestyle, living conditions and individual health. In this respect, I 
concluded, the flip side of unveiling the ‘molecular conduit’ (Landecker and Panofsky 2013) 
that adapts the epigenome to environmental exposures is the rise of expectations to safeguard 
its vulnerability from the assaults of lifestyles, occupational exposures, pollution, parental care, 
etc. Indeed, epigenomics has already been cast in terms of posing an additional responsibility 
for the management of individual health (Hedlund 2012, Rothstein 2013, Chadwick and 
O’Connor 2013, Loi et al. 2013). Once molecular knowledge of the impact of lifestyle and 
environment on disease aetiology becomes available, this line of reasoning goes, one 
expectation is that individuals may be held liable for the consequences of their health-related 
and epigenetically accountable decisions.  
In this chapter, I build upon this notion of ‘epigenetic responsibility’ and problematize 
the emphasis on individual responsibility from the empowerment perspective defended in Part 
1. To do so, I start from a reconstruction of the main arguments in favour, or against the 
legitimacy of normative claims of ‘epigenetic responsibility’ (Hedlund 2012, Rothstein 2013, 
Chadwick and O’Connor 2013). With regard to this matter, I show that these normative 
appraisals of epigenetic responsibility build upon the already existing debate on responsibility 
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for health analysed in Chapter 4. Accordingly, I show how claims of ‘epigenetic responsibility’ 
can be addressed both on the basis of arguments (Morreim 1995, Cappelen and Norheim 
2005, Feiring 2008, Segall 2009, Voigt 2013) and counter-arguments (Minkler 1999, Wilkinson 
1999, Buyx and Prainsack 2012, Brown 2013) for moral responsibility in public health ethics. 
Then, I move to a discussion of the idea that epigenetics reinforces ascriptions of liability for 
environmental and lifestyle exposures. I suggest that, whether this is the case, depends on the 
standards of evidence in epigenetic medicine. Namely, I argue that holding individuals 
responsible for aberrant epigenetic modifications depends also on the degree of analytic 
validity, clinical validity and clinical utility of epigenetic knowledge (Mill and Heijmans 2013). 
Whether epigenomics will become pivotal in orienting agency across a range of responsible 
healthy options is in fact conditional to the definition of the epistemic status of epigenomic 
profiles and their actionability with respect to the health-related impact of environmental and 
lifestyle exposures.  
Finally, I turn to an evaluation of claims of epigenetic responsibility on the basis of my 
normative account of empowerment. On the one hand, I argue that the premises of 
empowerment point to the difficulties of solving these matters by trading off individual merit 
and possible sanctions for health-related behaviours. In contrast to the individualisation of 
social policy currently dominating healthcare (Shapiro 2012), the perspective I proposed 
requires in fact approaching normative matters of liability and accountability in healthcare 
(including the ones based on epigenetic medicine) by taking up the inherently ecological 
(Minkler 1999) nature of moral and legal responsibility for one’s behaviour. This means that 
an empowerment approach to epigenetic responsibility affirms the need to refrain from 
attributions of liability for epigenetic scars (i.e. aberrant epigenetic modifications) at the 
individual level (Hedlund 2012, Chadwick and O’Connor 2013).  
On the other hand, I maintain that the promise of epigenomics to make increasingly 
visible the interaction between lifestyle, living conditions and individual health (see infra 
Chapter 6), should not limit its societal appraisal to the danger of burdening individual 
responsibility for health. Rather, I argue that epigenetic knowledge may become pivotal in 
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fleshing out social and environmental influences inherently affecting health-related agency. 
From the perspective I develop here, epigenetic knowledge about social, environmental and 
lifestyle exposures determining health may in fact guide individuals across the spectrum of 
social determinants of one’s health (Marmot and Wilkinson 2003, World Health Organization 
2013), thus championing epigenomics with the potential of serving the empowering aims fleshed 
out throughout this work. 
There is, in other words, a two-way conceptual movement linking the political project 
of an empowered citizenship in healthcare, and the societal unfolding of epigenomics. The 
possibility I explore here is that empowerment and epigenomics may respectively shape their 
own political and epistemic dimensions in the future of healthcare. On the one hand, the 
normative resources of empowerment I developed in this work may prevent inflated claims of 
moral responsibility for epigenetic damage of one’s health. On the other, the promise of 
epigenomics to annotate the systematic health disadvantage in our society (in the form of a 
molecular read-out of the health-related consequences of one’s exposures and lifestyles) 
bestows to this technology the potential to empower citizens’ agency across the myriad of 
social and contextual determinants of one’s health. It is thus towards the identification of the 
possible synergies between these two promising tropes of contemporary healthcare that the 
final remarks of this work will be devoted. 
Normative claims of personal epigenetic responsibility for health 
The main reason why epigenomics has been linked to normative matters of social and 
individual responsibility for health is the molecular gaze it sheds on the biological mechanisms 
linking environmental factors and genes (Rothstein et al. 2009a, 2009b). As shown in Chapter 
6, epigenetic research has a number of potential applications in Personalised Medicine (PM), 
and bears the promise of clarifying the relationship between lifestyles, living conditions, health 
and wellbeing. As a result, epigenomics enables individuals and societal institutions to act 
accordingly to this knowledge, but also to do otherwise (Hedlund 2012). It is starting from 
these features of epigenomics that responsibility concerns arise, as to whom should be held 
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liable – between the individual and the wider society – to “do something” (Chadwick and 
O’Connor 2013, 464) about this knowledge. In particular, it is worth noting here how 
arguments in favour of epigenetic responsibility build upon the well-established emphasis on 
responsibility for lifestyle behaviours and health outcomes in the ethics of public health (see 
infra Chapter 4).  
The avenues to construct arguments in favour of responsibility to protect one’s 
epigenome and health can, in other words, be identified among the normative resources 
previously discussed in this thesis (see infra Chapter 4). And indeed, building upon the 
distinction between backward- and forward-looking accounts, some scholars have already 
argued that, as epigenetic damage may be brought about by voluntary conduct (such as 
smoking or diet), individuals must bear – both retrospectively and prospectively – the 
responsibility for this damage (Wiener 2010, Hedlund 2012, Chadwick and O’Connor 2013). 
In particular, the taxonomy of arguments I presented in Chapter 4 can help us identify how 
different normative accounts would specify this general argument in favour of epigenetic 
responsibility in different ways.  
Certainly, one could imagine how a luck egalitarian approach (Segall 2009, Voigt 2013) 
would support claims of backward-looking epigenetic responsibility for health. Recall that this 
theory stipulates health inequalities to be “fair if and only if they are the result of choices for 
which agents can be held responsible” (Voigt 2013, 147). For this reason, it is easy to imagine 
that a luck egalitarian would argue that, since many epigenetic aberrations are the result of 
individual choice and behaviour, we do not have reasons of justice to include treatment of the 
resulting health conditions in the provision of publicly funded healthcare services. At the same 
time, a second kind of appeal to epigenetic responsibility based on its backward-looking 
understanding could be derived from the normative perspective of liberal egalitarians 
(Cappelen and Norheim 2005). Remember that while luck egalitarians consider individual 
choice sufficient ground to ascribe her the burden of their consequences, liberal egalitarians 
draw a distinction between choices and consequences that has strong normative relevance. To 
hold people responsible for the actual consequences of their choices is in fact too extreme for 
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the liberal egalitarian, because the outcomes of individual choices depend also on other 
factors. This is a particularly poignant consideration in the normative appraisal of epigenetic 
responsibility, because some of these mechanisms are also stochastically disrupted (Feinberg 
2014). For this reason, the liberal egalitarian would say that the health-related consequences of 
epigenetically unhealthy habits can partly be regarded as luck for which compensation is 
deemed legitimate (Cappelen and Norheim 2005). Accordingly, one could play out this main 
difference between luck and liberal egalitarians, by pointing out how epigenetic responsibility 
should be allocated on choices (through mechanisms that reward epigenetically healthy 
behaviours or penalize unhealthy ones), rather than health-related consequences.  
The same goes for claims of responsibility for health based on its ‘forward-looking’ 
interpretation. In its liberal-contractualist declension (Feiring 2008), this line of reasoning 
would claim that whether a subject is given an epigenetic information (such as ‘action X’ may 
bring about the epigenetic aberration ‘Y’), and she decides to sign an imaginary contract 
declaring a commitment to undertake activities aimed at avoiding Y, she could be held 
responsible for ignoring the advice (Chadwick and O’Connor 2013). Furthermore, and from a 
utilitarian perspective (Morreim 1995), it could be argued that inculcating epigenetic 
responsibility for health, through a system of economic incentives, may encourage behaviours 
that maximise health and wellbeing in the population. By making epigenetically hazardous 
lifestyles less appealing for citizens these incentives may in fact reduce costs of treatments for 
certain conditions, and at the same time maximise instances of appropriate and healthy 
choices. 
Assessing normative claims of epigenetic responsibility for health 
In reply to these different lines of reasoning on individual epigenetic responsibility for health, 
it is possible to identify a number of considerations, which challenge the validity of such 
normative claims. Besides “playing the cards” of normative arguments against attributions of 
responsibility for health identified in Chapter 4, this section questions the notion of 
‘epigenetic responsibility’ also on different grounds. First, I show how the epistemic validity 
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and utility of the epigenetic knowledge on common diseases is still in its infancy, and how this 
recognition challenges the widely held belief (Hedlund 2012, Chadwick and O’Connor 2013) 
that molecular knowledge of the impact of one’s lifestyle over health strengthens the legitimacy 
of normative claims of responsibility. Second, I also approach another largely underestimated 
aspect of this debate. Namely, I question the epistemic premises behind the emphasis on 
‘epigenetic responsibility’ as a distinct ethical issue of epigenomics rather than genomics 
(Rothstein et al. 2009a, 2009b, Chadwick and O’Connor 2013, Rothstein 2013). This view, I 
show, simply forgets the numerous ways these two fields intertwine (Meloni and Testa 2014) 
and runs the risk of obfuscating their important synergies in the constitutional project of the 
‘empowered patient citizenship’ problematized throughout this work. 
Claims against epigenetic responsibility for health 
Besides arguments in favour of epigenetic responsibility, also a number of counter-arguments 
can be isolated from debates in public health ethics. As we will see in this section, most of 
these lines of reasoning question the struggle to isolate an actor to hold responsible for 
epigenetic aberrations. One way of carrying out this task is to point out that not everyone is 
well-equipped to understand, manage and act upon risk of epigenetic damage, and that 
inculcating responsibility may therefore disadvantage those who cannot take advantage of 
relevant epigenetic knowledge (Hedlund 2012, Chadwick and O’Connor 2013). In essence, 
these are the same points we already encountered in public health debate about the barriers to 
individual freedom in making lifestyle decisions (Brown 2013). According to this view, appeals 
to epigenetic responsibility for health would be morally problematic because they conflate 
causal responsibility for disease aetiology with moral claims of responsible agency for 
unhealthy behaviours. Although it is impossible to deny that as individuals we have a 
fundamental influence on our health, it is far from clear – according to this view – whether we 
are sufficiently free in doing so, and consequently whether we should be held responsible for 
our epigenetically accountable actions. Socioeconomic status and background can be 
consistently shown to impinge upon our freedom as a condition to act responsibly (Pettit 
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2001), and therefore we should reject claims of responsibility also with regard to the safeguard 
of our epigenome. In addition, and specifically to matters of epigenetic responsibility, this line 
of reasoning would also point to the difficulties of understanding the molecular information 
of epigenomics. From such a perspective, not every citizen may be sufficiently able to grasp, 
manage and act upon epigenomic information as to one’s health risks, and – for this reason – 
insisting on epigenetic responsibility may be problematic due to the potential consequences it 
could yield for the most disadvantaged groups of our societies. Only those who are free and 
already better off would benefit from the potential of epigenomics to improve health-related 
decision-making. 
Alternatively to freedom-based rebuttals, also appeals to solidarity may provide 
normative grounds to reject claims of epigenetic responsibility (Buyx and Prainsack 2012). 
Building upon this recent shift in applied ethics, one could identify a number of weaknesses in 
the arguments played out above. First, a solidarity-based approach would point out that an 
excessive emphasis on individual responsibility for one’s epigenetically acquired aberrant traits 
fails to live up to solidarity-based social norms and structures (e.g. welfare systems and social 
welfare arrangements) that represent an explicit commitment to attend to vulnerabilities of 
other members of society (Buyx and Prainsack 2012). Even though the attribution of 
epigenetic responsibility may be a valuable strategy to promote general wellbeing and to 
optimize the use of healthcare resources, over-stating its importance overlooks other values 
founding our collective life, i.e. the ones comprised by the notion of solidarity.  
Second, this line of reasoning would also insist upon the difficulties in pinpointing the 
alleged causal link between individual behaviour, an epigenetic scar and the resulting health 
condition (Buyx and Prainsack 2012). As shown in Chapter 4, solidarity scholars question the 
possibility to ground allegations of moral responsibility on the causal responsibility the 
individual has with regard to a particular (health) outcome. In the view they criticize, 
distributing responsibility means first of all ascertaining that the individual has causally 
produced a state of affairs, and then evaluating whether this action deserves an ascription of 
fault, praise or blame (Miller 2001). The problem with this account is, however, that 
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behaviours are only part of the causes of lifestyle-related diseases. Indeed, these conditions are 
thoroughly multifactorial and include environmental influences, individual biological make-up 
and lifestyles alike. Hence, since we are not in the epistemic condition of disentangling the 
contribution of each of these factors, we should dismiss claims of responsibility in healthcare. 
This general consideration of solidarity scholars is likely to play an important role in 
the discussion of normative matters of epigenetic responsibility. On the one hand, one could 
argue that the main promise of epigenomics is precisely illuminating how these different 
factors interact (genome-wide) to bring about a given health outcome (Wiener 2010). In this 
respect, epigenomics could potentially provide solid ground to claims of causal responsibility 
questioned by solidarity scholars, hence discarding their critique of these appeals to 
responsibility for health. As we have seen in Chapter 6, the idea of a life-long epigenetic read-
out (mapping the continuous plastic modifications of the epigenome to environmental and 
lifestyle exposures) could disembroil the different contribution that all kinds of factors bring to 
the development of a condition. For instance, we have noted how a new conceptual model for 
the understanding of disease aetiology of CVDs emerges from epigenetics (Baccarelli et al. 
2010), which might help to explain how environmental and lifestyle factors respectively 
impose aberrant and individually unique gene expression patterns in an individual’s lifetime.  
On the other hand, one could also point out that it is debated whether or not 
epigenomics will extricate these interactions, and that this recognition should count in the 
evaluation of normative claims of epigenetic responsibility. This line of reasoning would 
emphasize that the more we plunge into the epigenetically mediated interaction between 
lifestyles, environmental exposures and genetic background the more we note how the 
boundaries between these three players get fundamentally blurred (Meloni and Testa 2014). 
The molecular and integrative language of the epigenome obfuscates – rather than illuminates 
– the border between what counts as genetic or lifestyle- and/or environmentally-induced 
effect, or even between what is nature and what is nurture (Landecker and Panofsky 2013, 
Meloni and Testa 2014). According to this view, assessing the contribution of each of these 
factors to our epigenome-patterning becomes therefore not only an unanswerable question 
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that jeopardizes claims of causal responsibility – like solidarity scholars think (Buyx and 
Prainsack 2012) – but also an underestimation of the holistic explanatory power of epigenome 
maps. Rather than striving to isolate an actor to be held responsible for each aberrant 
epigenetic influence, endorsing this view leans towards investigating the value of this 
knowledge in the appreciation of the structural factors (from genetic, to behavioural and 
environmental ones) that together shape our health. An epistemic question that seems decisive 
in establishing whether claims of responsibility acquire a new force through epigenetic 
knowledge. 
Does state-of the-art epigenetic knowledge strengthen normative claims of 
responsibility for health? 
To this stage of the present analysis, advances in epigenomics do not represent “any changes 
in kind” (Hedlund 2012, 178) with regard to existing normative matters of responsibility in the 
public health ethics literature. As we have seen above, these matters can in fact be addressed 
by resorting to existing general arguments on individual responsibility for health. Yet, most of 
the authors debating epigenetic responsibility are convinced that this knowledge does “make a 
change in degree” in resolving general ascriptions of responsibility for health same arguments 
(Hedlund 2012, 178). According to this view, apportioning responsibility through epigenomics 
arguably acquires an epistemic status, which is rather different from the one of the 
epidemiological data on which this debate originally grows out (Rothstein et al. 2009a, 2009b). 
Rather than pointing to the association of a given behaviour (e.g. unhealthy eating) and a 
relevant health outcome (e.g. cardio-vascular diseases), epigenomics is bestowed the potential 
to provide a precise knowledge of the molecular chain of events (or ‘conduit’; see Landecker 
and Panofsky 2013) that starts from a certain lifestyle- and/or environmentally-related factor 
(e.g. a nutrient like fatty acid) and causally leads to disease development. And for this reason, 
different scholars agree that arguments in favour of allegations of personal responsibility for 
health acquire, through the language of epigenomics, a whole new strength (Hedlund 2012, 
Chadwick and O’Connor 2013). This epigenetic information, they argue, has “significant 
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implications for the extent to which people are in a position to make a choice about the kind 
of life they want to live” (Chadwick and O’Connor 2013, 465). 
 This recognition deserves at least to be problematized. It is in fact very common in 
contemporary biomedicine to interpret new discoveries as challenging, or blurring the 
distinction between knowledge and its application. As argued by Nowotny and Testa (2011), 
casting a molecular glance to the understanding of human diseases, has had the effect of 
transforming knowledge-production into action. In one sentence: “understanding life means 
changing life” (Nowotny and Testa 2011, 5): a conceptual move which is not neutral from a 
moral standpoint. Once we illuminate the molecular conduit (Landecker and Panfosky 2013) 
from nutrients, through the epigenome, to cardiovascular disease risk (just to give an 
example), we inaugurate (or most likely tip the balance in already existing) normative 
discourses about values and expectations. Knowing what is the effect of our dietary habits on 
our epigenome, and consequently on our health, fortifies options of “what ought to be” done to 
protect its integrity (Nowotny and Testa 2011, 6).  
Yet, a decade of genomics should have probably taught us to be careful in concluding 
that higher quantity of molecular information regarding our biological make-up automatically 
results in improved quality of decisions (i.e. capacity, or opportunity to make better decisions) 
with regard to our health (Caulfield et al. 2009). What seems to be absent from debates on 
epigenetic responsibility is, in other words, an appreciation of all the conditions under which 
this knowledge qualifies as valid, reliable and actionable knowledge to improve one’s health 
(Mill and Heijmans 2013). Besides the question above-mentioned as to whether epigenomics 
will allow discriminating between different factors of disease aetiology, another open question 
here is whether this knowledge is sufficiently valid and useful so as to better orient agency. 
Like any biological test used in medical practice, also epigenome-based analyses, which are 
currently under development (see infra Chapter 6), will have to be evaluated in three main 
respects before translating into concrete possibilities and benefits to citizens (Hunter et al. 
2008). This means that epigenomics ought necessarily to comply with a number of already-
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existing criteria for the validation of medical information, before considering this knowledge 
as having a concrete impact upon individual behaviour and responsibility. 
First, it is still unclear whether epigenome-based analysis fares good with regard to its 
analytic validity (i.e. the capacity of a test to detect a given trait). Epigenetic landscapes are in 
fact tissue-specific and this may have an effect over the sensitivity and specificity of epigenetic 
testing. Differently from genetic variables (e.g. single nucleotide polymorphisms), which 
potentially (albeit still limitedly) can be identified in all possible cells of the human body, 
epigenetic analyses suffer from the difficulty of assuming that the effect of a given marker (e.g. 
DNA methylation) is detectable in easily accessible surrogate tissues, or in a tissue which is 
different from the one relevant to the condition under study. This means that, since each 
specialized type of cell is expected to have different epigenetic profiles, a change in the 
epigenetic pattern linked to a condition may be difficult to detect in the available cell type, 
such as (most typically) blood (Jones and Liang 2012). Despite this complication, a widespread 
consensus can be currently found in the scientific community as to the importance of 
addressing this main limitation of epigenetic studies, and indeed a number of studies have 
already focused on the identification of common epigenetic patterns across different cell types 
(Michels 2012). 
Besides the reservations arising from the tissue-specificity of epigenetic profiles, it is 
worth taking into account another limitation for the current biological significance of 
epigenetic knowledge. It is in fact far from clear that the information gathered from the 
available tissue (e.g. peripheral blood) may meet standards of clinical validity (i.e. the capacity of 
a test to diagnose a condition and predict an outcome). Investigating the epigenome is 
supposed to detect specific features of disease aetiology (e.g. the impact of DNA methylation 
on tumour prognosis) before counting as relevant risk-profiling or diagnostic test for 
individual patients. Unfortunately, most of these studies are currently still based on correlative 
analyses, which question their capacity to detect these conditions adequately (Mill and 
Heijmans 2013). Even though measurements of epigenetic associations are “strongly 
suggestive of being causal” and can “provide clues about underlying mechanisms”, the 
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functional consequences of these changes are “not yet understood” (Mill and Heijmans 2013, 
589). These associations have higher or lower credibility that question their predictive value, 
especially because of the limitations inherent in the available technologies for quantification of 
epigenetic modifications (Mill and Heijmans 2013). 
Finally, another set of difficulties identifiable in current standards of epigenetic 
knowledge relates to their clinical utility (i.e. the cost-benefit analysis of introducing a particular 
test in clinical practice). Specifically this criterion points to the necessity of estimating, before 
using epigenomic information in public health, that such information predicts disease risk 
better than other phenotypic biomarkers; that cost-effective interventions exist for those at 
increased risk; and that epigenetic risk information is sufficiently actionable to motivate 
changes of behaviour for the concerned individual. Otherwise stated, a number of questions 
may need to be answered before giving free reign to epigenetic knowledge in directing and 
delineating individual responsibility for one’s health: does this information allow treating the 
condition likely to be developed? If so, is it likely that people act on the grounds of the 
knowledge acquired via the test? Has the trade-off between the psychological impact of the 
test and the possible advantages of the knowledge produced, been assessed?  
It seems that most of the available knowledge on the epigenetic roots of common 
diseases fails with regard to these fairly reasonable objectives (Mill and Heijmans 2013). This is 
not meant to deny the important promises and hopes that epigenomics may most likely bring to 
the future of medicine (see infra Chapter 6). The point here is a rather different one. Namely, 
the analysis above shows that the impact of epigenomics on the notion of personal 
responsibility for health demands taking such knowledge with a grain of salt rather than 
subscribing to the “socio-technical hypes” and consequent expectations it may produce 
(Meloni and Testa 2014, 6). Epigenomics promises to replace knowledge of the association 
between one’s lifestyle or environmental exposures and health outcomes, with a fine-grained 
appreciation of the molecular effects of these influences on our body. And yet, this can hardly 
be regarded as automatically urging us to act upon this knowledge. Whether or not 
epigenomics makes “a change in degree” (Hedlund 2012, 178) for normative claims of 
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responsibility to protect one’s epigenome and health depends rather on its capacity to provide 
a reliable, valid and actionable set of knowledge about health-related molecular effects of one’s 
behaviour or environmental conditions. This means that the value of epigenomics information 
in guiding individual behaviour, responsibility and decision-making will very much depend on 
its capacity to comply with the already established standards of analytic validity, clinical validity 
and clinical utility discussed in this section of my work. 
Why does responsibility matter for epigenomics more than genomics? 
Finally, there is another issue attached to the notion of epigenetic responsibility, as it is 
currently debated in the philosophical and sociological literature (Rothstein et al. 2009a, 
2009b, Hedlund 2012, Rothstein 2013). The emphasis on normative matters of epigenetic 
responsibility grows out of the search for specificities in the societal impact of epigenomics vis 
à vis that of genomics. Many authors agree that a foundational issue in determining the ethical, 
legal and social implications (ELSI) of epigenomics regards an appreciation of whether 
challenges raised by epigenomics differ from those of genetics and genomics (Rothstein et al. 
2009a, 2009b, Chadwick and O’Connor 2013, Rothstein 2013). Answering this question, they 
argue, means looking at the current biomedical literature on epigenomics, and then identifying 
in what respects this endeavour differs from genomics in an ethically, legally and/or socially 
relevant manner.  
In general, this line of reasoning builds upon the recognition that epigenomics unveils 
the missing link between one’s genetic endowment and the number of environmental stimuli 
that determine health and disease. Epigenomics, these scholars argue, can illuminate – 
differently from genomics – the early-life events that cause an epigenetic drift in one’s 
susceptibility to diseases (e.g. the Dutch hunger famine discussed in Chapter 6; see Heijmans 
et al. 2008), and the fundamental contribution of environmental and social mediation to one’s 
health (e.g. the bio-dosimeter of health inequalities in Glasgow analysed in Chapter 6; see 
McGuinness et al. 2012). Furthermore, and again in difference from genomics, epigenomics 
unveils the malleability and plasticity of our biological make-up with respect to all of these 
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exposures, as well as the potential reversibility of their effects (Landecker and Panofsky 2013). 
It is therefore the fact that epigenetic traits are susceptible to intervention (e.g. changes in 
lifestyles and/or environmental exposures), which posits – for these authors – ethical 
questions about responsibility for ameliorating one’s epigenetic risks that do not pertain to 
genetic medicine (Rothstein et al. 2009a, 2009b, Hedlund 2012, Rothstein 2013).  
With regard to this view, I maintain that it is undoubted that the information gained 
through epigenomics evokes an imaginary of direct applications that, in contrast to genomics, 
appears to fall within everyone’s means. Epigenomics makes visible, in a molecular language, the 
effects that one’s unhealthy habits have over health. In doing so, it provides relevant 
information that can be prima facie enacted more easily than knowledge of one’s genetic 
susceptibilities. Changing one’s lifestyle is in fact within everyone’s range of possibilities: a line 
of reasoning that does not apply to ‘changing the genes we are born with’, or acting upon 
one’s genetic susceptibilities (Hedlund 2012). An important reason why ‘genetic responsibility 
arguments’ have rarely been proposed is, in other words, that no effective action can be taken 
to eliminate genetic risks (Resnik 2014). Besides continuing health monitoring, or the very 
recent progresses in gene therapy for a limited number of conditions (Aiuti et al. 2013), or the 
limited preventative measures available for some conditions (e.g. radical pre-emptive surgery 
to remove the risk of developing breast associated to BRCA1 aberrant mutations), very little 
possibilities of intervention exist for a genetic condition. Things stand differently, however, if 
we analyse claims of ‘epigenetic responsibility’. The plasticity and reversibility of epigenetic 
traits gets often interpreted as subverting the view ascribing to the genome the status of an 
intangible inherited set of biological predispositions. The epigenome is regarded as a digital 
representation of many activities that fall within individual control and points to the adoption 
of lifestyle-related changes to eradicate the source of epigenetic risk for which responsibility is 
evoked (Meloni and Testa 2014). In a nutshell, epigenomics differs from genomics because it 
opens up for increasing control over the environmental factors interacting with genes, and 
illuminates the extent to which an actor can make an influence over the aberrant drifts these 
interactions can bring about. Hence, it is for this reason that matters of individual 
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responsibility are more likely to be given a higher relevance in the societal appraisal of 
epigenomics, than the one they were given in the case of genomics (Chadwick and O’Connor 
2013). What needs to be clarified in this view, however, is why knowledge of the internal (to 
the organism) mechanisms of reaction to environmental stimuli improves the opportunities 
for control outside the organism. 
Besides this concern, this view runs the risk of overlooking at least two important 
considerations. First, it is unclear whether it is feasible to hold epigenomics and genomics as 
two separated endeavours like most of these scholars propose (Chadwick and O’Connor 2013, 
Rothstein 2013). The view they endorse, according to which epigenomics parallels genomics 
in the production of societal and ethical challenges, simply forgets the numerous ways in 
which these two fields intertwine (Meloni and Testa 2014). On the one hand, we have already 
seen how difficult it is to draw a line in the definition of what counts as epigenetic and what 
counts as genetic (see infra Chapter 6). On the other, epigenetics is not a way to investigate the 
aetiological quandaries of most common diseases affecting human health that is alternative to 
genetics. Rather, it is a quantum leap in the study of human diseases inaugurated and 
reinforced by a decade of genomic research and medicine (see infra Chapter 6). In this respect, 
the epistemic premises behind the emphasis on ‘epigenetic responsibility’ as an ethical issue of 
epigenomics rather than genomics, are much more nuanced than most of these scholars 
believe. Identifying challenges of responsibility as solely a consequence of epigenetics means, 
in a nutshell, overlooking the multiple interconnections between these two endeavours 
(Meloni and Testa 2014). 
Second, it seems odd to claim that epigenomics actually imports the discourse of 
responsibility for health into contemporary molecular medicine. An increasing attention is in 
fact currently paid also to the idea that we should be held responsible for addressing our 
genetic risks (Resnik 2014). From genetic testing and preventative measures for genetic 
predispositions, to pre-natal diagnostic or screening techniques (e.g. amniocentesis, chorionic 
villus sampling, enrichment of fetal cells from maternal blood), a number of scholars have 
already pointed out how genetics impacts on the notion of responsibility for both one’s health 
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(Resnik 2014) and that of future generations (Wilkinson 2010). Under this interpretation, 
epigenomics does not pose a novel and molecularized ethical demand to act responsibly in order 
to ameliorate one’s health risks. Rather, it may only “succeed” in dismissing what genetic 
medicine has already started to challenge: namely, the idea that we cannot control the genes 
we are born with (Meloni and Testa 2014). On the one hand, through genomics we are called 
upon acting responsibly to control the health-related impact of our genetic risks, by 
undergoing continuing health monitoring or adopting the preventative measures available for 
some conditions (e.g. radical pre-emptive surgery to remove the risk of developing breast 
associated to BRCA1 aberrant mutations). On the other, the contribution of epigenomics to 
normative matters of responsibility demands protecting one’s genome from the numerous 
external assaults to its healthy functioning, by changing one’s lifestyle or environmental 
exposures.  
The view I propose here challenges therefore the widely held belief that epigenomics 
gives rise to a unique emphasis upon normative questions of responsibility. If responsibility 
matters in the societal appraisal of epigenomics is not because, as most scholars believe 
(Rothstein et al. 2009a, 2009b, Hedlund 2012, Rothstein 2013), epigenetic science differs from 
genetics in this ethically relevant manner. Quite the contrary, epigenomics should be regarded 
as moving ahead the reconfiguration of personal responsibility for one’s health to which 
genomic medicine has already contributed. By expanding the possibilities and domains of 
agency where such normative claims can be directed, epigenomics is no more than reinforcing 
a much broader discourse of responsibility to act as stewards of our health (or to even prevent 
harms to future generation), leveraged by molecular knowledge of our (epi)genetic 
individuality (Rose and Novas 2005). In one sentence, claims of responsibility to protect our 
epigenomes should be addressed as a fundamental part of the constitutional project of the 
‘empowered patient citizenship’ problematized throughout this work. 
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Interim Conclusions 
All of these thoughts combined provide us reasons to question apportions of either causal or 
moral responsibility to individuals for particular epigenetic changes. Beyond the issue of 
ascribing freedom of choice to individuals in making epigenetically aberrant decisions (Brown 
2013), another problem regards the emphasis put on individual responsibility, which 
overlooks the importance of socially robust practices of solidarity in our collective life (Buyx 
and Prainsack 2012). In addition, another set of problems identifiable in the notion of 
epigenetic responsibility deals with the troubles of explaining how lifestyles alone causally 
affect the epigenome. This recognition should rather be countered with the possibility that 
epigenomics may actually flatten the differences among factors (from genetic, to behavioural 
and environmental ones) of disease aetiology in a unique holistic language that quantifies how 
together they shape our health (Meloni and Testa 2014).  
In addition, I also questioned the idea that normative claims of epigenetic 
responsibility “make a change in degree” (Hedlund 2012, 178) in comparison to the same 
kinds of issues in public health ethics. With regard to this, I showed that unless epigenomics 
provides a reliable, accessible and actionable set of knowledge about the molecular effects of 
one’s behaviour or environmental conditions, this alleged “change in degree” has very little 
ground and resembles more a “socio-technical hype” (Meloni and Testa 2014, 6), rather than a 
cogent enhancement of “choice about the kind of life [people] want to live” (Chadwick and 
O’Connor 2013, 465).  
Finally, I also turned to the overlapping consensus (Rothstein et al. 2009a, 2009b, 
Chadwick and O’Connor 2013, Rothstein 2013) as to the specificity of issues of responsibility 
in epigenomics, as opposed to those raised by genomics. As to this matter, I proposed that we 
have reasons to believe that epigenetic science does not differ from genetics in this ethically 
relevant manner. Quite the contrary, epigenomics should be regarded as partaking to the 
broader reconfiguration of personal responsibility for one’s health, which takes advantage of 
molecular imaginaries and knowledge of our (epi)genetic individuality, at the basis of the 
‘empowered patient citizenship’ I identified in this work. To the objective of fleshing out the 
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contribution of epigenomics to this political project, I now turn for the remaining of this 
chapter. 
Epigenetic responsibility for health: an empowerment approach 
The contribution of the empowerment approach I propose to the appraisal of normative 
claims of epigenetic responsibility can follow two pathways. On the one hand, my 
understanding of empowerment could be seen as providing further normative ground to the 
rebuttal of apportions of epigenetic responsibility at the individual level (Hedlund 2012, 
Chadwick and O’Connor 2013, Rothstein 2013). On the other, it is worth investigating how 
epigenomic knowledge – with all the provisos thus far enumerated – represents a unique kind 
of contribution to the patient citizenship project of empowerment in EBRs and Personalised 
Medicine (PM).  
As shown in Chapter 4, I argued that responsibility matters could hardly be solved, 
from the premises of empowerment, through a mere focus on freedom-of-choice as a 
condition for attributions of moral accountability. Quite the contrary, the empowerment 
approach frames individual agency as inextricably related to the capacity of the individual to 
operate transformations at the level of interpersonal relationships, community action and 
political agency (Wallerstein and Bernstein 1988, Laverack 2005, Tengland 2008, 2012). 
Attending to the moral judgement of individual responsibility for one’s epigenetic aberrant 
states means therefore, to the view defended in this work, examining whether the individual 
(and not merely her choices) is in a state of freedom-as-mastery of the politically and socially 
contextual process that is expected to produce the empowering outcome.  
This suggestion naturally prompts us to rethinking the dichotomy between individual 
and collective epigenetic responsibility (Chadwick and O’Connor 2013), and to rather look at 
the potential ways to promote an ‘ecological model’ (Minkler 1999) of epigenetic 
responsibility. The normative declension of this notion would point to (i) questions of access 
to relevant epigenetic information and knowledge; (ii) to the importance of epigenetic literacy 
as not only an understanding of a set of instructions (Jennings 2003), but also as a capacity to 
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act upon this knowledge in a social context; (iii) to the existence of effective resources and 
opportunities provided to an individual, or a community to act upon this information; (iv) to 
the importance of creating an active public with common values, needs and goals with regard 
to aberrant epigenetic states; (v) to the fundamental role and obligation on the side of 
professionals to provide epigenetic counselling through empowering means and relationships 
(see infra Chapter 2 and 5). Only if these kinds of measures are taken up, we are likely to 
obtain the conditions for empowered freedom at the basis of an ecological model of 
apportioning epigenetic responsibility.  
But besides this conceptual movement from empowerment to epigenomics, as a 
suitable framework to address the social concerns mobilized by epigenetic facts, there is 
another potential synergy between them which rather looks at what epigenomics can do for 
empowerment. I have already reiterated the multiple ways in which epigenomics promises to 
unveil the molecular effects of lifestyles and environmental exposures in an accessible, unified 
read-out (or ‘biodosimeter’; see Landecker and Panofsky 2013) of one’s epigenome (see infra 
Chapter 6). At the same time, I have also expressed (in this chapter) some legitimate concern 
as to the current limitations in the analytic, clinical validity and clinical utility of this knowledge 
that, at least for the moment, demand taking this promise as an encouraging but yet unrealized 
one. Nevertheless, it is worth noting how, should this promise be fulfilled, epigenomics will 
most likely revolutionize epidemiological data, values, conceptual premises and facts in our 
understanding of public health. Health and disease, needs and desires, pathological and social 
conditions, health inequalities and disadvantage all get embedded in a discourse of digital 
maps of DNA methylation, chromatin modifications and genome expression (Meloni and 
Testa 2014). We have already witnessed how this potential of epigenomics may soon become 
reality, in the discussion of the seminal study by McGuinness and colleagues (2012) on the 
epigenetic roots of health inequalities in Glasgow. Levels of DNA methylation have the 
potential to make visible (Nowotny and Testa 2011) how biographies and community-
membership, social structures and barriers get embodied through the porous molecular 
conduit that connects our genome to its environment. This is – in essence – the descriptive 
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powerful narrative inaugurated by epigenomics, which becomes also a normative one when 
regarded as a premise for the development of public policies, as well as individual and 
collective action for change (Landecker and Panofsky 2013).  
In particular, this paradigm-shift in the understanding of the social and biological roots 
of health and disease outlines a promising social program when juxtaposed to the substantive 
foundations of empowerment I laid in this work. It has already been pointed out how the 
language of epigenomics may become a useful heuristics for research on and regulation of our 
social life (Dupras et al. 2012, Landecker and Panofsky 2013). To this recognition I add that it 
is possible that, under certain conditions, this project may become a genuinely empowering one. 
Sufficiently valid, reliable and actionable epigenetic knowledge may provide comprehensive 
information on one’s health disadvantages and social deprivations. While confirming the 
direct link among environment, lifestyles and individual health outcomes, epigenomics can 
illuminate the limitations of one’s power to remedy to health problems or mitigate the 
structural effects that social arrangements have over the patterning of health in our societies 
(Marmot and Wilkinson 2003, World Health Organization 2013). This is the empowering step 
I envisage in the social unfolding of epigenomics, to which my normative analysis of 
empowerment could provide ethical guidance. Through the deployment of sufficiently 
supportive counselling services (see infra Chapter 2), epigenetic knowledge may constitute a 
genuine opportunity for seizing responsibility (see infra Chapter 4) with regard to one’s vital 
goals and health (see infra Chapter 3). Rather than being understood as a technological device 
lending itself to the dubious (for both moral and epistemic reasons) political objective of 
inculcating responsibility for health, epigenomics can become – through the lens of my 
account of empowerment – a liberating set of knowledge that inspires collective action, 
proactive patient citizenship (see infra Chapter 1), and political change in the environmental 
and societal conditions that have a power over individual health.  
A new epigenetic biopolitics is entailed in the developments and applications of 
epigenomic science to healthcare contexts, which will most likely reframe the embodiment of 
people’s social conditions in a descriptive and revealing molecular language (Meloni and Testa 
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2014). One possibility of governing its rise, I suggest, is putting this endeavour under the aegis 
of empowerment where such knowledge may inform categories of policy-making, identity-
making and entitlements, as well as providing an operative map of systematic and socially 
robust health disadvantages in the general population. Plunging into the biographical and 
biological roots of health may be regarded, if we attend to the normative perspective I 
proposed, as genuinely serving the value of an empowered patient citizenship in biomedicine.  
General conclusions of the thesis 
The analytical pathway followed by this thesis is a long and complex trajectory. I started from 
mapping a “new wave” of empowerment thinking in healthcare policy-making, epitomized by 
the emergence of numerous empowerment-based reforms (EBRs) (see infra Chapter 1). I 
observed that a reconfiguration of the substantive foundations of the approach has taken 
place in the last decade thanks to a number of EBRs emphasizing the alleged promise of 
empowerment to produce an ‘anti-paternalistic shift in responsibility for health’. In 
scrutinizing this “patient revolution” (Richards et al. 2013), I have resorted to the idea that a 
patient citizenship project is underlying EBRs, and that empowerment is the key political device 
to reconfigure the contours of citizenry in the personalised future of medicine.  
Starting from this recognition, I argued that this paradigm-shift is likely to mobilize 
some relevant social and ethical concerns, which mainly revolve around the three main 
evaluative domains (or sticks) in the concept (or bundle) of empowerment heralding this 
reconfiguration of agency in healthcare. First, a substantive matter of controversy relates to 
the promise of this approach to promote an anti-paternalistic model of professional-patient 
relationship (see infra Chapter 2). Building upon some critiques to the effectiveness of 
empowerment in delivering this promise (Buchanan 2000, Salmon 2004, Juengst et al. 2012), I 
identified a paradox in the ethical appreciation of (some accounts of) empowerment. 
According to this view, one of the potential outcomes of EBRs is that professionals may mask 
their paternalistic interferences with the use of the emancipatory and anti-paternalistic 
ideology of empowerment. In order to overcome this issue I suggested that, if empowerment 
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has to be praised for its non-paternalistic attributes, the element of increased control (and 
responsibility) over health should be an important element of patient-professional 
interactions. Changing the power balance by limiting professional control is, for the view I 
defended, of pivotal importance to attain the goals of empowerment. 
Second, I also approached another concern arising from the emphasis of EBRs on the 
promotion of responsibility for health. This issue, which I called the charge of healthism, 
highlights the possibility that resorting to the language of empowerment may actually 
constitute a way of imposing to citizens an obligation to conform to social expectations with 
regard to their health (see infra Chapter 3). From the perspective of these critics (Cribb 2005, 
Holland 2007, Veitch 2010), the main problem with EBRs lies in the ambiguity between 
enhancing individual opportunities to seize responsibility for determining one’s health (e.g. 
making a decision with regard to a given treatment, or deciding what kinds of services to 
request), and inculcating a responsibility to protect one’s health (e.g. supporting the system’s 
efficiency and sustainability through the adoption of healthier behaviours). The charge of 
healthism, I argued, can be debunked by looking at different understandings of the value of 
health in the broader framework of empowerment. In particular, I posited that the elements 
of self-determination and control in the appeals to responsibility isolated in EBRs clash with a 
deterministic account of health (Boorse 1975, 1997), and rather point to the necessity of 
embracing a holistic understanding of health (Nordenfelt 1993, 1995, 2001, 2012, forthcoming) 
as a suitable notion of health to attend to the substantive commitments in the empowerment 
bundle of EBRs. 
A main issue emerged in conclusion of this analysis. Opening up the value of health to 
a relativistic and holistic understanding runs the risk of considering all choices with regard to 
the preferred levels of health as equally valuable or responsible. This view would ignore the 
detrimental effects of social arrangements on those who are powerless, and may overlook the 
importance of addressing unfavourable social conditions to which people may adapt their 
chosen levels of health (Venkatapuram 2012). In order to counter this issue, I then moved to 
an analysis of what kind of choices may count as genuinely responsible ones in EBRs (see infra 
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Chapter 4). In addressing this issue, I started from a reconstruction of the main arguments 
(Morreim 1995, Cappelen and Norheim 2005, Feiring 2008, Segall 2009, Voigt 2013) and 
counter-arguments (Minkler 1999, Wilkinson 1999, Buyx and Prainsack 2012, Brown 2013) 
for normative claims of responsibility for one’s health. Then I discussed how an 
empowerment perspective on these matters points to an ecological model of attribution of 
responsibility (Minkler 1999), which emphasizes both the political opportunities in which health-
related choices are made, and the social influences that shape individual lifestyle and 
behaviours. 
Combining the analysis of these three substantive domains of empowerment in EBRs, 
I then moved to a potential application of the normative insights gathered in Part 1 of the 
thesis (see infra Chapter 5). In problematizing different methods for the evaluation of 
empowerment interventions in health promotion (Wallerstein 2006, Herbert et al. 2009, 
Hudon et al. 2010), I distilled some suggestions for the development of measurements 
grounded on the perspective I proposed in this work. Differently from what is currently held 
in the literature on metrics of empowerment, I suggested that the Pathways of research – 
focussing either on instruments for psychological empowerment, or health-related outcomes 
of empowerment, or community-based empowerment – should rather aim at integrating all of 
these dimensions in the assessment of its outcomes. This, I concluded, may actually capture 
the multi-level dimension of the notion of empowerment in EBRs, which spans across 
individual enablement through professional support, health-related decision-making, and 
community-based outcomes alike. 
In Part 2 of the thesis I then put to test this normative theorization of empowerment 
in the societal appraisal of epigenomics. I started from a comprehensive map of the 
contribution of epigenomics to Personalised Medicine (PM), and consequently of the political 
project inaugurated by EBRs (see infra Chapter 6). In particular, I identified the promises of 
epigenomics in the advancement of the personalization of care with regard to three important 
areas of healthcare: cardio-vascular diseases, neuropsychiatric disorders, and cancer. From 
lifestyle behaviours and environmental pollutants, to stress reactions and cognitive functions, 
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the main potential of epigenomics is the construction of a unified digital heuristics (Meloni 
and Testa 2014) for mapping the unfolding of the genome to external stimuli. In doing so, the 
upshot of epigenomics’ influence on PM is the unification of both biological and biographical 
roots of health and disease. The flip side of this monumental shift in the understanding of the 
plasticity of both disease aetiology and health outcomes, I argued, is the creation of an 
imaginary of individual and collective responsibilities to protect one’s epigenome and 
consequently one’s health (Hedlund 2012, Chadwick and O’Connor 2013). 
Starting from this recognition, I finally problematized in this chapter the emerging 
notion of ‘epigenetic responsibility’. First, I played out some normative arguments we 
encountered in Chapter 4 – grounded on considerations of freedom and solidarity – to 
evaluate claims of individual epigenetic responsibility (Buyx and Prainsack 2012, Brown 2013). 
Second, I questioned the recognition that, through epigenomics, claims of responsibility 
acquire a new strength provided by the molecular knowledge of one’s contribution to disease 
development (Hedlund 2012, Chadwick and O’Connor 2013). In countering this view, I 
argued that we should be careful as to the current explanatory power of epigenome maps in 
illuminating lifestyle’s contribution to disease development. And that this recognition 
challenges the view that epigenomics promotes a new discourse of responsibility in healthcare. 
Still many challenges are waiting ahead for the translation of epigenomics into healthcare 
practice, which question the analytic validity, clinical validity, and clinical utility of this 
knowledge. State-of-the-art epigenomic medicine is far from providing sufficiently reliable and 
usable knowledge to direct individuals in acquiring responsibility for the numerous 
epigenetically mediated influences of their health. Third, I also challenged the notion of 
epigenetic responsibility as an allegedly specific societal implication of epigenomics rather than 
genomics. With regard to this, I showed that it is also dubious that epigenomics may represent 
the link between responsibility matters and contemporary biomedicine. It is rather the case that 
the notion of epigenetic responsibility will build upon the already present emphasis on genetic 
responsibility, and provide further biotechnological resources to project of the ‘empowered 
patient citizenship’ in PM and EBRs. 
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Finally, I turned to an attempt of understanding epigenetic responsibility from my 
account of empowerment. As to this matter, I noted how normative claims of accountability 
to protect one’s epigenome could be dismissed on the basis of an empowerment approach to 
moral responsibility. However, I also identified another possible synergy between the 
endeavour of epigenomics and the normative framework of empowerment proposed. 
Provided that epigenome-based analysis can acquire sufficient epistemic value to illuminate 
the societal and biological influences of health (Landecker and Panofsky 2013, Meloni and 
Testa 2014), I showed how epigenomics may represent indeed an empowering technology.  
In a remarkable display of potential synergy, I concluded, these two endeavours of 
contemporary biomedicine may mutually shape their respective normative and epistemic 
orders alike. And to this purpose, I hope, the analysis presented in this work may provide a 
desirable ethical guidance.   
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Post-script: a forward look on Empowerment-based Reforms 
The intersection between empowerment and epigenomics at the basis of this thesis has many 
implications for the design and implementation of what I called “Empowerment-based 
Reforms” (EBRs). First of all, it is worth emphasizing how the normative foundations of 
empowerment defended throughout this work stand in sharp contrast with already existing 
and popular uses of the concept in the policy-making literature (Colombo et al. 2012). Rather 
than pointing to the need of opening up the healthcare system’s rationale and functioning to 
consumerist views of healthcare delivery (see infra Chapter 1), my account of empowerment 
points to the radicalism entailed in the approach (Tengland 2008), and to the importance of 
focusing on the broader societal conditions for fostering empowered health-related agency 
(see infra Chapters 2, 3 and 4). From the role of non-paternalistic professional support, to the 
relevance of theories of health and ecological thinking about individual responsibility, my 
normative theorization of empowerment underlines the plethora of social and relational 
obligations that could ground substantive claims of empowerment in healthcare reform 
proposals. This recognition raises an important question as to the implications that my 
account of empowerment may have over the development healthcare policies. On the one 
hand, it could be argued that the different substantive commitments at the basis of my 
understanding of empowerment call for abandoning this concept in developing reforms for 
the healthcare system. To this view, the approach to empowerment I develop in the thesis is 
more cognate to established scholarship on the role and value of public participation in 
biomedicine and science citizenship (Prainsack forthcoming), than to the policy literature on 
empowerment. And for this reason, one crucial implication of my thesis would demand 
acknowledging that ethical foundations of the approach I defend clash with mainstream uses 
of the concept, to the extent that they require rather refraining from the language of 
empowerment.   
On the other hand, a different reading of my work could stress the continuity that my 
understanding of empowerment establishes with some specific accounts of the concept in 
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disciplines such as liberatory pedagogy, social psychology, mental health and health promotion 
(Freire 1972, Rappaport 1987, Wallerstein and Bernstein 1988, Rodwell 1996, Laverack and 
Labontè 2000). According to this interpretation, it would be rather worth emphasizing that 
one result of my work is discriminating between more or less ethically problematic 
interpretations of empowerment (i.e. traditional accounts of empowerment vis à vis its ‘new 
wave’ in policy-making). Consequently, one its implications may be better allowing the 
evaluation of policies that resort to this concept, or alternatively provide ethical guidance to 
the use of empowerment as a basis for reform proposals. Otherwise stated, rather than 
focusing on the potential conceptual confusions created by competing accounts of 
empowerment, this reading of my work would rather stress the importance of philosophical 
analysis for solving the political and ethical controversies attached to current uses of the 
concept.  
Secondly, it is also important to stress not only how the conclusions of my thesis 
affirm the need of normative thinking for the achievement of empowering social programs 
(see infra Chapters 2, 3 and 4), but also how relevant could the role of (certain types) of 
knowledge be for the constitution of empowered citizenry. By scrutinizing the impact of 
epigenetic knowledge on the development and implementation of Personalised Medicine 
(PM), Part 2 of the thesis highlights in fact the importance that this information may play in 
instating, developing and delivering an empowerment program in healthcare. Epigenetics may 
thus be regarded, under certain conditions (see infra Chapter 7), as a type of information that 
could fundamentally contribute to the attainment of the empowerment aims discussed in this 
work. Better to say, it is precisely through the language of epigenomics that empowering 
processes in healthcare may take place. As argued in Chapter 7 of the thesis, drawing from 
examples in the scientific literature (McGuinness et al. 2012), a growing emphasis is currently 
being put on the role of epigenetic knowledge in tackling social inequalities and healthcare 
disparities. This means that another implications of this work lies in the opportunity that 
epigenetic information may become a constitutive aspect of policies addressing the societal 
conditions that have an impact upon individual health, thus mobilizing the political and social 
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responsibilities for health attached to empowerment processes. Without further indulging on 
the details of this potentially liberating endeavour, epigenetics may represent what Landecker 
and Panofsky (2013) have called a ‘bio-dosimeter’ of health inequalities: the translation of 
social categories such as ‘deprivation’, ‘social determinants of health’, or ‘health disadvantage’ 
into the digital format of epigenetic modifications, and functional aberrations of genomic 
regulations (Meloni and Testa 2014). 
Thirdly, and building upon the above recognition, one of the major implications of 
this thesis is to draw attention on the role that juxtaposing these two technologies of 
innovation – i.e. the political discourse of empowerment and the molecular language of 
epigenomics – may play in the broader context of contemporary biopolitics and biomedicine 
(Rose 2007).  Undoubtedly, the proliferation of studies in human populations on the 
epigenetic biomarkers of social conditions and adversities will contribute to the on-going 
renegotiations of citizenship and patient responsibilities inaugurated by molecular medicine. 
Contemporary molecular biopolitics has in fact already taken many forms. From the 
inauguration of a ‘biomedical mode of reproduction’ brought about by genetic 
biotechnologies (Thompson 2005), to the explosion of a new regulatory and ‘technological 
zone’ for stem cell and tissue engineering technologies in the EU (Faulkner 2009), the style of 
thought of molecular biologists is nowadays pervasive in regulating political action and agency 
as to what counts as ‘health’, ‘disease’ and ‘illness’, as well as with regard to the roles and 
expectations of citizens as political subjects. Within this moving and changing landscape, what 
my thesis emphasizes is that a synergy may be established between the ways policy-makers and 
citizens make sense of their powers and responsibilities for health both in terms of 
empowerment and in the language of epigenetics. The opportunity that my work may open up 
is to trigger the development of a perspective on patient citizenship, which combines to the 
contestation of a given interpretation of empowerment an understanding of what counts as 
social inequalities, morbidities, and lifestyle-related illnesses imbued with the language of 
molecular epigenetics. This is, in essence, the biological politics that is stamped in the pages of 
this work. 
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